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Abstract
As the European Commission muscled in the national configuration and domestic 
actors engaged with the EU institutions, the purpose of this dissertation is to explore 
the impact of Europeanisation on the state corporatist arrangement encompassing the 
Greek state and the shipowners. The central argument is that although there is 
evidence of the reshaping of the relations between the state and Greek shipowners, the 
direction of change varies across industry segments and is contingent on four 
conditions. Firstly, it is contingent on the nature of the Greek state and its ability to 
exercise ‘integrated leadership’. Secondly, the domestic actors recognise and act upon 
the incongruence between EU initiatives and existing domestic or international 
policies. Thirdly, the shipowners possess the capacity to exit the domestic 
configuration through capital mobility. Fourthly, alongside the shipowners, the 
presence of influential formal or factual veto points in the domestic institutional 
arrangement. The argument made is sustained through the analysis of the impact of 
Europeanisation on the relations between the Greek state and shipowners in two case 
studies. The first case study is devoted to ocean-going shipping and the growing EU 
competence in maritime safety regulation, concentrating on the accelerated phasing- 
out of single-hull tankers and the constitution of criminal sanctions for ship-source 
pollution. The Greek ocean-going shipowners in consultation with the incumbent 
Greek governments mobilized at every possible level to halt or amend the EU 
initiatives. As a result, there is evidence of the reinforcement of state corporatism 
which is contingent on the unitary nature of the Greek state, the absence of integrated 
leadership, the incompatibility between EU and international policies, the capital 
mobility and ensuing structural power of ocean-going shipowners and the weakness 
of the other formal or factual veto points in the domestic political process. The second 
case study concentrates on the coastal shipping sector and EU measures to abolish the 
cabotage trades across the member states. The coastal shipowners, the incumbent 
Greek governments and the island communities engaged politically with the EU 
institutions in advancing their interests. In this instance, there is evidence of the 
loosening of the state corporatist arrangement between the Greek state and the coastal 
shipowners. In spite of the unitary nature of the state, the lack of ‘integrated 
leadership’ and the incongruence between the EU and domestic policies, the coastal 
shipowners were more embedded at the national level and contended with an 
influential factual veto point in the form of the island communities.
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I am grateful to my supervisors Professor Kevin Featherstone and 
Professor Klaus H. Goetz for their guidance, attentiveness and inspiration throughout 
my graduate studies at the London School of Economics.
I am indebted to the Bodossakis Foundation for generously funding my research and 
affording me the opportunity to study in depth the impact of European Union 
integration on Greek politics and the shipping industry.
I would like to express my gratitude to several colleagues from the European Institute 
and the broader LSE community for providing a stimulating environment and their 
constructive criticism to the many drafts that preceded the final version of this 
dissertation.
Last but not least, I am thankful to Tata for her emotional support, humour and 
patience and to my parents for their unwavering love and encouragement.
Michael J. Romanos 
January 31, 2008
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction............................................................................................10
1.1: Setting the Scene........................................................................................................10
1.2 Analytical Framework and Central Argument...................................................... 18
1.3: Structure of Thesis.................................................................................................... 22
Part I: Europeanisation, the Greek state and the Shipowners
Chapter 2: Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework........................ 28
2.1 Conceptualizing change: Europeanisation and State-Business Relations.............29
2.1.1 Defining Europeanisation.............................................................................. 29
2.1.2 European Integration and Business Associability....................................... 35
2.2 Analytical Framework...............................................................................................45
2.3 Methodology...............................................................................................................49
2.4 Europeanisation, Business Associability and Domestic Impact.............................52
Chapter 3: Europeanisation, the IMO and organized shipping........................... 55
3.1 The IMO and International Maritime Regulation....................................................56
3.2 The Evolution of the Common Maritime Transport Policy.................................64
3.3 EU Politics, Organised Shipping and the Greek shipowners.................................74
3.4 Europeanisation, the IMO and Organised Shipping................................................86
Chapter 4: The Greek Shipowners and Domestic State-Business Relations 90
4.1 The Weakness of the Greek State............................................................................ 92
4.2 The Autonomy of Business Interests...................................................................... 102
4.3 State-Business Relations.......................................................................................... 113
4.4 State Corporatism, the Greek state and Shipowners..............................................124
6P art II: Continuity and change: Negotiating the CMTP
Chapter 5: The Liberalisation of the Greek Coastal Shipping M arket.............. 128
5.1 From the Post-War Year to 2001.............................................................................131
5.1.1 The Immediate Post-War Years.................................................................. 131
5.1.2 The Heraklion Accident...............................................................................134
5.1.3 The Regulatory Framework........................................................................ 138
5.2 Negotiating the EU Maritime Cabotage Trades (1986 -  1992)............................ 144
5.3 Abolishing Cabotage................................................................................................ 153
5.3.1 Industry Consolidation and Fleet Modernization.....................................153
5.3.1.1 The Adriatic Sea Corridor..............................................................153
5.3.1.2 The Greek Coastal Transport Market............................................156
5.3.2 Reforming the ‘System of Licenses’...........................................................160
5.4 Express Samina and the Acceleration of Reform.................................................. 167
5.5 January 2004 and the Shortage of Vessels..............................................................176
5.6 Coastal Shipping, Greek politics and the European Union..................................190
Chapter 6: Greek Shipping, Maritime Safety and the European Union........... 198
6.1 Ocean-going shipping and the Greek economy..................................................... 201
6.2 International Regulation of Maritime Safety......................................................... 206
6.2.1 MARPOL and Ship-Source Pollution........................................................ 207
6.2.2 The Exxon Valdez and the Phasing-Out of Single-Hull Tankers.............. 209
6.3 The Phasing-Out of Single-Hull Tankers.................................................................212
6.3.1 The Erika Accident...................................................................................... 213
6.3.2 The Prestige Accident................................................................................. 226
6.4 The Directive on Ship-Source Pollution..................................................................241
6.5 Ocean-going Shipping, the Greek State and the European Union.........................257
Chapter 7: Discussion of Empirical Findings........................................................ 266
Chapter 8: Conclusion..............................................................................................278
Bibliography and Interviewees................................................................................ 283
List of Tables and Figures
Table 1: Fee Contribution IMO Budget..........................................................................66
Table 2: Timetable for adoption of IMO regulations.....................................................68
Table 3: Industry Associations and Greek Shipowners.................................................93
Table 4: State -  Shipowners Interdependence..............................................................136
Table 5: Revised MARPOL Regulation 13G (MEPC April 2001)............................236
Table 6: Revised Phasing-out Timetable (July 2003/Sept. 2005)..............................251
8Figure 1: YEN Organisation Chart................................................................................106
Figure 2: Greek Ferry Passenger Traffic (1997 -  2005)..............................................141
Figure 3: Greek Ferry Passenger Traffic per route (1995)..........................................142
Figure 4: Greek Ferry Market Share (passenger traffic 2006)................................... 170
Figure 5: Greek Ferry Fleet Development and Age Profile (2000 -2006)................ 172
Figure 6: History of Tanker Freight Rates.................................................................. 214
Figure 7: Greek-owned Fleet (No. of vessels)............................................................. 216
Figure 8: Greek-owned Fleet (Dwt)............................................................................. 216
Figure 9: World Bulk Fleet by Top 10 Flags (Dwt, 2006)........................................ 218
Figure 10: Foreign Exchange Earnings from Shipping ($US Millions)................... 219
Figure 11: Timeline of MARPOL revisions............................................................... 254
9
10
Chapter 1
11
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Setting the Scene
On the thirteenth of May 2004, at the London headquarters of the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO), the Greek Minister of Mercantile Marine met 
simultaneously with the IMO General Secretary and the Greek Shipping Cooperation 
Committee (GSCC) to discuss the expanding EU competence in the regulation of 
maritime transport. In Athens, the Union of Greek Shipowners (UGS) was in contact 
with Greek MEPs to ensure that their interests were represented at the Transport 
Committee of the EU Parliament. The European Commission was pushing ahead 
with controversial measures on the designation of criminal sanctions for ship-source 
pollution. These initiatives were opposed by the Greek shipowners and interpreted as 
incompatible with existing international maritime safety legislation. By contrast, 
thirty-five MPs from the main Greek opposition party sent a letter criticising the 
government of undermining the reputation of country by not siding with the other EU 
members during the Council of Transport Ministers meeting on ship-source pollution.
On the sixteenth of December 2004 the island prefectures of the Dodecanese, 
Cyclades, Lesvos, Samos and Chios organised a large demonstration outside the 
Ministry of Merchant Marine in Piraeus. The island communities were calling for 
regular and affordable sea transport services and the recognition by the EU of their 
exceptional circumstances. Concurrently, the Minister for the Aegean and Island 
Policy was attending an informal Council of Ministers in Rotterdam presenting 
evidence on the economic decline of the island communities. The Minister put 
forward the proposal that coastal transport should be partially financed from EU
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funds. Back in Greece, the government was under criticism by the opposition party 
for conducting secret negotiations with the industry associations of the coastal 
shipowners, punishing the island communities that had not voted for the government 
in the most recent elections. Yet, the coastal shipowners were publicly commending 
the European Commission for sending a letter of formal notice to the Greek 
government for having not completed the liberalisation of the domestic market.
Indeed, the starting point of this dissertation is to analyse the impact of the expanding 
EU competence in maritime transport regulation on the relations between the Greek 
state and the shipowners. As the EU muscles in the domestic configuration and 
domestic actors engage with the EU institutions, the concept of Europeanisation is 
employed to interpret the ensuing political process. In compiling the statistics of the 
Kingdom of Greece in 1868, Demetrius Bikelas noted that, “...the extensive coast of 
Greece, her position in the Mediterranean, and the natural aptitude of her inhabitants 
for the sea, explain the development of her mercantile navy” (Bikelas 1868: 282). The 
continuing significance of the shipping industry for the Greek economy is manifested 
in the ocean-going and coastal shipping segments. Greek ocean-going shipowners 
control the largest fleet worldwide of dry bulk and tanker ships comprising 3,338 
vessels and accounting for 17.1 percent of world tonnage (in dwt) (Lloyd’s Register -  
Fairplay March 2006, UGS Annual Report 2004 -  05). Accordingly, merchant 
shipping makes a substantial contribution to the Greek national economy, generating 
nearly five percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and representing a source 
of employment, technology transfer and investments in other sectors such as energy, 
banking, insurance and tourism. The prominent position of Greek ocean-going 
shipping is attributed to the family-based structure of shipping companies, clan-like
networks extending into the industry and the state corporatist relations between the 
Greek state and ocean-going shipowners (Lavdas 2005, Stefanidis and 
Mourdoukoutas 2005, Harlaftis and Theotokas 2004, Lavdas 1997, Harlaftis 1996, 
Harlaftis 1993, Legg 1969). This arrangement is embedded within an international 
industry, underpinned by self regulation, unfettered competition and internationally 
agreed rules and standards. (Kumar and Hoffman 2002, Haralambides 1998, Branch 
1996, Yannopoulos 1989, Farthing 1987). The International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) provides the institutional forum for the negotiation and approval of these 
international rules and regulations. (Mankabady 1986, Mankabady 1984, Juda 1977). 
Greece maintains an influential position within the IMO which is manifested in the 
country’s membership in the IMO Council, the provision of technical expertise and 
knowledge and the active attendance in sub-committee and committee meetings. 
Certainly, this may be the sole field of international policy-making that is 
characterised by Greece’s leading involvement in the negotiation process and shaping 
of policy outcomes.
In parallel, coastal shipping has developed as a separate yet integral segment due to 
Greece’s archipelagic geography. The Greek coastal shipowners were responsible for 
the transportation of the largest number of ferry passengers in the EU for 2004 and 
thus contributing to the social cohesion and territorial integrity of the 124 inhabited 
islands with the Greek mainland (ESPO National Statistics 2004). Alongside family 
operations, since the 1970s coastal shipping consisted of ‘people-based’ companies 
that maintained close ties with their native islands. By contrast to the free competition 
principles underpinning ocean-going shipping, coastal shipping in Greece has been a 
cabotage trade, reserving the provision of transport services to passenger ferries
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flying the Greek flag. The ‘system of licenses’ was setup to prevent ‘destructive 
competition’ between coastal shipping companies and ‘predatory pricing’ against 
passengers (Steer Davies Gleave 2005, Giannopoulos and Aifandopulou-Klimis 2004, 
Lekakou 2002, OECD 2000, Psaraftis 1996, Sturmey, Panagakos and Psaraftis 1994). 
As part of this arrangement, the Ministry of Mercantile Marine (YEN) maintained 
considerable discretion in issuing licenses to coastal shipowners for servicing 
specified routes over the entire economic life of the vessel, which could extend well 
over thirty years. A state corporatist arrangement emerged resting on the longstanding 
ties between YEN, the coastal shipowners that held the licences and island 
communities. This resulted in high institutional barriers of market entry that stifled 
competition and shaped a coastal shipping segment that was characterised by old 
passenger ferries, unreliable services and a poor safety record (Psaraftis 2002, 
Lekakou, Papandreou and Stergiopulos 2002, Psaraftis 1996).
Within the context of extensive state involvement in the economy, regime 
discontinuities in twentieth century Greek politics spawned a patchwork of state- 
business relations across industry sectors that was interpreted as ‘disjointed 
corporatism’ (Lavdas 2005, Molina and Rhodes 2002: 308, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, 
Lavdas 1997). Given the overarching patterns of ‘disjointed corporatism’, it was 
maintained that the relations between the state and Greek shipowners took the form of 
state corporatism. This is manifested in the monopolistic representation, hierarchical 
coordination and formal recognition of shipowner associations and in their regular 
interaction with the Greek state and consultation prior to legislative deliberation 
(Schmitter and Grote 1997, Wilson 1990, Cohen and Pavoncello 1987, Schmitter 
1977). The Union of Greek Shipowners (UGS) and the Union of Coastal Shipowners
(EEA) are the peak associations in the ocean-going and coastal shipping segments, 
involved in the negotiation of collective wage agreements with seafarers. In tandem, 
the Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee (GSCC) articulates the interests of the 
Greek shipowners located in London whilst the Greek Shipowners Association for 
Passengers Ships (EEEP) and the Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Shipowners Union 
(EEMFP) represent respectively shipowners on international passenger routes and 
shortsea cargo shipowners. The shipowner associations maintain informal and formal 
access to the incumbent Greek government, YEN and MPs and their participation in 
the consultation on draft legislation is institutionalised through the National Shipping 
Policy Council (NSPC), the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping (HCS) and the Council of 
Coastal Transport (CCT). Notably, this state corporatist arrangement is not shaped by 
the domination of the state as the theorists of corporatism would anticipate (Schmitter 
and Grote 1997, Schmitter 1979, Schmitter 1977). Rather, this arrangement is 
determined by the autonomy and capital mobility of the Greek shipowners (Lavdas 
2005, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Lavdas 1997, Aspinwall 1995, Strange 1976). The 
ocean-going shipowners are in a position to exercise structural power, as they hold 
the option to withdraw vessels from the Greek registry and relocate their operations to 
other international maritime centres (Aspinwall 1998, Gill 1995, Hirschman 1970).
Against this background and since the mid-1980s the EU rapidly expanded its 
presence in the regulation of the commercial and safety aspects of maritime transport. 
This expansion was encouraged by landmark European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
rulings, the declining competitiveness of the European Community (EC) merchant 
fleet and successive waves of enlargement, especially the accessions of the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Cyprus and Malta (Selkou and Roe 2004, Pallis 2002,
Paixao and Marlow 2001, Kiriazidis 1994, Bredima-Savopoulou and Tzoannos 1990, 
Pantelidis 1979). In combining the commercial and safety aspects of maritime 
transport, it was advanced that open competition and the elimination of substandard 
shipping would enhance the competitive position of EU flagged shipping. Regarding 
the IMO, the European Commission recognised the primacy of the international level, 
by designing measures that would buttress the implementation and enforcement of 
internationally accepted standards (CEC Com 66/93, CEC Com 266/89, CEC Com 
90/85). Nonetheless, in the 1996 maritime strategy, the European Commission 
questioned the status quo by proposing measures that sought to address the 
weaknesses of the IMO and departed from existing international standards 
(Mitropoulos 1998, CEC Com 81/96). Moreover, following the high-profile maritime 
accidents of the Erika in 1999 and the Prestige in 2002, the European Commission 
put forward measures that went beyond international maritime safety standards. 
Amongst the proposals, the accelerated phasing-out of single-hull tankers and the 
criminal sanctions for ship-source pollution were strongly opposed by the Greek 
government and the ocean-going shipowners. In influencing the policy-making 
process at the EU level, there was extensive consultation and coordination between 
the incumbent governments and the industry associations of the ocean-going 
shipowners. The European Commission was confronted with a constellation of formal 
and factual veto points, including the Greek government, the UGS, GSCC and a 
plethora of international shipping associations. The Greek shipowners mobilized at 
the national and European levels, utilising every access point in seeking to favourably 
shape the EU policy-making process.
Alongside measures affecting ocean-going shipping, the EU sought to reform the 
domestic coastal trades within member states. Indeed, as part of the broader project of 
the completion of the single market, the European Commission proposed the abolition 
of EU member state cabotage trades in 1986. In the ensuing negotiations the 
opposition of the Greek government and coastal shipowners culminated in a political 
compromise that took the form of Regulation 3577/92. Although the Regulation 
stipulated the liberalisation of domestic coastal shipping across the EU, a derogation 
period of eleven years was accepted for Greece. Given the importance of coastal 
shipping for the social cohesion of the country, it was argued that this period would 
allow coastal shipowners to prepare for the arrival of foreign competition. The 
anticipated opening of the market in January 2004 instigated economic and 
institutional changes to the Greek coastal shipping market. Nevertheless, even after 
the advent of the formal deadline the terms of liberalisation remained under 
negotiation between the European Commission, the EEA, EEEP, YEN and the island 
communities.
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the impact of the expanding EU 
competence in maritime transport regulation on the relations between the Greek state 
and the shipowners. As the EU muscles in the domestic configuration and domestic 
actors engage with the EU institutions, the concept of Europeanisation is employed to 
capture the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’ effects on the relations between the Greek 
state and shipowners. In accordance with several examinations of the Europeanisation 
of state-society relations in Greece, it would be anticipated that that EU involvement 
in maritime transport regulation would loosen the state corporatist arrangement 
between the Greek state and the shipowners (Pelagidis 2005, Mouzelis and
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Pagoulatos 2002, Morlino 2002, Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998, Ioakimidis 1996, 
Diamandouros 1994). It is maintained that especially in the southern EU member 
states, the ties between the state and business are weakened, as the former represent 
the interests of other constituencies such as the general public or environmentalists, 
whilst the latter benefit from direct interaction with the EU institutions. Several 
commentators argue that Europeanisation should entail the retreat of the Greek state 
and parties, releasing political space for a variety of interest groups, including 
business interests (Sotiropoulos 2004, Kazakos 2004, Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, 
Morlino 2002, Paraskevopoulos 2001, Ioakimidis 1996, Diamandouros 1994). 
Illustratively, it was claimed that “... Europeanisation has been a powerful force for 
redefining the role, functions and powers of the state and ... the rebalancing of 
powers and a redefinition of boundaries between the state and society in favour of the 
latter. The state has certainly lost its unchallenged ability to impose its grip upon 
society and control the economy” (Ioakimidis 1999).
The empirical evidence that is presented in this dissertation indicates that 
Europeanization has contributed to the reshaping of the relations between the state 
and shipowners. Nevertheless, the direction of this change does not axiomatically 
entail the weakening of the state corporatist configuration. This observation is 
sustained through the analysis of the impact of Europeanisation on the relations 
between the Greek state and shipowners in two case studies. The first case study 
corresponds to the impact of the EU initiatives seeking the opening of the domestic 
cabotage trades. Resting on the adoption of Regulation 3577/92 as a political 
compromise, the terms of liberalisation are under negotiation between the European 
Commission, the coastal shipowners, YEN and the island communities. The
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regulatory framework that underpinned the close ties between the Greek state and the 
coastal shipowners is being replaced by a more transparent arrangement that 
encourages market competition and institutionalises the participation of the island 
communities in the policy-making process. The second case study is related to the 
impact of the expansion of EU competence in the regulation of maritime transport 
safety on the relations between the Greek state and ocean-going shipowners. In 
particular, attention is drawn to the phasing-out of single-hull tankers and the ship- 
source pollution measures that were vehemently opposed by the national, European 
and international industry associations of the ocean-going shipowners. In this 
instance, there is evidence of the reinforcement of the state corporatist arrangement 
encompassing the Greek state and the ocean-going shipowners.
It would appear that Europeanisation contributes to opposing directions of political 
change by loosening the relations between the Greek state and shipowners in coastal 
shipping, whilst reinforcing state corporatism in ocean-going shipping. This 
contradictory process is in line with a growing consensus in the theoretical literature 
that Europeanisation is accompanied by asymmetry and fragmentation as the 
domestic impact varies across sectors and institutions (Featherstone 2005, 
Featherstone and Kazamias 2001, Featherstone 1998). Therefore, building on this 
interpretation, the purpose of the dissertation is to identify and analyse the conditions 
that account for the observed differentiation in the domestic impact of 
Europeanisation on the two segments of the Greek shipping industry.
In addition, the dissertation seeks to make an empirical contribution by providing an 
analysis of the relations between the state and the Greek shipowners, particularly in
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the post-authoritarian years of Greek politics. In spite of the importance of the 
shipping industry to the Greek economy, the relations between the state and 
shipowners have not received attention from political scientists. Certainly, apart from 
scattered references claiming that “...business power vis-a-vis the state has been 
exceptional” or that shipping enjoys “.. .unlimited access” to the Greek government, 
exisiting research on the political dimension of Greek shipping is limited (Lavdas 
2005, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Lavdas 1997, Harlaftis 1996, Harlaftis 1995, Harlaftis 
1993, Milios and Ioakeimoglou 1991, Legg 1979).
1.2 Analytical Framework and Central Argument
The proposed framework is intended to provide a conceptualisation encompassing the 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ effects of Europeanisation on the domestic relations 
between the Greek state and shipowners. Inductive and deductive approaches were 
employed in setting up the analytical framework. The focus on the differentiated 
impact of Europeanisation on the domestic relations between the Greek state and 
shipowners was inductively identified from empirical data on the evolution of state 
corporatist relations in the Greek shipping industry. Yet, identifying the conditions 
underpinning this differentiation required continuous shifting between the inductive 
and deductive perspectives. Resting on an integrative understanding of institutions 
and political change, the framework draws from institutionalism in analysing the ‘top- 
down’ effects and emphasizes agency in the interpretation of the ‘bottom-up’ 
dynamics of the Europeanisation of the Greek domestic configuration (Schmidt and 
Radaelli 2004, Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003, Checkel and Moravcsik 2001).
In analysing the ‘top-down’ impact of Europeanisation on domestic politics, a 
framework consisting of three levels is put forward (Heritier and Knill 2001, Knill 
2001, Heritier and Knill 2000). The first level corresponds to the degree of 
congruence between the EU and domestic policies in a particular sector. Although 
incongruence between the two levels may generate adaptation pressures, this does not 
automatically entail domestic change. Rather, the occurrence of change is contingent 
on the domestic ‘reform capacity’ which is defined as the provision of ‘integrated 
political leadership’ by the state and the number of formal and factual veto points that 
are opposed to reform (Heritier and Knill 2001, Knill 2001 Heritier and Knill 2000).
At the same time, the analytical framework emphasises agency in the interpretation of 
the ‘bottom-up’ dynamics of Europeanisation on the domestic relations between the 
Greek state and shipowners. It is recognised that the political engagement of domestic 
actors at the EU level has repercussions on the domestic distribution of power and the 
institutional configuration (Radaelli 2004, Jacquot and Woll 2003a, Jacquot and Woll 
2003b, Hennis 2001: 83). The ‘top-down’ domestic redistribution of opportunities 
must be recognised and acted upon by domestic actors, in other words, ‘there is no 
impact without usage’ (Radaelli 2004, Jacquot and Woll 2003a, Irondelle 2003: 212).
Resting on this analytical framework, the main argument of this dissertation is that 
the direction of domestic political change differs across industry segments and is 
contingent on four conditions. Firstly, the nature of the Greek state and its ability to 
exercise ‘integrated leadership’. Secondly, domestic actors recognising and acting 
upon the incompatibility between the EU measures and existing domestic or 
international policies. Thirdly, the shipowners’ capacity to exit the domestic
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configuration through capital mobility. Fourthly, aside from the shipowners, the 
presence of competing formal or factual veto points in the domestic institutional 
arrangement.
The analytical framework is applied to a single country case study concentrating on 
the shipping industry in Greece. As the framework examines a political process 
unfolding across the international, European and domestic levels, the single country 
case study offers opportunities for data collection and ‘measurement refinement’ that 
would not be possible in cross-national case studies (Golden 2005). This form of 
‘thick description’ allows for the testing and inspection of the differentiated domestic 
impact of Europeanization as theorised in the respective literature (Landman 2003, 
Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 2005). In addition, the two policy sectors of 
ocean-going and coastal shipping are characterised by state corporatism and are 
exposed to the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ Europeanisation dynamics, whilst 
concurrently were subject to dissimilar conditions and forces. The coastal shipowners 
are more embedded at the national level whilst the ocean-going shipowners operate in 
an international industry.
The first case study on the abolition of the domestic cabotage trades in coastal 
shipping commences in 1985 with the issuance by the European Commission of the 
first package of proposals on maritime transport (CEC Com 90/85). The Greek 
coastal shipowners and YEN opposed the European Commission proposals and in the 
ensuing negotiations a political compromise was reached in 1992 that took the form 
of regulation 3577/92. Acknowledging the importance of coastal shipping in ensuring 
the social cohesion and territorial integrity of Greece, there was a derogation period
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of eleven years culminating in January 2004. The case study covers the period until 
March 2006 as in spite of the advent of the formal deadline, the terms of liberalisation 
remain under negotiation between the coastal shipowners, YEN and the island 
communities.
The second case study begins in December 1999 with the maritime accident of the 
single-hull tanker Erika. In seeking to address the weaknesses of the international 
maritime safety framework, the European Commission pursued the accelerated 
phasing-out of single-hull tankers and the designation of criminal sanctions for ship- 
source pollution (CEC Com 142/00, CEC Com 105/03). A second maritime accident 
involving the single-hull tanker Prestige in November 2002 instigated an even more 
stringent phasing-out timetable for single-hull tankers by the European Commission 
(CEC Com 681/02). These were vehemently opposed by the Greek ocean-going 
shipowners who mobilised at the national and EU levels with the purpose of blocking 
or amending the European Commission proposals. The negotiations culminated in the 
adoption of Regulation 417/02 accelerating the phasing-out of single-hull tankers and 
Directive 35/05 on ship-source pollution and the introduction of sanctions, including 
criminal sanctions for pollution offences. The case study covers this period until 
December 2005 with the formal request for judicial review of Directive 35/05 at the 
High Court in London by a coalition of Greek and international shipping associations.
1.3 Structure of Thesis
Chapter Two is devoted to an analysis of the theoretical approaches informing the 
analytical framework of this dissertation. The chapter commences with an 
examination of the concept of Europeanisation through the theoretical perspectives of 
intergovemmentalism, neofunctionalism and multi-level governance. Although 
offering divergent accounts of the impact of European integration on the role of state, 
these approaches share an emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ dynamics. In parallel to the 
acceleration of European integration in the mid-1980s, there was increasing interest in 
the ‘top-down’ effects of Europeanisation. The evolution of the respective literature 
culminated in the designation of Europeanisation as an interactive process, 
encompassing ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ effects. Accordingly, the interrelations 
between European integration and business associability are examined as domestic 
actors utilised the direct, national association and European association routes in 
seeking to influence EU policy-making. In conjunction, there was evidence of the 
‘top-down’ impact of Europeanisation on domestic business associations in Southern 
European countries, manifested in the loosening of state-business relations and the 
increasing autonomy of business interests. The theoretical discussion allows for the 
analytical framework to take shape and the identification of four conditions that 
account for the differentiated domestic impact of Europeanisation.
Chapter Three The purpose of this chapter is to establish the empirical background 
regarding international maritime transport policy-making. Indeed, in understanding 
the expansion of EU competence in maritime transport, particularly in the ocean­
going sector, an investigation into the evolution of international maritime transport
regulation is required. The International Maritime Organisation is the central 
institutional forum for the negotiation and adoption of international maritime safety 
standards. Within this institutional arrangement, Greece is in a position to shape and 
influence the negotiating process and an attempt to explain this prominence is made. 
Amongst other factors, attention is drawn to Greece’s participation in the IMO 
Council, the provision of technical expertise and active attendance of IMO internal 
meetings. However, over the years in spite of the successes of the IMO, several 
shortcomings became evident in the form of inconsistent implementation, feeble 
enforcement of internationally accepted legislation, the slow decision-making process 
of the IMO and the prevalence of lowest common denominator outcomes. The 
chapter goes on to demonstrated how the EU sought to utilise the IMO’s weaknesses 
in pursuing measures beyond the international maritime safety regime, questioning 
the exclusivity of the IMO on such issues. Against this international background the 
evolving role of the European Union is interpreted. Indeed, the origins and 
development of the Common Maritime Transport Policy are presented. In response to 
the increasing presence of the EU in maritime transport regulation, international and 
European shipowner associations actively engaged with the EU institutions in seeking 
to influence legislation. The influential position of the Greek shipowners in these 
associations is explored and attributed to their sizeable membership, supply of 
technical expertise and industry knowledge and active participation in the internal 
workings and formulation of policy positions.
Chapter Four concentrates on the development of the relations between the Greek 
state and the shipowners, underpinned by a state corporatist arrangement. It is argued 
that regime discontinuities in twentieth century Greek politics spawned a patchwork
of state-business relations, characterised by ‘disjointed corporatism’. Despite the 
extensive presence of the state in the regulation of the Greek economy, the Greek 
state is theorised as weak and susceptible to party politics. The greater organisational 
resources, legitimacy and internal cohesiveness of political parties underpinned the 
instrumentalization of the state for the distribution of jobs and favours to party 
loyalists. As part of the state configuration, YEN was established in recognition of the 
importance of shipping for the Greek economy. Despite the penetration of YEN by 
party politics, national policies on ocean-going and coastal shipping were consistent 
throughout the post-authoritarian period. Subsequently, attention is drawn to the 
forms of collective organisation and political influence of business interests. It is 
argued that the exisiting literature on Greek state-society relations downplays the 
autonomy of business interests. The primary industry associations in the ocean-going 
and coastal shipping segments are presented in analysing their autonomy vis-k-vis the 
state and political parties. Resting on the interpretations of a weak state and 
autonomous shipowner interests, the chapter turns to the elaboration of their relations. 
It is maintained that the state corporatist interaction of the Greek state and shipowners 
was manifested in monopolistic representation, hierarchical coordination, formal 
recognition, regular interaction and consultation prior to legislative deliberation. In 
converse to the expectations of the theorists of corporatism, the emergence of state 
corporatism in shipping is attributed to the stmctural power of the shipowners and not 
the state domination of the sector.
Chapter Five is dedicated to the first empirical case study on the liberalisation of the 
domestic cabotage trades in Greek coastal shipping. The chapter begins with the 
historical overview of the evolution of Greek coastal shipping and the examination of
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the regulatory framework comprising cabotage reservations and the ‘system of 
licenses’. The primary objectives of this arrangement were preventing ‘catastrophic 
competition’ between coastal shipowners, protecting passengers from ‘predatory 
pricing’ and ensuring the social cohesion and territorial integrity of the inhabited 
islands with the Greek mainland. Nonetheless, as part of the first maritime transport 
package of measures in 1986, the European Commission proposed the abolition of 
cabotage restrictions within the EU member states. There proposals were vehemently 
opposed by the coastal shipowner associations, YEN and island communities and the 
ensuing negotiations culminated in the adoption of Regulation 3577/92, stipulating a 
derogation period of eleven years for the opening of the domestic cabotage trades. 
The chapter continues by describing the ensuing changes in the structure of Greek 
coastal shipping through industry consolidation, market restructuring and fleet 
renewal was accompanied by the reshaping of the internal composition of coastal 
shipowner associations and the reconfiguration of formal and factual veto points. In 
spite of the completion of the derogation period, the terms of liberalisation remain 
under negotiation between the European Commission, coastal shipowners, YEN and 
the island communities. Yet, there is evidence of the loosening of the state corporatist 
arrangement between the state and the coastal shipowners, whilst the political 
influence of the island communities became formalised in the institutional 
framework.
Chapter Six involves the second case study on the expansion of EU competence in 
maritime safety regulation and especially the accelerated phasing-out of single-hull 
tankers and the constitution of criminal sanctions for ship-source pollution. Initially, 
the exisiting international legislation and standards on the phasing-out of single-hull
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tankers and ship-source pollution are examined. Triggered by two high-profile 
maritime accidents with single-hull tankers in the EU waters, the European 
Commission put forward a set of proposals that went beyond international legislation 
and questioned the primacy of the international level in the regulation of maritime 
transport safety and marine pollution prevention. The Greek shipowner associations 
were in opposition to the principle of adopting regional measures as well as the 
content of the European Commission proposals. In the negotiations that followed 
there is evidence of the political engagement of the Greek shipowners with the EU 
institutions through the direct, national association and European association routes. 
EU material and immaterial resources were employed across different stages of the 
policy-making cycle in seeking the favourable shaping of legislation. In tandem, there 
was considerable consultation and coordination with the Greek government as an 
access point to the Council of Ministers. By contrast to the coastal shipping case, the 
domestic impact of Europeanisation results in the reinforcement of the state 
corporatist arrangement between the Greek state and the ocean-going shipowners.
Chapter Six serves as a discussion of the findings in the two preceding empirical case 
studies. The empirical evidence gathered from the ocean-going and coastal shipping 
segments is compared and related to the analytical framework that was articulated in 
Chapter Two. This leads on to Chapter Seven which outlines the concluding remarks 
of the dissertation. The chapter seeks to draw attention to broader observations 
stemming from the findings of this dissertation and offer suggestions for future 
research in relation to the differentiated domestic impact of Europeanisation and 
potential new avenues of investigation in Greek comparative politics.
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Chapter 2
Chapter 2: Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical background and methodology 
underpinning the empirical findings and analytical framework of this dissertation. The 
concept of Europeanisation is employed in linking the EU political process with 
domestic change at the member state level. The chapter commences with an overview 
of the evolution of the concept of Europeanisation as it was interpreted by the 
theoretical strands of neofunctionalism, intergovemmentalism and multi-level 
governance. Despite differences in the analysis of European integration and the role 
of the state, these approaches shared a bottom-up perspective. As the pace of 
European integration intensified in the mid-1980s, growing interrelations between 
European integration and business associability were observed. With the evolution of 
the literature, there was increasing agreement that Europeanisation denotes an 
interactive process involving ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ dynamics attention was 
drawn to the ‘top-down’ effects of EU policy-making. Subsequently, the chapter turns 
to lobbying efforts of domestic actors in influencing the EU policy-making process. 
This leads on to a discussion of the growing evidence of the ‘top-down’ impact of 
European integration on state-business relations. Emphasis is placed to the diverging 
interpretations of the domestic impact of Europeanisation on the Southern EU 
member states.
2.1 Conceptualising Change: Europeanisation and Business Associability
2.1.1 Defining Europeanisation
In a burgeoning literature, Europeanisation has had decidedly contested 
interpretations. It has been employed • to signify European integration, political 
unification, policy transfer mechanisms between European states, longitudinal 
historical processes, transnational cultural diffusion, external boundary shifts and the 
export of institutions to non-EU states (Featherstone 2003, Goldsmith 2003, Page 
2003, Anderson 2002, Bulmer and Burch 2001, Knill 2001, Bulmer and Burch 1998). 
Nevertheless, in recent years there is growing consensus that Europeanisation denotes 
the domestic impact of European integration (Radaelli 2004, Featherstone 2003, 
Olsen 2002, Green-Cowles, Risse and Caporaso 2001, Goetz and Hix 2000).
The avant-garde authors of European studies concentrated on the dynamics of 
European integration and the unfolding of the political process at the European level. 
Emphasis was placed on the formation of a European state that would supplant or 
amalgamate the individual member states. Indeed, there was little interest in the 
domestic impact of European integration, partly reflecting the limited discretion and 
extent of the EU in formulating policies and legislation. The discussion followed three 
theoretical strands, namely intergovemmentalism, neo-functionalism and multilevel 
governance. In spite of diverging predictions, all three approaches shared a ‘bottom- 
up’ interpretation of European integration that entailed the formation of a political 
community at the European level by the member states. By contrast, the impact of 
European integration on domestic institutional configurations was not a part of the 
research agenda.
Proponents of intergovemmentalism maintained that European integration was 
strengthening the nation state. Growing interdependence at the international level 
required resources that were beyond the capacities of individual states. Through 
regional integration, the problem-solving capacity as well as the legitimacy of the 
member states would be buttressed (Moravcsik 1994: 63). In tandem, the state 
remained the protagonist at the European level and as a gatekeeper it held the 
initiative in the allocation of resources vis-a-vis domestic actors (Pollack 2001: 226). 
In converse, according to the neo-functionalist approach, European integration was 
eroding the state. The expansion of EU competencies was providing domestic actors 
with opportunities to circumvent national governments in the formulation of policies. 
At the same time, the transfer of competencies and resources spawned the formation 
of interest groups at the European level. The ensuing direct linkages between 
domestic and transnational actors would underpin the emergence of a European 
political community (Pentland 1973: 101, Haas 1972: 92, Haas 1958: 16). 
Representing a moderate position, the Multi-Level Governance perspective claimed 
neither the reinforcement nor the enfeeblement of the state. It was advanced that the 
state was undergoing a process of transformation, as the European, national and sub­
national levels were becoming intertwined and eventually indistinguishable (Marks 
and Hooghe, 2004: 16 -  22).
However, with European integration regaining momentum in the 1980s, the research 
programme was recast. Instead of emphasizing the integration of states at the 
European level, the analytical focus was reversed, suggesting that the expansion of 
EU competence can alter domestic policies, politics and polities. Within this strand of 
‘top-down’ theorizing, two generations of authors can be discerned. The fust
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generation of theorists of Europeanisation was preoccupied with the ‘top-down’ 
domestic impact of European integration (Dyson and Goetz 2003: 15, Bache 2003: 6 
-  7). The differentiated nature of this impact was recognized, as it variegated across 
time, member states, regions and policy areas (Gamble and Buller 2002: 19). The 
links between European and domestic levels were not unmediated, as EU induced 
pressures were ‘refracted’ by differentiated domestic conditions. According to one 
account, this resulted in ‘...domestic adaptation with national colours’ (Risse, Green 
Cowles and Caporaso 2001). Illustratively, in a study on the Europeanisation of the 
British central government, it was observed that although substantial change had 
occurred, ‘it has been more or less in keeping with British traditions’ (Bulmer and 
Burch 1998: 603). It has been put forward that three mechanisms of Europeanisation 
were discemable in the forms of positive integration, negative integration and framing 
integration (Knill and Lehmkukl 1999: 2 - 3 ) .  Positive integration involved the exact 
transposition of an EU model to the domestic level, whereas negative integration 
entailed modifications or the reform of the domestic opportunity structure. Further, 
‘framing integration’ unfolded by reconstituting the beliefs and preferences of 
domestic actors. Alternative interpretations of this taxonomy were provided by other 
authors, notably the distinction between mimetism, regulatory competition, 
‘minimalist’ directives and the open method of coordination (Radaelli 2003: 4 1 -3 ) .
In elucidating the mechanisms of domestic change, the ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis 
was introduced (Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso 2001: 6 -  7). A misfit occurred if 
the EU processes, policies and institutions were incompatible with domestic 
processes, policies and institutions. The ensuing incongruence generated adaptation 
pressures. However, misfit denoted a necessary but not sufficient condition for
domestic change (Borzel and Risse 2003: 60 -  3). The incompatibility between the 
EU and domestic levels generated new opportunities and constraints for domestic 
actors. Their capacity to utilize the opportunities and circumvent the constraints was 
determined by a number of mediating factors. Drawing from rational choice 
institutionalism, the number of veto points and the existence of formal institutions 
shaped the responses of domestic actors (Borzel and Risse 2003: 64 -  5). Veto players 
were defined as individual or collective actors who were in a position to obstruct 
reform to the regulatory or institutional status quo. The larger the number of veto 
players, the more unlikely was the occurrence of reform. Moreover, formal 
institutions provided ideational and material resources in assisting domestic actors to 
exploit opportunities emanating from the European level. In parallel, informed by 
sociological institutionalism, additional mediating factors were ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
and the political culture. Persuasion and advocacy were employed by ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ in reconstituting preferences and identities. Hence, it was argued that 
informal institutions and inter-subjective understandings shaped responses to 
Europeanisation (Borzel and Risse 2003: 67 -  8).
This framework was elaborated by a second generation of Europeanisation writings, 
reflecting wider attempts to integrate the insights of institutionalism and 
constructivism (Checkel, Caporaso and Jupille 2003: 15 -  7). The definition of 
Europeanisation introduced by the first generation of authors rested primarily on 
institutionalism. This material conception of politics was gradually complemented by 
an appreciation of ideational dynamics. It was maintained that alongside shaping 
opportunities and constraints, institutions supplied agents with an understanding of 
their interests (Checkel, Caporaso and Jupille 2003: 14). Mutual constitution
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underpinned this process, as the interaction of agents and structures reshaped 
identities and preferences (Checkel 1999: 548). Therefore, the research programme 
was broadened, accounting for identities, interests, discourse, learning and 
socialization (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 183 -  4, Christiansen, Jorgensen and 
Wiener 2001: 2 -  3). Departing from a ‘narrow’ emphasis on ‘top-down’ processes, 
Europeanisation was portrayed “...as part of a dynamic and interactive process that 
includes ‘downloading’ as well as ‘uploading’ processes”. Yet, to avoid confusion 
with the notion of European integration, downloading was designated as a ‘defining’ 
feature, whilst ‘uploading’ as an ‘accompanying’ property (Dyson and Goetz 2003: 
15).
As national and EU policies and institutions were ‘open to interpretation’, the notion 
of misfit was challenged. Rather than a fixed interpretation, it was advanced that 
misfits were constructed by domestic actors. Hence, attention should be drawn to 
domestic opportunity structures, policy beliefs and discourse. EU requirements and 
recommendations were exploited by domestic actors in pursuit of their preferences 
(Dyson and Goetz 2003: 17). Similarly, the EU was instrumentalised by domestic 
actors in legitimizing policy change as well as obstructing reform (Thatcher 2004: 
286, Hay and Rosamond 2002: 163).Thus, the point of departure for this research was 
the definition of Europeanisation that was detailed by Klaus H. Goetz and Kenneth 
Dyson (2003: 20). In the words of the two authors,
“ ...Europeanisation denotes a complex interactive ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up 
process in which domestic polities, politics and policies are shaped by 
European integration and in which domestic actors use European integration to
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shape the domestic arena. It may produce either continuity or change and 
potentially variable and contingent outcomes”.
By referring to European integration, the definition stretched the investigation to 
incorporate policy formulation. Alongside expanded EU competencies, the 
independent variable could be the bargaining process of expansion. In advance of 
deciding to expand EU competences, the unfolding of negotiations involved ‘top- 
down’ Europeanisation effects. Even though negotiations may not engender European 
legislation, the interruption and recasting of domestic politics could be anticipated. 
Contrarily to the claim that Europeanisation necessarily entailed change, it was 
conjectured that policy continuity was contingent on ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
Europeanisation (Gamble -  Buller 2002: 27). Hence, the domestic impact of 
Europeanisation may be triggered by proposals on the future extension of EU 
competence. The circulation of an EU Commission proposal reverberated at the 
domestic level, instigating responses by the domestic constellations of actors. Seeking 
to preserve or modify the domestic status quo, domestic actors instrumentalised the 
proposals and mobilized at all accessible venues. In the words of Simon Bulmer and 
Claudio Radaelli (2004) “.. .the process of agreeing EU policy was inextricably linked 
with the prospect, later in the policy process, that a change in policy will ensue at the 
national level”. Successful uploading of domestic preferences could reduce adaptation 
pressures if the proposed measures were eventually endorsed at the EU level (Dyson 
and Goetz 2003: 15).
Recapitulating, literature on Europeanisation was developed by two generations of 
authors. The first generation of authors concentrated on the efforts of states to form a
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political community at the European level. By contrast, the second generation of 
writing drew attention to the ‘top-down’ effect of European integration, employing 
the notion of Europeanisation to interpret the impact of the expansion of EU 
competence on domestic policies, politics and polities. This approach was 
underpinned by the different strands of institutionalism in analyzing how EU induced 
pressures for reform were mediated through domestic veto points, formal institutions, 
norm entrepreneurs and the political culture. Integrating the insights of the above 
authors, second generation literature recognized Europeanisation as an interactive 
process involving ‘defining downloading’ and ‘accompanying uploading’ properties. 
In conjunction, instead of reproducing the division between constructivism and 
institutionalism, the pertinence of veto players, formal and informal institutions and 
discourse was recognized. Accordingly, for this thesis Europeanisation was 
understood as an interactive process involving the impact of EU policy-making on 
domestic policies and politics and the usage of EU resources by domestic actors in 
shaping the domestic and EU political process.
2.1.2 European Integration and Business Associability
An extensive body of literature on the relationship between European integration and 
business associability had emerged. There was agreement that the increasing 
complexity of the EU institutional configuration entailed a plethora of channels and 
access points for business interests to influence the political process. According to 
Van Schendelen (1993) in such as political environment business interests were 
confronted not with a shortage “... but an over-supply of potential routes” to policy­
makers. At the same time, the EU shaped the organization, composition and
articulation of business interests. Indicatively the European Commission encouraged 
the development of European business associations by offering privileged access to 
such organizations (Fairbrass 2004, Bouwen 2002, Lahusen 2002, Greenwood and 
Aspinwall 1998, Eising and Kohler-Koch 1994, Van Schendelen 1993, Mazey and 
Richardson 1993, Greenwood, Grote and Ronit 1992, Streeck and Schmitter 1991). It 
was maintained that commencing from the Single European Act the mobilization of 
business interests at the EU level grew rapidly, encompassing Euro-groups, European 
associations, ad hoc coalitions of companies and political consultancies. In 
deciphering the political engagement of business interests three primary channels of 
influence were identified, the direct route, the national association route and the 
indirect route through European or international associations. In parallel, an 
increasingly important phenomenon was the hiring of political consultants as an 
additional source of influence in shaping EU policy-making.
The direct route of influencing the EU political process involved the formulation of a 
‘Brussels strategy’ by an individual corporation. There was evidence of companies 
engaging directly with the EU institutions, especially the European Commission in 
articulating their positions on issues of pertinence (Coen 1997, Pollack 1997, Grant 
1993). Depending on the policy area, this was limited to large, often transnational 
companies that had the resources to design a political strategy and the legitimacy to 
gain direct access to the EU institutions (Coen and Dannreuther 2003). According to 
one study, the direct route was more likely to be employed when national associations 
consisted of large corporations, the industry was highly consolidated and national 
associations were small (Bennett 1999). However, it was seldom the case that the 
direct route was the sole channel a company utilized in promoting its interests. Rather,
it was argued that the direct route would constitute one aspect of a multi-channel 
strategy designed to influence EU legislation. In the words of Coen (1997), “...it has 
become accepted practice by European affairs directors that collective and direct 
strategies, national and European mobilization were all simultaneously required, if 
influence was to be maximized in the Brussels arena”. Even further, there was 
evidence of national associations using individual member companies to lobby on 
their behalf at the EU (Bennett 1997). The employment of the direct route was not 
applicable to the shipping industry. This was attributed to the fragmentation of the 
shipping industry, comprising numerous small to medium-sized companies.1 
Although there were a handful of sizeable companies, particularly in the liner 
shipping sector, there was an absence of evidence regarding direct mobilization at the 
EU level.
A more prevalent route utilised by companies was through national associations 
engaging either with national governments or EU institutions. As national 
governments participated in EU policy-making through the Council, this provided an 
access point for national associations. Underpinned by long-standing interaction, it 
was argued that national associations maintained considerable access to their 
respective governments. In turn, national governments exerted influence at the 
technical committees through national civil servants and at the Council through the 
respective Ministers. It was maintained that the likelihood of selecting the national 
association as the primary channel of influence at the EU level was larger when an 
industry sector was not internationalised, the domestic sector was highly regulated,
1 Using market capitalisation as a proxy of company size, Frontline Ltd, the largest European tanker 
company had a stock market capitalisation of US$ 2.5 billion on April 24, 2006. However, this remains 
small compared to the large European corporations (Lloyd’s List -  Bloomberg Top 50 Shipping Index 
April 24, 2006).
industry consolidation varied amongst EU member states or there were distinct 
national interests. In tandem, there was evidence of national associations developing 
‘Brussels strategies’ in engaging directly with the European Commission and the 
European Parliament. Corresponding to the size of the resources committed, there 
were plentiful examples of national associations establishing a physical presence at 
the European level, primarily through an office in Brussels (Grant 2001). Several 
instances of EU mobilization by national shipping associations can be cited. 
Illustratively, the Danish Shipowners Association established a permanent presence in 
Brussels in 1989 during the EU negotiations on the second package of maritime 
transport measures. It was anticipated that the direct involvement of DSA 
representatives would ensure the effective articulation of the Danish shipowners’ 
decisions, circumventing the existing European shipowners’ associations (Interview 
with Director of Danish Shipowners’ Association March 2006). A similar initiative 
was taken by the Swedish Shipowners’ Association in establishing a permanent 
Brussels office in the mid-1990s (Interview with Head of Brussels Representation of 
Swedish Shipowners’ Association April 2006). At the same time, both associations 
employed indirect channels of influence as members of the respective European 
associations. In these instances, the establishment of permanent Brussels office was 
part of a multi-channel strategy in favourably shaping EU policy-making.
In parallel to the intensification of European integration since the mid-1980s, the 
European and international industry association routes witnessed the most growth. 
European associations varied according to their membership, with the so-called Euro- 
groups being the most prevalent form of organisation. Euro-groups were comprised of 
national, sector or branch associations in seeking to represent the interests of an entire
industry or sector across the EU member states (Mazey and Richardson 1993, Van 
Schendelen 1993). In the words of one commentator, Euro-groups did not bring 
together individual companies but were involved in ‘organising organizations’ 
(Pijnenburg 1998). Although not as common as Euro-groups, there was a number of 
European Associations that restricted their memberships to individual companies. In 
representing the interests of shipowners at the European level, the primary Euro-group 
was the European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) consisting of 
national shipowners’ associations. Concurrently, there were several international 
shipowner associations that were involved in EU lobbying and consisted of shipping 
companies, notably the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(Intertanko), the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo) and 
the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO). Literature on the 
mobilization of business interests at the EU level concentrated on the internal 
dynamics, influence and effectiveness of Euro-groups. These associations engaged 
primarily in the collection of information, the facilitation of coordination between the 
member organizations and the undertaking of lobbying (Greenwood 2002: 8 -  10). It 
was argued that especially small and medium-sized enterprises could benefit from the 
formation of associations as they lacked the resources or legitimacy to directly 
influence the European Commission (Coen and Dannreuther 2003). It was advanced 
that in comparison to an individual corporation or national association, a European 
association was more likely to gain the attention of the European Commission 
(Camerra-Rowe 2004: 4). Moreover, European associations performed service and 
lobbying functions (Pijnenburg 1998). The service function referred to the provision 
of exclusive information to the members by monitoring political developments and 
the legislative output at the EU level. With the expansion of EU competence, this
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became a central function of European associations. The lobbying function entailed 
the political engagement with EU institutions in shaping favourably decisions and 
legislation. This took various forms such as direct engagement with European 
Commission officials, the provision of technical expertise and knowledge to the 
European Commission and the participation in public hearings at the European 
Parliament (Interview with Director General of Chamber of Shipping March 2006, 
Interview with Secretary General of European Tugowners Association March 2006).
There was wide agreement that Euro-groups were not an effective route in influencing 
EU policy-making (Jordan and McLaughlin 1993). This was partly attributed to the 
limited resources Euro-groups were endowed with, although this differed across 
industry sectors. It was advanced that national associations were reluctant to transfer 
resources to European associations. However, this was linked to the status and 
internal organisation of the European association to the extent that the payment of 
regular membership fees was compulsory or the organisation was financed from 
voluntary donations. An additional source of financing was the European Commission 
but this applied mainly to interest groups that were not representing business interests. 
In a survey conducted on European interest groups, it was established that one-fifth 
received EU funding with approximately five percent stating that this was their main 
source of funding (Greenwood 1997). Another characteristic of European associations 
was the lack of autonomy from the member national organisations (Pijnenburg 1998). 
It was maintained that the objectives and lobbying activities of these organisations 
were determined by the national associations. Yet, it was argued that the autonomy 
and effectiveness of an association were highly correlated. Autonomous associations 
were able to dictate and pursue long-term objectives without succumbing to the short­
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term concerns of their members. Autonomy was linked to the possession of 
independent resources, skilled leadership and a decision-making arrangement that 
could not be captured by a minority of members (Greenwood and Westgeest 2002: 
229 -  231, Greenwood 2002: 151 -  2). The lack of autonomy rendered European 
associations susceptible to the differences in the lobbying style and political culture of 
their member national associations. The prevalence of a particular lobbying style was 
associated to the internal power dynamics of the European association. Most likely 
certain national associations were more influential due to larger resources and greater 
relevance in the specific industry. Consequently, the lobbying style of these 
associations would disproportionately inform the strategy and approach of their 
respective European associations. Moreover, attention was drawn to the divisions 
between the members of European associations on the issues that were negotiated at 
the EU level (Pijnenburg 1998). Reaching agreement on common positions could be 
elusive, resulting in lowest common denominator outcomes. Due to the weakness of 
Euro-groups, it was maintained that these organizations constituted one channel of 
influence within a portfolio of lobbying activities by business interests. In the words 
of Coen (1997), the “...European federations represent high cost options with their 
membership fees, yet a desire not to be excluded from the club and long-term political 
games, regardless of the federations’ effectiveness in the short term, draws firms into 
active participation”.
Given the weaknesses of the Euro-groups mechanism, an alternative form of 
institutional representation at the EU level was through the formation of informal 
clubs, round tables or ad-hoc coalitions (Coen and Dannreuther 2003, Van Apeldoom 
2000, Pijnenburg 1998). Informal clubs and round tables allowed a variety of actors,
including European associations, national associations or individual companies to 
meet with the purpose of discussing issues of mutual interest and coordinating 
lobbying efforts. These were informal arrangements that were not supported by a 
dedicated secretariat. With respect to the lobbying efforts of the shipping industry, 
there were several such arrangements and most notably, the Round Table of 
International Shipping Associations. Four major international shipping associations 
formed the Round Table to avoid duplication and cooperate in promoting the interests 
of the shipping industry at the EU and the International Maritime Organization 
(Interview with Secretary of International Chamber of Shipping February 2006, 
Interview with Manager of Intercargo March 2006). Compared to Euro-groups, ad 
hoc coalitions represent a less formal mechanism for organizing business interests. 
Although supported by a dedicated secretariat, ad hoc coalitions were characterized 
by a single-issue profile, limited duration and autonomy of the coalition partners 
(Pijnenburg 1998). Illustratively, some of the largest companies in the liner shipping 
industry formed the European Liner Affairs Association (ELAA) in May 2003. The 
purpose of the ELAA was to represent the interests of the liner companies in the 
European Commission review of Council Regulation 4056/86. The mandate of the 
association was devoted to a single issue and once the review process was completed, 
the ELAA would be disbanded (Interview with Executive Director of ELAA March 
2006).
Although the ‘bottom-up’ lobbying efforts of business interests received considerable 
attention, the same does not apply with respect to the ‘top-down’ effect of European 
integration on domestic state-business relations. Some commentators argued that 
state-business relations at the national level remain ‘sticky’ with limited evidence of
change due to European integration (Grote and Lang 2003). In a study of business 
associations in the Netherlands, it was established that in spite of European 
integration, the domestic institutional configuration remained largely unchanged. The 
EU involvement of domestic business associations was interpreted as a supplementary 
activity with little impact on the relations between business interests and the state 
(Wilts 2001). Nonetheless, it was countered that European integration was not only 
spawning change at the domestic level, but was contributing to the reshaping of state- 
business relations, especially in the southern EU member states (Morlino 2002: 252, 
Jordan and Fairbrass 2002: 143, Aspinwall 1998: 212, Aspinwall and Greenwood 
1998). The emergence of multiple access points allowed business interests to engage 
in ‘venue shopping’ in effectively advancing their positions. European integration was 
expanding the choice of political options available to domestic firms, offering “a 
degree of latitude as to how ‘European’ they behave” (Coen 1997). National 
institutional arrangements were being changed by providing new European roles for 
established domestic channels of influence. Similarly, formerly pivotal national 
channels of influence became less significant as European institutions joined the 
political process. Nonetheless, the top-down effects of European integration differed 
across member states. According to one study, as business interests in the United 
Kingdom were historically accustomed to competing for the attention of the 
government, adjusting to the lobbying opportunities of the EU was effortless. In 
converse, in EU member states such as France, Germany and Italy, the 
institutionalized lobbying arrangement of business interests with the state delayed the 
recognition of the declining relevance of national channels of influence (Coen 1997). 
Likewise, it was argued that European integration was loosening the close ties 
between the French state and domestic business interests. On the one hand, the
autonomy of the state in the French institutional configuration was weakened as the 
French government increasingly shared the drafting of legislation with the EU 
institutions. On the other hand, the autonomy of French business increased as it 
tightened its bonds with the European Commission and EU business counterparts 
(Schmidt 1996: 247). Moreover, several studies suggested that European integration 
was reshaping state-business relations in the southern EU member states (Morlino 
2002: 252, Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998). In the case of Greece there was 
evidence of the loosening of the patronage relations between the state and business 
interests (Pagoulatos 2005, Featherstone 2005, Aranitou 2002, Blavoukos 2002, 
Lavdas 2005, Lavdas 1997). It was argued that a combination of global pressures and 
European integration strengthened the domestic position of business associations in 
Greece (Aranitou 2002). Top-down pressures from the EU were inducing the 
reconfiguration of state-business relations through institutional reform and the 
redistribution of structural power. Greek business interests, particularly the segments 
that were not accustomed to state protectionism, expanded their autonomy from the 
state (Pagoulatos 2005, Blavoukos 2002). European integration was contributing to 
the redrawing of state-business relations in Greece, although the direction and extent 
of change remained inconclusive (Featherstone 2005).
In sum, the increasing complexity of the EU policy-making process entailed 
numerous access points for the representation of business interests. According to one 
commentator, the EU institutional arrangement, “...with its many internal links 
between the different bodies and its variety of external linkages with the member 
states, provides an almost infinite number of access points” (Van Schendelen 1993). 
Accordingly, there was substantial evidence of domestic business interests engaging
with the EU institutions in seeking to influence legislation. Three main channels of 
influence were distinguished encompassing the direct, the national association and the 
European or international association routes. The direct route referred to individual 
companies lobbying EU institutions involving large, transnational corporations that 
maintain the resources and legitimacy to formulate their own ‘Brussels strategies’. A 
more common means of influencing policies was the national association route, 
whereby domestic associations lobbied their respective governments or established a 
physical presence in Brussels. Nonetheless, the European association route received 
the most consideration in the literature. Euro-groups consisting of national 
associations monitored EU political developments and legislative output and lobbyied 
the EU institutions on behalf of their members. The effectiveness of Euro-groups was 
questioned due to limited resources, lack of autonomy and internal conflicts between 
member organizations. Nonetheless, it was maintained that these routes were not 
mutually exclusive and it was most likely that business interests would be employing 
a combination of channels of influence in advancing their interests at the EU level. 
Unlike ‘bottom-up’ dynamics, the ‘top-down’ effect of European integration on 
domestic state-business relations had not received comparable attention. The majority 
of existing research suggested that European integration was reconfiguring the 
position of business interests in domestic politics. In varying degrees across the EU 
member states, the autonomy of business interests was increasing as companies 
sought to politically engage with the EU institutions. Especially in relation to the 
South European EU member states, it was argued that European integration was 
loosening state-business relations, releasing political space for the business interests 
that were not reliant on state protectionism. As European integration spawned new
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political dynamics, there was agreement that the direction and scope of domestic 
change was unresolved.
2.2 Analytical Framework
The proposed framework is intended to provide a conceptualisation encompassing the 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ effects of Europeanisation on the domestic relations 
between the Greek state and shipowners. In interpreting the ‘top-down’ effects of 
Europeanisation, the analytical framework draws from the theoretical insights of new 
institutionalism (Peters 1999, Hall and Taylor 1996, Dowding 1994, Hall 1986). The 
notion of ‘institutions’ was employed to refer to the “...formal rules, compliance 
procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall 1986: 19). Political 
institutions have a first order impact in defining the collective actors that participate in 
the political process and by structuring their strategies and interactions. In tandem, it 
was acknowledged that political institutions can have a second order effect by shaping 
the preferences and ideas of collective actors (Hall and Taylor 1996). Accordingly, 
two mediating logics of domestic institutional change in response to Europeanisation 
are employed (Boerzel and Risse 2003, Boerzel and Risse 2000). Rational choice 
institutionalism applies the ‘logic of consequentalism’ in interpreting the domestic 
impact as the redistribution of political resources and re-shaping of the opportunity 
structure of actors. Conceptualised as ‘single loop learning’, actors receive new 
information, adjuste their strategies but continue to pursue fixed interests (Schmidt 
and Radaelli 2004, Boerzel and Risse 2003: 64 -  5, Schmidt 1996: 224 -  5, Hall and 
Taylor 1995). The sociological variant of institutionalism follows the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ in identifying social learning as the prime mechanism of domestic 
change reshaping the identities, preferences and interests of the domestic actors
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(Boerzel and Risse 2003, Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001, Checkel and Moravcsik 
2001, Hall and Taylor 1995).
In analysing the ‘top-down’ impact of Europeanisation on domestic politics, a 
framework comprising of three levels is advanced (Heritier and Knill 2001, Knill 
2001, Heritier and Knill 2000). The first level consists of the degree of congruence 
between the EU and domestic policies in a particular sector. The incompatibility 
between the two levels spawns adaptation pressures on the domestic arrangement. 
Yet, incongruence does not automatically entail domestic change. Rather, the 
occurrence of change is contingent on the domestic ‘reform capacity’ which is defined 
as the number of formal and factual veto points that are opposed to reform and the 
provision of ‘integrated political leadership’ (Heritier and Knill 2001, Knill 2001 
Heritier and Knill 2000). A veto point can be understood as a collective agent or 
institution that due to its influence and location in the domestic political process can 
obstruct reform (Caporaso 2004, Heritier and Knill 2001, Knill 1999). The larger the 
number of veto players, the more unlikely change to the status quo becomes (Tsebelis 
2002: 19). In tandem, integrated political leadership can be provided by formal 
majoritarian government or an effective tradition of consensual decision-making 
incorporating divergent interests.
In parallel, the analytical framework emphasises agency in the interpretation of the 
‘bottom-up’ dynamics of Europeanisation on the domestic relations between the 
Greek state and shipowners. In the words of one commentator, “...how do domestic 
actors use Europe to shape the domestic arena?” (Goetz 2003). The political 
engagement of domestic actors at the EU level has repercussions on the domestic
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distribution of power and the institutional configuration (Radaelli 2004, Jacquot and 
Woll 2003a, Jacquot and Woll 2003b, Hennis 2001: 83). It has been argued that the 
‘top-down’ domestic redistribution of opportunities and resources does not suffice in 
bringing about political change. Rather, collective actors must recognise these 
opportunities as resources and act upon them, in other words, ‘there is no impact 
without usage’ (Radaelli 2004, Jacquot and Woll 2003a, Irondelle 2003: 212). 
Explicitly, usage was defined as “...practices and political interactions which adjust 
and redefine themselves by seizing the EU as a set of opportunities” (Jacquot and 
Woll 2003a, Jacquot and Woll 2003b). This is an important interpretation in 
addressing the operationalization difficulties of applying ‘top-down’ institutionalism. 
Although ‘top-down’ Europeanisation may be altering the domestic configuration, the 
documentation of change by a researcher can be elusive, unless it is accepted that 
domestic actors recognise and use the available resources.
In elaborating the ‘bottom-up’ dynamics a distinction is drawn between material 
resources involving European institutions, policy instruments and financing and 
immaterial resources referring to cognitive interpretations, causal ideas and normative 
beliefs (Jacquot and Woll 2003a, Jacquot and Woll 2003b, Checkel, Caporaso and 
Jupille 2003, Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 2001, Surel 2000). The usage of 
European institutions enables domestic actors to participate in the deliberation of 
policy problems and to influence the formulation of policy decisions at the EU level. 
Accordingly, “...the process of agreeing EU policy is inextricably linked with the 
prospect, later in the policy process, that a change in policy will ensue at the national 
level” (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 5, Jordan and Fairbrass 2002, McLauglin and 
Grant 1993). Usage of EU institutions bestows credibility to domestic actors and
provides them with new ideas or information that could place them at an advantage to 
domestic competitors. Policy instruments could be constraining in the form of 
directives and court judgments or less restrictive, represented by soft law instruments 
such as resolutions, recommendations communications (Jacquot and Woll 2003b: 12). 
Moreover, financing refers to funds allocated by the European Commission for the 
participation of collective actors in specific projects. With respect to immaterial 
resources, cognitive interpretations enable actors to understand and describe policy 
developments, causal ideas refer to cause-and-effect explanations of change whilst 
normative beliefs denote value judgements (Jacquot and Woll 2003b, Borzel and 
Risse 2003, Surel 2000). Once policy incongruence is acknowledged, the actors 
maintain the discretion to employ EU material and immaterial resources in cognitive, 
strategic or legitimising ways (Jacquot and Woll 2003b). These types of usage 
correspond to specific political stages in relation to the definition of problems and 
solutions, policy-making and justification. Cognitive usage is attached to the 
deliberative stage of the political process, involving on the one hand, the 
understanding and interpretation of facts and events and on the other hand, employing 
persuasion to spread these interpretations amongst other actors (Surel 2000: 500). 
Strategic usage entails the conversion of resources into political practices with the 
purpose of achieving a clearly outlined objective. Hence, resources are used in order 
to influence policy decisions, extend an actor’s range of political tools or increase 
access to the political process. Legitimising usage enhances the legitimacy of 
domestic policies by making reference to the EU and European integration. Its most 
common manifestation was in the form of rhetorical appeals to the ‘European Idea’ or 
‘European constraints’ (Jacquot and Woll 2003a, Jacquot and Woll 2003b, Surel 
2000). The domestic proponents of policy change may exercise ‘blame-shift’ or use
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the EU as a ‘smokescreen for domestic political strategies’ in overcoming resistance 
to reform (Cole and Drake 2000, Featherstone 1998: 35 -  6).
Resting on this analytical framework, the main argument of this dissertation is that the 
direction of change varies across industry segments and is contingent on four 
conditions. Firstly, the nature of the Greek state and its ability to exercise ‘integrated 
leadership’. Secondly, the reaction by domestic actors to the perceived incompatibility 
between the EU measures and existing domestic or international policies. Thirdly, the 
capacity of shipowners for capital mobility in holding an option to exit the domestic 
political process. Fourthly, alongside the shipowners, the presence of influential 
formal or factual veto points in the domestic institutional arrangement.
2.3 Methodology
The purpose of the research is the analysis of political change, as observed in 
reformed processes and institutions and perceived by the actors involved, both 
individual and collective participants. As such, the research does not lend itself to 
quantitative analysis as we are not associating political change with differences in 
numeric variables and the distribution of data. Indeed, the quantitative approach 
would provide a response to the question of “How many of them are there?” 
(Landman 2003: 19, Patton 2002). More specifically, EU initiatives are noticed and 
interpreted by domestic actors who may act upon these in seeking to defend their 
vested interests and favourably shape political outcomes. The ensuing impact on the 
domestic political configuration cannot be captured by reference to aggregate data. 
Rather, the purpose and intentions of this research are better served by the application 
of a qualitative approach in identifying the formation of new institutions, the
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reconfiguration of existing institutions and the associated perceptions of the respective 
actors. Moreover, this approach necessitates a concentration on a small number of 
countries or a number of sectors within a single country.
The qualitative approach comprises a number of methods, including participant 
observation, interviews and the so-called ‘thick description’ (Landman 2003). A 
similar classification is proposed by Patton (2002), distinguishing between 
observations, interviews and documents. Participant observation seeks to provide 
deep descriptions of social processes, including the behaviour, interaction and power 
dynamics between social actors as well as the context within which these processes 
unfold (Patton 2002). In the context of this dissertation this would entail the 
observation of the negotiations and lobbying taking place within a variety of venues, 
ranging from IMO fora, European Commission committees, YEN consultations to the 
UGS annual meetings and informal gatherings at non-institutionalized settings. 
Although this method would ensure insights into the political process and the power 
dynamics between actors, it was logistically unfeasible to gain access to these types of 
meetings. Certainly, these gatherings are by and large held behind closed doors, 
prohibiting the participation of external, third party observers.
Moreover, for the purposes of this dissertation, the methods of documentary analysis 
and interviewing are employed. These methods can be partly seen as substitutes for 
the insights and information that could have been gathered through participant 
observation. In analyzing the interrelations between the Greek state, ocean-going and 
coastal shipowners, island communities and the EU institutions, documentary data is 
gathered from open sources such as policy declarations, reports, press releases,
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briefing notes, newsletters, speeches, interviews and public hearings. Content analysis 
figures prominently amongst the available tools for the interpretation of the identified 
documentation. This could involve a quantitative word-count approach in explaining 
the priorities and agenda of the respective authors. However, in line with the purpose 
of this dissertation a critical approach is adopted, taking into account the meaning and 
context of the documents under review. Hence, alongside issues of authenticity and 
credibility, the political context of documentary sources is recognized in taking into 
account “...who [writes] what, to whom, how and with what effects” (Pennings, 
Keman, Kleinnijenheis 2005, Jupp and Norris 1993: 40, Johnson and Shocket 1976: 
205).
Documentary analysis is complemented by semi-structured ‘depth’ interviews with 
academics, commentators on shipping affairs and representatives of shipping 
companies, national, European and international shipowner associations, 
environmental groups, the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine, the Greek permanent 
representations to the IMO and the EU, European governmental bodies, the European 
Commission and the International Maritime Organisation. In the words of one social 
scientist, “...in order to understand other people’s constructions of reality, we would 
do well to ask them” and interviews provide this opportunity (Checkel 1999: 550, 
Punch 1998: 175, Richards 1996: 199). Semi-structured interviewing is selected due 
its flexibility, cost-effectiveness and opportunity of offering otherwise inaccessible 
information on negotiations and the reasoning underlying decisions and public 
statements. In addition, this type of interviewing ensures a minimum of comparability 
across the interviewees’ responses whilst allowing for the latter’s perspective and 
perception of the political process to be probed. Accordingly, the interviewees are
selected on the criteria of representation, political significance and the feasibility of 
access.2 However, a shortcome of this method is the inverse relation between 
‘personal reactivity’ and validity, as the interviewee may engage in assumptions and 
speculation (Richards 1996). Nevertheless, the validity of interviewee comments are 
strengthened through triangulation with open sources and interviews with other 
parties. Another useful variant of the interviewing method are group or focus 
interviews that would allow for group norms and dynamics to be investigated. We 
would seek to simulate the negotiating process by bringing together representatives of 
the stakeholders in maritime transport policy-making. However, aside from 
weaknesses related to selectivity, representation and validity, there were 
insurmountable logistical obstacles in conducting this type of interviewing.
There is substantial secondary literature on the history, regulatory framework and 
market structure of international shipping. Information on world tonnage and the 
position of Greek shipping was compiled from Lloyd’s Register -  Fairplay Annual 
Review, the UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, the OECD Maritime Transport 
report, the UGS and GSCC Annual Reports, the European Sea Ports Organisation 
Annual Statistics, the Bank of Greece Annual Report and research by the Hellenic 
Chamber of Shipping and the Ministry of Mercantile Marine. Shipping industry news 
were published in several Greek and international newspapers and periodicals 
including Naftemporiki, To Vima, Eleftherotypia, Kathimerini, Naftiliaki, Naftika 
Chronika, Efoplistis, Elnavi, Lloyds List, Lloyds Shipping Economist, Fairplay, 
Shipping Intelligence Weekly, Shipping News International, Tradewinds, Tanker 
Operator and the International Bulk Journal Moreover, the Athens News Agency
2 See list o f interviewees as part of Bibliography.
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and the Aegean News Agency were utilised as well as a number of local newspapers 
and periodicals, particularly in documenting the political mobilization of island 
communities in response to the liberalisation of the cabotage trades.
Therefore, a qualitative approach is adopted in interpreting the domestic impact of 
Europeanisation. Interviewing and documentary analysis are selected as the most 
appropriate methods in tracing the actual and perceived change to the political process 
in relation to Greek shipping. Indeed, a similar set of methods has been applied by a 
number of studies seeking to analyse the interactions between European integration 
and the domestic politics of EU member states (Fairbrass 2003, Bomberh and 
Peterson 2000, Checkel 1999). Moreover, the combination of these methods allows 
for the triangulation of the findings enhancing the validity and reliability of this 
research.
2.4 Europeanisation, business associability and domestic impact
In interpreting the expansion of EU competence, the concept of Europeanisation is 
employed which is defined as an interactive process involving the ‘top-down’ impact 
of EU policy-making on domestic politics and the ‘bottom up’ usage of EU resources 
by domestic actors in shaping the domestic and European political process. The 
expanding competence and growing complexity of the EU institutional configuration 
offers a multiplicity of access points for the representation of business interests. In 
analyzing the EU lobbying efforts of business interests, the direct, national association 
and European association routes are distinguished. In addition, with respect to the 
‘top-down’ dynamics, there is a degree of agreement that European integration is
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contributing to the reshaping of domestic state-business relations. Especially in the 
southern EU member states, it is claimed that the ties between the state and business 
are loosened, as the political interaction of domestic business interests with the EU 
institutions grew. Nonetheless, other authors take the view that the domestic impact of 
Europeanisation is fragmented and differentiated across different sectors.
Building on these insights, an analytical framework is put forward according to which 
the direction of change varies across industry segments and is contingent on four 
conditions. Firstly, the nature of the Greek state and its ability to exercise ‘integrated 
leadership’. Secondly, domestic actors recognising and acting upon the 
incompatibility between the EU measures and existing domestic or international 
policies. Thirdly, the shipowners’ capacity to exit the domestic configuration through 
capital mobility. Fourthly, in addition to the shipowners, the presence of influential 
formal or factual veto points in the domestic institutional arrangement. This chapter is 
followed by an analysis of the domestic state-business relations in Greece in 
understanding the political process that is being exposed to Europeanisation. In 
subsequent chapters the framework is applied to the case studies of ocean-going and 
coastal shipping in interpreting the impact on the Greek political process.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3: Europeanisation, the IMO and Organised Shipping
The nature of the shipping industry is international, operating in conditions of free 
competition and within a framework of international safety standards and self­
regulation (Kumar and Hoffman 2002, Nordquist and Moore 1999, Zacher 1996, 
Yannopoulos 1989, Farthing 1987, Cafruny 1987, Mankabady 1986, Mankabady 
1984). The international coordination of market initiatives and lobbying efforts 
entailed that shipping interests have a tradition of associability beyond the national 
level.
As opposed to industry sectors that are embedded at the national level, the EU sought 
to insert itself in a sector characterised by dense transnational activity. Commencing 
from the mid-1980s the EU expanded its presence in the regulation of the commercial 
and safety aspects of maritime transport. In parallel, the complexity of decision­
making increased, culminating in the adoption of the co-decision procedure for 
maritime transport issues in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Certainly, in understanding the 
Europeanisation of the shipping industry, the analysis of the international regulatory 
framework is required.
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the context of international shipping policy­
making and its implications for the analysis of institutional roles and domestic 
change. Maritime transport differs from other industry segments due to the its 
international nature and existence of an elaborate regulatory and policy-making 
framework beyond natibnal or regional boundaries. The chapter commences with an 
overview of the international maritime transport regulatory framework and the
62
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) which is central to this arrangement. The 
shortcomings of the IMO are analysed as these form the ‘policy window of 
opportunity’ for the expansion of the EU initiatives. This is followed by the 
examination of the influential position of the Greek ocean-going shipowners within 
the existing European and international industry associations. This provides the basis 
for the interpretation of the reasons underlying the Greek shipowners’ capacity to 
mobilize at the EU level
3.1 The IMO and International Maritime Regulation
Maritime transport was historically regulated at the international level, underpinned 
by the principle of self-regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, Zacher 1996, 
Yannopoulos 1989, Farthing 1987, Ram 1969). Aside from shipowners and cargo 
owners there was a plethora of actors involved in the form of classifications societies, 
underwriters and the flag and port states. Illustratively, underwriting insurance for a 
vessel was intertwined with the award of the Classification Certificate by a 
classification society. In turn, the classification societies were fundamental in the 
establishment and application of high technical standards in the design, construction 
and survey of vessels (Interview with Maritime Safety Advisor of the Hellenic 
Register of Shipping March 2006, Interview with Head of External Affairs of Lloyd’s 
Register March 2006).
There was long-standing agreement that international shipping should be governed by 
uniform international laws and regulations (Interview with Secretary-General of 
International Maritime Organisation March 2006, Interview with Chairman of Lloyd’s
Register March 2006, Interview with Director-General of Danish Maritime Authority 
April 2006, Interview with Chairman of Lloyd’s Register March 2006). Regulatory 
variance across states would generate a host of practical difficulties for the operation 
of shipping. In tandem, the ownership and operation of the industry was 
multinational, a phenomenon that was heightened with the expansion of open 
registries (Kumar and Hoffman 2002, Brooks 2000, Yannopoulos 1989, Strange 1976, 
Lorentzen 1972). Following the Second World War, this consensus was reiterated in 
the discussion on the formation of an international governmental organisation that 
would be dedicated to maritime transport. However, although there was general 
agreement on the necessity of international safety standards, contrasting visions were 
articulated regarding the commercial aspects of shipping. Under the leadership of the 
United Kingdom, traditional maritime states including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, 
Holland and Greece were in favour of an international institutional arrangement to 
facilitate coordination on safety standards, technical issues and the working 
conditions of seafarers. Concurrently, these states were categorically opposed to any 
form of governmental interference in the commercial aspects of shipping. In converse, 
non-traditional maritime countries that sought to establish national merchant fleets 
supported governmental intervention through protectionist measures and flag 
discrimination (Okere 1981, Silverstein 1978). As a result, in founding the Inter­
governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) as a specialised UN 
agency in 1958, the mandate of the new organisation was devoted to the adoption of 
the highest practicable standards affecting maritime safety and pollution prevention to 
the exclusion of issues of a commercial nature (Nordquist and Moore 1999, 
Mankabady 1986, Mankabady 1984). The IMCO was granted with consultative and 
advisory functions, in issuing recommendations, convening conferences and
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contributing to the formulation of conventions which were subsequently 
recommended to governments for approval (Campe 2005, Juda 1977, Simmonds 
1963). According to the IMCO Convention, the objectives of the organisation were to 
“...provide machinery for co-operation among governments in the field of 
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters ... and to
encourage the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters
concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of 
marine pollution from ships” (Article 1 IMCO Convention).
Despite the limited powers of the IMCO, the traditional maritime states and 
shipowners were apprehensive of the new organisation. Although the IMCO 
Convention was drafted in 1948, it was only in 1958 that the required number of
ratifications was received. The Greek government initially ratified the IMCO
Convention in 1950, yet in 1956 decided to withdraw the instrument of ratification. 
Nonetheless, by 1958 the Greek government had reinstated its ratification with a 
clause stipulating that if the “...Organisation extends its activities to matters of 
commercial and economic nature, the Greek government may find itself bound to 
reconsider its acceptance” (Padwa 1960: 524). There was concern amongst 
shipowners that gradually the IMCO would become involved in the commercial 
regulation of shipping, becoming a proxy for governmental intervention (Juda 1977). 
The unease of the shipowners was heightened by the ambiguous wording of the 
IMCO Convention stating that “...assistance and encouragement given by a 
Government for the development of its national shipping and for purposes of security 
does not in itself constitute discrimination, provided...that the measures were not 
designed to restrict of the freedom of shipping of all flags to take part in international
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trade” (Article 1 IMCO Convention). Nevertheless, in the ensuing four decades the 
IMO (renamed in 1982) remained a technical organisation involved in the promotion 
of international safety standards and the prevention of marine pollution. The primarily 
function of the IMO was to serve as a facilitator of negotiations amongst the member 
states with the IMO Secretariat staff interpreting their role as mediators and ‘brokers’ 
(Campe 2005). At the same time, the IMO seldom put forward recommendations for 
negotiation, with the member states setting the agenda instead. Approximately forty 
conventions and protocols were adopted and notably the Convention on the Safety of 
Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS 74), the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships 1973 (MARPOL 73), the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 78), and 
the Convention on Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping 1978 
(STCW 78).
With respect to the political structure of IMO, the Council was the executive organ 
consisting of forty members, representing the ten largest shipping member states, the 
ten largest seaborne trading states and twenty member states that maintained a 
maritime interest and represented the major regions of the world (Article 17 IMO 
Convention). Since the inception of the organisation, Greece was a member of the 
Executive Council. Fee contributions by the member states corresponded to the 
tonnage of their merchant fleets. Unlike other UN agencies a large proportion of the 
IMO budget was paid by Panama, Liberia and the Bahamas that maintained open 
registries.
Table 1: Fee Contribution IMO Budget
Member State Fee Contribution ($) % of Budget
Panam a 4,141,951 18.47
Liberia 1,730,648 7.72
Baham as 1,128,559 5.03
United Kingdom 1,040,068 4.64
Greece 973,151 4.34
Singapore 900,531 4.02
Japan 842,596 3.76
Marshall Islands 802,983 3.58
USA 771,737 3.44
China 749,093 3.34
Source: IMO 2006
Nonetheless, the size of fee contribution was not directly correlated with the influence 
member states exerted within the IMO. In shaping IMO regulations the most 
influential member states were those with the greatest technical expertise and 
consistent participation in the workings of the organisation (Interview with IMO Head 
of Policy and Planning Unit March 2006, Interview with IMO Senior Deputy Director 
Maritime Safety Divisions March 2006). These were the member states that chaired 
or prepared drafts for the committees and contributed disproportionately to the 
preparation of regulations before negotiations at the IMO Council. According to a 
study of the first two decades of the IMCO the technical expertise of the United 
Kingdom placed it at an advantage to the other member states. It was estimated that a 
sixth of the Secretariat were of British nationality whilst the United Kingdom scored 
the highest in the most person-months of technical assistance and on an acceptance 
index of IMO conventions (Silverstein 1978). Although the United Kingdom 
maintained its influence, Greece, the US, Japan, Germany, Russia and China also 
engaged actively in IMO negotiations (Interview with Senior Deputy Director of IMO 
Maritime Safety Division March 2006). Alongside its position in the IMO Council, 
Greece possessed substantial technical expertise and actively attended sub-committee
and committee meetings. The technical competence of the Greek permanent 
delegation was underpinned by the existence of YEN that specialised in maritime 
transport issues and the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping that integrated the expertise 
and knowledge of the Greek shipping industry (Interview with Deputy Maritime 
Transport Attache of Greece to IMO, April 2006). In conjunction, the Greek 
shipowners buttressed the resources of the permanent delegation through the 
provision of technical knowledge and experience. However, commencing from the 
early 1990s it was maintained that there was a growing politicisation of the IMO 
policy-making process (Interview with Secretary of International Chamber of 
Shipping February 2006, Interview with Member of Greek Shipping Cooperation 
Committee Council March 2006, Interview with International Affairs Liaison of 
Baltic and International Maritime Council March 2006). This was partly attributed to 
the attempts of the European Commission to coordinate the positions of the EU 
member states within the IMO. It was argued that this reduced the scope for experts 
from the EU member states to discuss the details of rules on their technical merits 
(Westfal-Larsen 2005). Indicatively, in June 2005 the European Commission blocked 
the submission of proposals by the United Kingdom and Denmark to IMO 
Committees. European Commission officials objected to the advancement of 
proposals by EU member states before prior consultation and arrival at a uniform 
position CLloyd’s List June 05, 2005). Furthermore, there were concerns that the 
European Commission initiatives would instigate the formation of counter-blocks 
within the IMO, jeopardising the quality of decision-making. In response, the 
European Commission emphasised that the EU strengthen implementation and 
enforcement of international standards through a democratic process involving the 
Council, European Parliament and the European Social and Economic Committee
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(Interview with Head of Maritime Transport Policy & Maritime Safety European 
Commission April 2006).
However, over the years the weaknesses of the IMO process for the negotiation and 
adoption of international safety standards became increasingly palpable. Firstly, the 
slow pace of the policy-making process entailed that the IMO could respond swiftly 
neither to technological advancement nor requests by the member states and the 
general public. For the adoption of amendments to existing Conventions a majority 
rule, commonly two-thirds of the member states was required. Partly addressing this 
shortcoming the principle of ‘tacit acceptance’ was incorporated in technical 
conventions, whereby amendments entered into force by a specified date, unless 
objections were received from a certain proportion of the contracting parties 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, Cox 1998, Juda 1977).
Table 2: Timetable for adoption of IMO regulations
Actions Required Time Needed
Sub-Committee work 2-3 years
Approx by Committees and circulation 9-12 months
Adoption and entry into force 18 months
Total time needed 4.5-5.5 years
Source: Sasamura 1998
Secondly, as the IMO sought the consensus of member states in adopting legislation, 
there was a tendency for minimum standard outcomes. The IMO contended that 
consensus was indispensable as small majority outcomes entailed the danger of 
disaffected member states seeking alternative regional or national solutions. 
Nevertheless, there were examples, exemplified by the adoption of the Oil Pollution
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Act 1990 by the US administration when member states proceeded with stringent 
measures that would not have been attainable through the IMO process. Thirdly, it 
was argued that the IMO did not have a formal sanctions mechanism and was unable 
to ensure the consistent implementation and uniform enforcement of international 
legislation. IMO standards were not applied consistently across national jurisdictions, 
generating discrepancies with sub-standard shipowners taking advantage. In the words 
of a formed IMO Secretary General,
“Over the past decades the IMO has adopted several shelves full of rules and 
regulations...However, regulations are only effective if they are put in 
practice and are enforced and there is no doubt that many IMO conventions 
and other standards are not implemented as vigorously as they should be” 
(O’Neil 1998).
The responsibility for ensuring that ships were built, equipped and operated in 
compliance with IMO standards, lies with the flag state. However, with the expansion 
of flagging-out, certain open registry member states did not have the technical 
expertise and human resources to effectively implement IMO requirements. In 
improving implementation the IMO adopted measures to monitor the performance of 
flag states. More importantly, an additional mechanism for safeguarding international 
safety standards was sought through port state control. Under port state control 
regimes, a proportion of ships calling at a port were inspected to ensure compliance 
with international safety, pollution and manning standards (Haralambides 1998, 
Yannopoulos 1989).
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In sum, maritime transport regulation was historically negotiated and adopted at the 
international level. The IMO became central to this process as the institutional venue 
for the discussion of new rules and standards. Over the years Greece figured 
prominently in the IMO policy-making process as a member of the IMO Council and 
due to the expertise and knowledge of YEN and the technical support from Greek 
shipowners. In addition, Greece actively participated in the sub-committee and 
committee meetings that precede the adoption of IMO regulations. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of the IMO in promoting maritime safety and preventing environmental 
pollution was impaired by inconsistent implementation and a weak enforcement 
mechanism, slow decision-making process and the adoption of minimum standards. 
Combined with the political pressures and media exposure accompanying maritime 
accidents, these weaknesses provided ‘windows of opportunity’ for the European 
Commission to increase the regulatory presence of the EU in maritime transport.
3.2 The evolution of the EU Common Maritime Transport Policy 
(CMTP)
Maritime transport represented more than ninety percent of the external trade and 
approximately forty-one percent of internal trade of the EU. In tandem, it was 
estimated that approximately forty percent of world fleet was controlled by EU 
shipping interests (ECSA 2005). Nonetheless, in the first two decades of the European 
Community (EC), maritime transport was not featured in the common transport 
policy. Bolstered by the accession of traditional maritime states such as the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Greece, the European Commission became increasingly 
involved in the regulation of maritime transport. This culminated in the 1986 and 
1989 packages of measures, forming the foundation of the Common Maritime 
Transport Policy. Subsequently, the involvement of the EU in maritime transport 
regulation advanced rapidly, especially in the areas of maritime safety and the 
prevention of marine pollution.
The Treaty of Rome made one reference to maritime transport in stating that,
“The provisions of the Title shall apply to transport by rail, road and inland 
waterway. The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what 
extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea 
and air transport” (Article 84, Title IV Treaty of Rome).
In distinguishing sea transport from rail, road and inland waterways, the founding 
members acknowledged the international nature of shipping. It was maintained that 
the differentiation of sea transport was attributed to the Netherlands that was seeking
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to safeguard the international character of shipping by precluding regulatory 
intervention by the newly founded regional organisation (Roe and Selkou 2004: 63). 
In tandem, there were concerns with respect to the impact of maritime transport 
policies on EC trading partners (Aspinwall 1995: 89). Indeed, these characteristics 
were affirmed by the European Commission,
“.. .sea and air transport have their own distinctive features and are (to a much 
greater extent than inland types of transport) closely connected and depedent 
on the world economy. It is in the Community’s own interest to take this into 
account and not to call into question the competitive position of sea and air 
transport outside the sphere of the Treat of Rome (European Commission 
Memorandum 1961).
Hence, for over two decades there was an absence of maritime transport measures at 
the EC level (Selkou and Roe 2004, Paixao and Marlow 2001, Erdmenger 1983, Rizzi 
1978). In 1973, the European Court of Justice issued its judgement on the ‘French 
Seamen’s case’ confirming the application of Article 48 on the free movement of 
labour to seafarers. The ECJ concluded that the general rules of the Treaty held sway 
for maritime transport (ECJ Case 167/73). Hence, provisions for the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital, the right to establishment and competition were 
applicable to maritime transport (Bredima-Savopoulou and Tzoannos 1990: 74 -  6). 
This was reinforced in 1985 with another ECJ ruling stating that the Council was in 
breach of obligations arising from the Treaty of Rome by not formulating a common 
transport policy, including maritime transport (ECJ Case 355/87). Nonetheless, there 
was broad agreement that issues of maritime transport, particularly in relation to
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maritime safety and the prevention of marine pollution should be negotiated and 
endorsed at the international level.
From the early 1970s until the mid-1980s an embryonic maritime transport policy 
began to take shape at the EC level. The measures adopted during this period were 
concentrated on the external relations of the EC (Erdmenger 1983, Bredima and 
Tzoannos 1981: 98). Several developments underpinned the expansion of EC 
competence in maritime transport, including the introduction of the UNCTAD Liner 
Code in 1974, competition from COMECON countries that maintained protectionist 
policies and high-profile maritime accidents (Aspinwall 1995: 91). Firstly, in 1977 a 
consultation procedure was established for the coordination of the positions of the 
member states in international maritime fora. Secondly, with the purpose of 
addressing the competition from the COMECON countries, procedures were 
established for the collection and dissemination of information on the activities of 
non-EC liner shipping companies. Thirdly, in response to a number of high profile 
maritime accidents in the late 1970s, at the Copenhagen Council meeting in April 
1978 measures regarding maritime transport were endorsed. The Council urged for 
the prompt implementation of existing international legislation, the improvement of 
coordination between member states and the endorsement of common positions at 
international venues. In conjunction, the European Commission was called upon to 
come forward with proposals to control and reduce pollution from oil spills. Despite 
this recognition and the articulation of an ambitious package of proposals, the 
European Commission initiatives materialised into a handful of formal declarations 
and resolutions, encouraging the EC member states to ratify the IMO conventions 
(Bredima-Savopoulou and Tzoannos 1990, Tzoannos 1989: 46). Specifically, In June
1978 Resolution 162/78 was adopted establishing an action programme on the control 
and reduction of pollution from ship-source discharges whilst in December 1978 
Directive 115/79 was adopted stipulating compulsory pilotage of vessels by deep-sea 
pilots in sensitive maritime areas such as the North Sea and the English Channel. In 
addition, in 1980 the European Commission proposed a Directive to improve the 
enforcement of international safety standards through port state control. Greece was 
singled out as an IMO member state with a poor enforcement record. Explicitly, it 
was stated that the “ ...list of infringements of IMCO standards per country 
demonstrates the need for the Commission and the Council of Ministers to make sure 
that [Greece] is really willing to submit to Community rules in this important area” 
(Aspinwall 1995: 95). However, the EC member states were unable to reach an 
agreement neither on the details of the measures nor on the principle of EC 
involvement in maritime transport safety. The consensus amongst the EC members 
was that maritime safety should be regulated at the international level (Stevens 2004: 
125 -  6, Kiriazidis 1994, Erdmenger 1983). Rather, the member states plus Norway 
circumvented the EC in forming a voluntarily agreement that took the form of the 
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in 1982. Amongst other 
measures, the Paris MOU set forth an inspection target of twenty-five percent of 
vessels calling at the ports of the contractual parties, involving the detention of vessels 
if deficiencies were discovered.
Moreover, the development of the EC maritime transport policy was attributed to the 
successive waves of enlargement, involving the accession of traditional maritime 
transport countries. The accession of the UK and Denmark in January 1973 and 
Greece in January 1981 raised the salience of maritime transport in the EC. The
admittance of Greece increased the capacity of the Community fleet by sixty per cent, 
raising it to 25.2 per cent of world capacity in 1981 (Bredima and Tzoannos 1981: 95, 
Pantelidis 1979, Rizzi 1978, Tsoukalis 1978). In tandem, the structure of the 
Community fleet was reshaped, as existing member states concentrated on the 
maritime transport of industrial products, whereas the Greek fleet was geared towards 
wet and dry bulk commodities such as oil and iron ore. The enlarged membership of 
the EC provided the impetus for the adoption of concrete maritime transport 
measures. In March 1985, the European Commission issued a Communication on the 
“Progress towards a Common Transport Policy” (CEC Com 85/90). It was argued that 
the competitiveness of the EC fleet was hampered by the expansion of open registries 
and the endorsement of protectionist measures by third countries. More specifically, 
the member states were confronted with a proliferation of protectionist measures as 
Japan, the Newly Industrialised Countries and the COMECON countries expanded 
their national fleets. To enhance their competitiveness, EC shipowners sought to 
reduce operational costs by turning to open registries, also know as ‘Flags Of 
Convenience’. These were national flags that were open to vessels owned by non­
citizens who sought to minimise costs by avoiding manning and taxation restrictions 
(Metaxas 1985, Metaxas 1981). Illustratively, after reaching a peak of 42 million dwt 
in 1981, the Greek-registered fleet declined to 22.8 million dwt in 1991. The majority 
of the tonnage withdrawn from the Greek registry was transferred to open registries, 
especially the flag of Cyprus. Indeed, over the same period, Greek owned tonnage in 
open registries grew from 23 million dwt in 1981 to 45 million dwt in 1987 
(Aspinwall 1995). Subsequently, following from the Commission proposals, the 
Council adopted a package of maritime transport measures in 1986. Resting on open 
market principles, the measures sought to counter unfair competition, enhancing the
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competitiveness of the EC fleet and furthering employment. It was decided that all 
intra-European maritime transport trades with the exception of cabotage should open 
to competition with establishment in the EC as the sole requirement in order to 
provide maritime transport services across the EC.3 The negotiations for the package 
were conducted between the Western European member states and Greece, with the 
United Kingdom mediating between the two sides (Aspinwall 1995, Bredima- 
Savopoulou and Tzoannos 1990). The principle underlying the position of Greece 
with respect to maritime transport was the promotion of free and fair competition and 
the prevention of protectionist measures and governmental intervention (Interview 
with Greek Maritime Transport Attache to EU March 2006). In the words of the YEN 
Minister “...Greece shall always be among those countries striving for the 
consolidation of free and fair competition for shipping...we should fight against any 
trend of new protectionist measures and practices, wherever these may appear” 
(Soumakis 1996). The sole exception to the Greek approach was domestic coastal 
transport operating under a cabotage regime and reserving transportation to vessels 
flying the Greek flag. This became an intractable negotiating point until it was 
resolved with the adoption of Council Regulation 3577 in December 1992 applying 
the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within member 
state.4
The continued decline of EC fleet tonnage instigated an additional set of proposals by 
the European Commission in 1989 on “A future for the Community shipping industry:
3 The package comprised of Council Regulation 4055/86 applying the principle of freedom to provide 
maritime transport between member states and between member states and third countries, Council 
Regulation 4056/86 laying down the rules for the application of competition rules to maritime transport 
and Council Regulations 4057/86 and 4058/86 on unfair pricing and restrictions by third countries to 
the free access to ocean trades.
4 This is discussed in more detailed in Chapter on the opening of the cabotage trades.
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measures to improve the operating conditions of Community shipping” (CEC Com 
266/89). It was maintained that the high fiscal and labour costs associated to EC flags 
underpinned the decisions of shipowners to transfer their vessels to open registries. In 
both enhancing the competitiveness of EC shipping and safeguarding employment, 
the European Commission proposed the formation of the Euros Register. This was 
designed as a parallel register for the all the vessels on EC member state registries 
with the purpose of counterbalancing the benefits accruing from open registries. 
According to an amended 1991 proposal, shipowners with vessels registered under 
Euros and meeting a mandatory minimum of EC seafarers would be eligible for the 
reimbursement of the seafarer’s income tax. In spite of a variety of amendments 
introduced by the European Commission an agreement was not reached on the Euros 
Register (Selkou and Roe 2004, Pallis 2002, Erdmenger 1983).5 Greece was opposed 
to the formation of a single EC register claiming that the link between improving the 
competitiveness of EC shipping and the European Commission measures was weak. 
Particularly the issue of mandatory crewing requirements became an insurmountable 
obstacle leading to the abandonment of the proposals (Aspinwall 1995). Nevertheless, 
Denmark, France, Spain and Portugal proceeded with the formation of second 
registries enabling ships flying their flags to avoid fiscal and labour costs arising from 
their first registries.6 Rather than creating a second registry in Greece, the Greek 
shipowners opted for open registers, notably Panama, Malta, Cyprus, the Bahamas, 
Liberia and the Marshall islands (Lloyd’s Register -  Fairplay March 2006). In 
addition to proposals for the formation of the Euros Registry, the European
5 CEC Amended Proposal fo r a Council Regulation establishing a Community ship register and 
providing fo r  the flying o f the Community flag by sea-going vessels (Com 54/91), CEC Amended 
Proposal fo r  a Council Regulation establishing a Community ship register and providing fo r  the flying 
of the Community flag by sea-going vessels (Com 483/91).
6 Denmark formed the DIS, France through the Kerguelen Register, Portugal with MAR and Spain with 
the Canary Island Register.
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Commission issued guidelines for evaluation of state aid to the maritime transport 
sector (CEC Sec 921/989).7 Accordingly the European Commission decided the 
authorisation of state aid to vessels operating under EC member flags, to modernise 
vessels and to maintain the employment of EC seafarers (Interview with former 
Managing Director of European Maritime Cooperation Agency March 2006).
In late 1992 and early 1993 the grounding of oil tankers in the EU waters instigated 
renewed discussion on maritime safety and the prevention of marine pollution at the 
EU level. Concurrently, the Treaty of the European Union established a legal basis for 
the adoption of EU measures with respect to transport security. Article 71 of the 
Treaty stipulated that the EU could provide for “...measures to improve transport 
safety”. The European Commission proceeded by issuing the Communication on “A 
common policy on Safe Seas” (CEC Com 66/93). Resting on a thorough analysis of 
vessel losses and flag states’ performances, the European Commission drew attention 
to the primary causes of casualties. These were attributed on the one hand to the poor 
performance of shipping operators and their flag states and on the other hand, human 
error. Underpinning these causes was not the inadequacy of existing international 
rules. Rather, the European Commission highlighted the incomplete implementation 
and the insufficient enforcement of the international standards (CEC Com 66/93: 10 - 
11). In addressing these weaknesses the European Commission proposed an action 
programme resting on four pillars. These encompassed the convergent 
implementation of existing international standards, uniform enforcement of 
international rules by port states, development of traffic surveillance infrastructure 
and the strengthening of the role of EU in international maritime safety rule-making.
7 CEC Financial and Fiscal Measures concerning shipping operations with Ships registered in the 
Community (Sec 921/89).
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In particular the European Commission emphasised the importance of port state 
control in ensuring that flag states comply with international standards. In the 
following years, resting on the European Commission proposals several measures 
were endorsed implementing international standards. The primary objective of these 
initiatives was to prevent shipping companies from lowering safety standards in
O
obtaining an advantage over competitors. Although there may have been differences 
on the details of the measures, Greece remained in agreement with the principles 
underlying EU legislation on maritime transport. By acknowledging the primacy of 
the international level, the EU concentrated on strengthening the implementation and 
enforcement of international standards by the member states.
Nevertheless, the number of vessels flying the EU flag fell, eroding the
competitiveness of EU shipping. Although EU ownership in shipping remained
substantial accounting for a third of world tonnage, over half was transferred to open
registries (Papaioannou 1996). In response, the European Commission introduced a
new set of proposals in March 1996 with its Communication “Towards a new
maritime strategy” (CEC Com 81/96). It was recognised that the cost differentials
arising from manning and taxes placed EU shipping at a competitive disadvantage,
rendering inevitable the decision of re-flagging to open registries. It was estimated
that the proportion of world tonnage under EU member state flags declined from
thirty-two percent in 1970 to fourteen percent in 1995. In addition, flagging-out had
ramifications for maritime safety by reducing the flag state control power of EU
member states. The use of EU flags entailed that the safety standards of vessels could
be closely monitored by the EU member states (CEC Com 81/96). In implementing
8 Directive on Classification Societies 57/94, Directive o Port State Control (21/95), Directive on 
Notification obligations (75/93), Regulation on Segregated Ballast Tanks (2978/94), Regulation ISM 
Code (3051/95).
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the maritime strategy, the European Commission proposed a series of measures 
encompassing maritime safety, the protection of open markets and the promotion of 
the competitiveness of EU shipping. Regarding safety the European Commission 
emphasised the convergent application of internationally agreed standards. In 
ensuring this across all flags, it was proposed that the non-binding resolution of the 
IMO were converted to compulsory EU legislation. In conjunction, the strengthening 
of port state control and flag state control were underscored as well as a legislative 
measure with the intention of improving the quality of EU registries (Interview with 
Head of Maritime Transport Policy and Maritime Safety of European Commission 
April 2006, Official of Unit Aerospace, Defence and Maritime Industries of European 
Commission March 2006). However, the principles underlying the maritime strategy 
on safety were questioned by the IMO. It was countered that the only appropriate 
venue for the conversion of IMO recommendatory standards to compulsory 
legislation was the IMO (Mitropoulos 1996). It was argued that such EU initiatives 
could lead to the formation of tiers of regulation across different regions of the world, 
undermining the smooth operation of shipping. Greece concurred with the IMO 
approach, welcoming measures for the enhancement of safety at sea that were within 
the international framework, as defined by the IMO but objecting to any form of 
regional measures (Soumakis 1996, Manos 1996, Interview with Director of Hellenic 
Chamber of Shipping May 2006, Interview with member of Greek Shipping 
Cooperation Committee Council March 2006).
Recapitulating, by contrast to the mandate of the IMO that concentrated on issues of 
maritime safety and the prevention of marine pollution, the Common Maritime 
Transport Policy encompassed measures concerning the competitiveness of EU
shipping as well as maritime safety. In combining the commercial and safety aspects 
of maritime transport, it was maintained that open competition and the prevention of 
substandard shipping would enhance the competitive position of EU flagged shipping. 
With respect to the opening of the EU maritime transport trades, Greece adopted an 
inconsistent approach that reflected the free trade principles of its ocean-going sector 
and the protectionist approach of the coastal shipping sector. In parallel, in spite of 
differences regarding the content of measures, Greece was in agreement with the 
principles underpinning the EU maritime safety measures. It was accepted that the 
IMO was the appropriate level for the adoption of rules with the EU promoting 
consistent implementation and uniform enforcement of the international rules. 
However, the 1996 maritime strategy included proposals that departed from the status 
quo, challenging the exclusivity of the IMO as the organisation competent for safety 
of navigation and marine environment protections issues.
3.3 EU politics, organised shipping and the Greek shipowners
Alongside national associations, shipping interests have a long history of associability 
beyond the national level, stemming from the international nature of the industry. 
Only a handful remained active since their inception in the early twentieth century, 
whilst most of the associations founded were either merged or subsumed into larger 
entities. In most instances the original objectives of the associations were revised and 
in only a few cases the initial purpose involved political lobbying and influencing 
legislation (Interview with Secretary of International Chamber of Shipping February 
2006, Interview with International Affairs Liaison of Baltic and International 
Maritime Council March 2006). It was argued that these entities blurred the dividing 
lines between international organisations with a legislative mandate and industry 
associations promoting the interests of their members (Strange 1976). This was 
exemplified by the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(Intertanko) that was at first engaged in the Schierwater Scheme that shaped the 
supply of tanker tonnage by laying-up surplus tankers. Benefiting from the higher 
freight returns, the tankers remaining in trade would contribute ten percent of their 
freight income to the owners of the vessels placed in lay-up. Although similar 
schemes were initiated in the subsequent decades, notably the International Tanker 
Recovery Scheme in 1962, the distinction between international regulatory 
organisations and industry associations was only crystallised with the establishment of 
the IMO. The industry associations gained consultative status at the new international 
organisation while the right to vote was reserved to the member states. Likewise, as 
EU competence grew in the regulation of maritime transport, there was growing
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evidence of engagement and lobbying by industry associations at the European level. 
In analysing the involvement of industry associations in EU policy-making and the 
role of the Greek shipowners, attention was drawn to five organisations, the European 
Community Shipowners’ Association (ECSA), the International Chamber of 
Shipping, Intertanko, the International Association of Dry Cargo Owners (Intercargo) 
and the Baltic and International Maritime council (BIMCO). Moreover, there was a 
plethora of shipping organisations that were engaging with the EU institutions, 
notably the European Liner Affairs Association (ELAA), the European Sea Ports 
Organisation (ESPO), the European Tugowners Associations (ETA) and the Alliance of Maritime
Regional Interests in Europe (AMRIE). Nonetheless, with respect to Greek shipowners and in the 
context of the case studies examined in the dissertation, this section concentrated on an analysis of the 
five major shipowners’ industry associations.
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) was the international trade association 
for merchant shipowners. ICS membership comprised forty-four national shipowner 
associations representing over half of the world's merchant fleet across all industry 
segments including dry bulk, tanker, liner and passenger shipping. The ICS was 
organised in specialist committees that consisted of representatives from the national 
shipowner associations. The committees were responsible for the formulation 
international shipping policy and agreeing on positions to be adopted in international 
fora and especially the IMO (Interview with Secretary of International Chamber of 
Shipping February 2006). Due to its composition, the ICS sought to reach a consensus 
amongst shipowners from different countries and across different sectors. The ICS 
maintained a consultative status at the IMO which allowed its representatives to 
observe deliberations and express the opinion of the shipowners. According to the 
ICS, maritime safety and marine pollution preventions standards should be adopted at
the international level and it was opposed to any form of national or regional 
measures that could cause commercial distortions (ICS Statement of Purpose 2006, 
Interview with Secretary of International Chamber of Shipping February 2006). It was 
maintained that the ICS was particularly influential in promoting the interests of 
shipowners at the international level (Strange 1976). In tandem, within the ICS there 
was an asymmetry of influence as shipowner associations from traditional maritime 
countries especially the UGS were more influential in shaping policies and common 
positions. Alongside different fee contributions, the national associations that actively 
attended internal meetings, provided technical knowledge and voiced their positions 
on issues of interest were the most influential.
At the European level a variety of organisations were established to represent the 
interests of shipowners. In the early post-war years it was acknowledged that 
shipowners were poorly represented at the European level (Farthing 1987, Erdmenger 
1983). In response to the adoption of protectionist measures in the form of cargo 
preference regimes, the European shipowners formed the Committee of European 
Shipowners (CES) and the Committee of European National Shipowners’ 
Associations (CENSA) in the late 1950s. The Greek shipowners were prominent 
members of both associations (Ronit 1995: 185 -  6). In 1974 these two organisations 
merged together with the Japanese Association of Shipowners to form the Council of 
European and Japanese National Shipowners’ Associations (CENSA) originally as an 
ad hoc arrangement. Alongside the Japanese shipowners CENSA was composed by 
thirteen European shipowner associations, including the UGS. CENSA sought the 
promotion of free and fair international trading conditions through a multilateral 
approach rather than regional or unilateral measures (Farthing 1987). Over the years
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CENSA concentrated on the commercial aspects of international shipping, becoming 
involved in maritime trade discussions within the OECD, representing shipowners in 
the negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and 
lobbying the US Congress on liner shipping issues through a Washington 
representative. However, due to the overlap with the activities pursued by the ICS, 
there was a gradual convergence between the two organisations (Lloyd’s List August 
14, 1996). Eventually, in January 2002 CENSA was subsumed into the Shipping 
Policy Committee of the ICS (Fairplay January 10, 2002).
As the European Community (EC) possessed limited competence in the regulation of 
maritime transport, there was an absence of engagement by the CES and CENSA. 
Exchanges with the EC remained marginal and were delegated instead to the Comite 
des Associations d’Armateurs des Communautes Europeennes (CAACE) which was 
established in 1965. It was initially described as a ‘letterhead’ association as it 
represented a fraction of European shipowners and was endowed with limited 
resources. In December 1973 the CAACE put forward its first proposals to the 
European Commission calling for the incorporation of shipping clauses in the EC’s 
trade agreements (Erdmenger 1983: 83). However, underpinned by successive waves 
of enlargement and the expansion of EC competence in maritime transport, the 
CAACE became the foremost representative of shipowner interests at the EC level. In 
June 1990 the association was reorganised and renamed as the European Community 
Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA). ECSA maintained a permanent secretariat in 
Brussels, disseminating information and promoting the industry’s positions through a 
number of specialised committees. In representing the interests of shipowners at the 
European level, the ICS worked closely with ECSA (Interview with Executive
Advisor to the European Community Shipowners’ Association March 2006). Indeed, 
the membership of ECSA comprised the national shipowner associations of the EU 
member states and Norway and these associations were concurrently members of the 
ICS. Nevertheless, alongside their ECSA membership, certain national shipowner 
associations sought direct representation at the EU level. In monitoring developments 
at the EU level and establishing direct contact, the Danish Shipowners Association 
and the Swedish Shipowners Association maintained permanent physical presence in 
Brussels (Interview with Head of Brussels Representation of Swedish Shipowners’ 
Association April 2006, Interview with Director of Danish Shipowners’ Association 
March 2006, Interview with Head of International and Defence Policy of the Chamber 
of Shipping March 2006). However, the UGS had not established permanent 
representation in Brussels, relying on ECSA to represent its interests within the EU 
institutions. Over the years, it was acknowledged that the UGS was influential in 
shaping the policies and positions of ECSA (Aspinwall 1995: 37, Ronit 1995: 188). 
As in the case of the ICS, this was attributed to the active participation of the UGS in 
the internal ECSA committees and the provision of technical knowledge and research. 
At the same time, the GSCC was a member neither of the ICS nor of the ECSA and 
had not sought permanent representation at the EU level. Rather, its close cooperation 
with the UGS ensured access to the resources and networks of ECSA, whilst on issues 
of importance the GSCC mobilized directly in contacting European Commission 
officials and MEPs. In addition, it could be argued that the position of the Greek 
shipowners was strengthened with the admittance of the Cyprus Shipping Council and 
the Malta International Shipping Council to ESCA in parallel to the accession of 
Cyprus and Malta to the EU. The open registries of Cyprus and Malta encompassed a 
sizeable share of Greek owned vessels (Interview with Secretary-General of Cyprus
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Shipping Council April 2006). In turn, the Greek shipowners exerted influence within 
the respective industry associations of Cyprus and Malta. In seeking to influence EU 
policy-making the ESCA was engaged in a variety of activities. Notably in February 
2003 ECSA in collaboration with the Greek EU Presidency organised an exhibition in 
Brussels to promote the image of the shipping industry. However, ECSA was 
criticised at times for being ‘too close to the European Commission’ in seeking to 
mediate between the shipowners and the EU institutions rather than effectively 
representing the positions of its members (Interview with Shipowner March 2006). In 
tandem, as the ECSA positions rested on compromises between the diverse interests 
of the EU shipowners, national positions could be diluted.
Alongside national shipowner associations, independent tanker and dry bulk owners 
were represented by Intertanko and Intergarco respectively. Historically these 
organisations were engaged in the representation of their members’ interests at the 
international level, particularly at the IMO and the US Coast Guard. As the EU 
expanded its competence in maritime transport regulation, particularly Intertanko 
committed increasing resources in monitoring regulatory output and seeking to 
influence legislation at the EU level (Djonne April 2005, Djonne January 2004, Swift 
March 2004). The dry bulk industry was historically fragmented into numerous 
operators with small fleets (Nomikos and Alizadeh 2002). In fostering a collective 
voice for this sector, the Greek shipowner Anthony J. Chandris promoted the 
formation of a forum for dry bulk owners in the late 1970s. This initiative led to the 
founding of Intercargo in 1980 with the purpose of facilitating dialogue between dry 
bulk shipowners and promoting their interests in international fora. Over the years the 
association grew to 63 owner members with Greek shipowners representing
approximately fifty percent of membership (Intercargo Annual Review 2004 -  05). 
Over the first decade if its existence Intercargo represented dry bulk owners at 
UNCTAD and concentrated on the commercial aspects of shipping (Interview with 
Manager of Intercargo March 2006). Since gaining consultative status at the IMO in 
1993, Intercargo became increasingly involved in issues of maritime safety and the 
regulation of the dry bulk sector. Commencing from September 2003 Intercargo 
shares a joint secretariat with Intertanko and draws from the resources of the later in 
lobbying at the EU level (Interview with Manager of Intercargo March 2006).
Against the background of adverse economic conditions, the International Tanker 
Owner’s Association was founded in 1934. The objective of the association was to 
facilitate cooperation amongst tanker owners in adjusting to market conditions. 
According to one of its founding members, the purpose of the imitative was “to 
establish a medium for tanker owners to exchange information and opinions and to 
deal with the oversupply of tanker tonnage which depressed the market at the time” 
(Intertanko January 2001). In 1970 the organisation was reorganised as the 
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), circumscribing 
its membership solely to independent tanker owners. Over this period, membership 
rose to 160 million dwt corresponding to seventy-five percent of eligible membership 
in the tanker industry. In conjunction, in the early 1970s Greek independent tanker 
owners overtook in terms of tonnage their Norwegian counterparts within Intertanko. 
There were forty-four Greek member companies which rose to sixty-one in 2005 
accounting for twenty-four percent of Intertanko total membership (Intertanko Annual 
Report 2004-05). The sizeable presence of Greek tanker shipowners underpinned the 
formation of the Hellenic Forum and Committee within Intertanko. Bringing together
all the major Greek independent operators in the tanker sector, the Hellenic Forum 
was intended to discuss and promote the positions and strategies of Intertanko with 
respect to free competition, maritime safety and marine pollution prevention. Indeed, 
over the past three decades the association gradually departed from direct market 
involvement and became increasingly involved in representing the interests of its 
members firstly at the IMO and the US Coast Guard and subsequently at the EU. 
Intertanko maintained an effective network in the EU from the beginning of the 
1990s. The first formal visit of an Intertanko Chairman to the European Commission 
was traced to 1993, whilst in 1998 Intertanko organised a Brussels tanker event to 
raise the profile of the industry in the EU institutions (Djonne April 2006). The EU 
strategies of Intertanko involved lobbying the Council member states through the 
tanker operators of the respective countries, working closely with allies in the 
European Commission and European Parliament and liaising with non-EU member 
states such as the US, Japan and Norway (Djonne January 2004). Particularly in the 
aftermath of maritime accidents, ‘damage limitation’ procedures were developed in 
proactively addressing the causes of the accident and highlighting the improving 
maritime safety record of the tanker industry. In January 2004 following a period of 
intense lobbying with the EU, foremost on the issue of single-hull tankers, the 
Intertanko European Reference Group (IERG) was established. Consisting of 
European members of the Intertanko Council, the purpose of the IERG was to build 
up contacts with the respective national governments to facilitate exchanges on issues 
that were being negotiated at the EU institutions (Intertanko Press Release January 
2004, Naftika Chronika January 2004).
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In monitoring EU policy developments and undertaking lobbying efforts Intertanko 
contracted a political consultancy, ADS-Insight, in the late 1990s. The political 
consultancy assisted Intertanko in monitoring and providing information on the 
legislative output and political developments at the EU institutions, identifying key 
contacts and allies in the European Commission and the European Parliament and 
advising on lobbying strategies (Djonne April 2005, Djonne January 2004). This 
reflected the increasing importance of commercial consultancies in the process of 
interest representation at the EU level (Lahusen 2002, Lahusen 2003). It was argued 
that the institutional configuration of the EU was conducive to the development of 
political consultancies. Indeed, the Treaty of Amsterdam expanded the co-decision 
procedure to the regulation of maritime transport, offering a number of access points 
for industry associations seeking to influence legislation. On the one hand, the rapid 
expansion of EU legislation entailed an opportunity for political consultants to 
provide monitoring services, analysis and strategic advice. On the other hand, political 
consultancies were utilised as additional voices or access points in advancing sectoral 
interests. In turn, the decision to contract a political consultancy was associated to the 
resources of industry associations, the need for additional support and the perception 
of political consultancies as a useful tool in furthering interests (Lahusen 2002). These 
criteria were fulfilled in the case of Intertanko as it was one of the best endowed 
industry associations (Intertanko Annual Report 2004-05, Intertanko Annual Report 
2002-03). In parallel to the expansion of EU competence in maritime transport, it was 
recognised that Intertanko should be in a position to inform its members on EU 
developments, represent their interests effectively and engage in lobbying activities to 
influence EU legislation.
91
An additional channel of indirect influence to the EU institutions was the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO). Indeed, in January 1905 the following 
telegraph exchange occurred between the British shipowner Thomas Cairns and the 
Danish shipowner Johan Hansen that led to the to founding of BIMCO in February 
2005:
“With reference Baltic homeward rates coming season can you bring about 
understanding amongst Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, German owners to act 
with British owners demand not high but reasonable rates?”
"I do not for a moment believe that we should be able to regulate freights, but 
it is beyond doubt that when it is known that such meeting has taken place and 
the various associations would bind themselves not to accept freight under a 
certain reasonable minimum, I believe this alone might influence the market in 
the right direction” (Lloyd’s List October 23, 2003).
As the association evolved over the years, amongst its principal objectives was to 
ensure that the shipping “industry’s position and pragmatic solutions were brought to 
the attention of the US, EU and other global maritime authorities” (BIMCO January 
2006). The membership of BIMCO was diverse with the main constituencies being 
shipowners, shipbrokers and agents. The owner-members of BIMCO controlled a 
fleet of 550 million dwt accounting for sixty-five percent of the world’s dry bulk and 
tanker fleet. Amongst the 903 owner members, the Greek tanker operators represent 
approximately thirty to forty percent of total membership. BIMCO actively engaged 
with IMO working groups and sub-committees, the EU and the United States Coast 
Guard in promoting the interests of its members (Interview with BIMCO International 
Affairs Liaison March 2006). In particular, it was maintained that BIMCO sought
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“...to fight against the increasing regulatory burden placed upon the shipping 
industry.... alarmed by the sheer volume of rules and regulations, BIMCO aims to 
ensure that further initiatives for new legislation were practical and justified and 
reflect the true state of shipping”. Over the past decade, BIMCO committed 
increasing resources in developing its networks of contacts in the European 
Commission and European Parliament. In improving its access to the European 
Commission, BIMCO appointed the former European Commissioner Neil Kinnock as 
its EU Liaison Officer and advisor on EU maritime affairs in January 2005. It was 
anticipated that the EU liaison officer would “.. .assist BIMCO in its aim of positively 
engaging in the maritime policy debates in a constructive way and contribute to our 
own considerable body of knowledge, expertise and experience” (Tung 2005, 
Interview with Executive Director of European Liner Affairs Association April 2006, 
Interview with Executive Advisor of European Community Shipowners Association 
March 2006).
Due to the concurrent presence of several industry associations, discussions were held 
in the late 1990s to examine an optimal arrangement in representing shipowners at the 
EU and international levels. The ICS, Intertanko, Intercargo, BIMCO and CENSA 
considered schemes on improving cooperation, pooling resources and eliminating 
duplication {Lloyd’s List October 31, 1998). In 1999 the industry associations agreed 
to form the Round Table of International Maritime Associations in institutionalising 
their informal exchanges. Through the Round Table the industry associations would 
coordinate their activities on general topics, allowing each individual association to 
concentrate on distinct issues pertaining to the interests of their members (Interview 
with Manager of Intercargo March 2006, Interview with BIMCO International Affairs 
Liaison March 2006, Interview with Secretary of International Chamber of Shipping
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March 2006). In 2004 the Round Table was reorganised and according to the revised 
mandate it was intended to provide a strong and unified shipowner voice at 
international fora, ensure optimal use of limited resources and resolve conflicts in 
policies between shipowners (Round Table Strategic Plan October 2005). It was 
recognised that in the aftermath of maritime accidents, the response of shipowners 
was spasmodic and confusing with industry associations sending divergent messages 
to national governments, the media and the general public. The Round Table was 
active in the preparation of joint submissions to the IMO and common positions to the 
EU. Furthermore, in establishing a formal interface with the European Parliament, the 
Round Table formed the Intergroup on Maritime Affairs in 2005 (Interview with 
Secretary of International Chamber of Shipping February 2006). This vehicle enabled 
industry associations to communicate their viewpoints and interests to MEPs. The 
purpose was to attract MEPs that do not have knowledge of the shipping industry with 
the expectation of influencing legislation in forthcoming negotiations. Yet, rather than 
informing MEPs on the issues of the shipping industry, the Intergroup was criticised 
for “preaching to the converted” in drawing MEPs who were already engaged with 
the industry associations.
Table 3: Industry Associations and Greek Shipowners
ICS ECSA Intertanko Intercargo BIMCO
MembersNp National Shipowners 
Associations
National Shipowners Independent Tanker 
Associations Operators
Independent Dry Bulk 
Operators
Shipowners, 
Shipbrokers, Agents
Resources vis-a-vis EU Close cooperation with 
ECSA
Permanent Secretariat in Contracted political 
Brussels consultancy 
Experience of EU politics European Reference Group 
Access to EU institutions Access to EU institutions
Joint Secretariat with 
Intertanko
Appointed high-profile 
EU Liaison Officer 
Access to EU institutions
Greek presence
UGS, HCS, CSC, 
LSC*
61 independent tanker 
operators**,
24% of total membership, 
UGS, CSC, MISC Hellenic Committee
30 independent dry bulk -30-40% of owner
C
owners*** 50% of total membership**** 
membership
* Union of Greek Shipowners, Hellenic Chamber of Shipping, Cyprus Shipping Council, Liberia Shipowners' Council, M alta International Shipping Council. 
"  Members by registration country, total of 252 members (Intertanko Annual Report 2005).
"•M em bers by country, total of 61members (Intercargo Annual Review 2004-05).
""M em b e rs  by country, 903 owners and operators, total of 2396 members (B IM CO Piraeus Presentation June 2005).
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In sum, in monitoring EU developments and seeking to favourably shape the EU 
policy-making process, the UGS and the GSCC drew from the resources and 
networks of several major industry associations. Due to the international nature of the 
shipping industry, shipping interests had a long history of associability beyond the 
national level. Although the ICS, ECSA, Intertanko/Intergarco and BIMCO were 
founded on different principles and objectives, these industry associations expanded 
their presence and increasingly committed resources in shaping the EU policy-making 
process. Nonetheless, it was argued that in comparison to other industries, the 
financial resources that shipowners committed to lobbying were limited (Van Dyck 
2005, Fairplay March 31, 2005). With the purpose of avoiding duplication and 
pooling resources the ICS, Intertanko, Intercargo and BIMCO formed the Round 
Table to effectively promote the interests of the industry at the EU and the IMO. 
Within these organisations, the Greek shipowners developed a strong presence and 
were influential in shaping industry positions. This was attributed to the sizeable 
representation of Greek shipowner interests in the memberships, the provision of 
technical expertise and industry knowledge and the active involvement in the internal 
workings of the industry associations. The Greek members belonging to the 
international industry associations were in turn members of the UGS, the GSCC or 
both. Thus, alongside the Greek government and direct mobilisation at the EU level, 
the Greek shipowners were in a position to draw from the resources and networks of 
the international industry associations in favourably influencing the EU policy­
making process.
3.4 Europeanisation, the IMO and organised shipping
Maritime transport rules and standards are historically negotiated and agreed at the 
international level. In the immediate post-war years, the IMO a specialised UN 
agency was established responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing 
pollution from ships. The mandate of the IMO did not comprise the commercial 
aspects of shipping, as the founding member states and shipowners were opposed to 
any form of intervention in the competitive operation of merchant shipping. In the 
subsequent decades the IMO introduced a series of measures and most notably the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78). Greece 
maintained an influential position in the IMO which was attributed to its membership 
in the IMO Council, the provision of technical expertise and knowledge and active 
attendance in sub-committee and committee meetings. However, the effectiveness of 
the IMO was undermined by the inconsistent implementation of international 
standards, an inadequate enforcement mechanism, slow decision-making process and 
the adoption of lowest common denominator outcomes. The ensuing failings in 
upholding high maritime safety standards opened ‘windows of opportunity’ for the 
expansion of EU competences in maritime transport.
Certainly, the formulation of a common maritime transport policy was not among the 
priorities of the founding members states of the EU. Gradually, maritime transport 
began to figure more prominently on the EU agenda underpinned by landmark ECJ 
rulings, the declining competitiveness of the EC merchant fleet and successive waves
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of enlargement. The accession of the traditional maritime nations of the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Greece increased manifold the size of the EC fleet. In spite of 
the rise in tonnage, the competitiveness of the EC fleet was eroded by the 
protectionist measures of developing countries and the transfer of vessels by 
European shipowners to open registries. With the dual purposes of preparing for the 
single market and enhancing the competitiveness of shipping, the first EC package of 
measures on maritime transport was endorsed in 1986. Subsequently, the common 
maritime transport policy expanded, including the abolition of cabotage trades, 
maritime safety and marine pollution prevention. In combining the commercial and 
safety aspects of maritime transport, it was maintained that open competition and the 
elimination of substandard shipping enhanced the competitive position of EU flagged 
shipping. With respect to the IMO, the EC initially emphasised the primacy of the 
international level, seeking to strengthen the implementation and enforcement of 
internationally accepted standards. However, the 1996 maritime strategy included 
proposals that departed from the status quo, on the one hand, addressing the weakness 
of the IMO and on the other hand, challenging the exclusivity of the IMO in the 
regulation of maritime safety and marine pollution prevention.
Although it was unlikely that shipping companies would engage directly with the EU 
institutions, there is evidence of the mobilization of Greek shipowners through the 
national association and European association routes. The lobbying strategies of the 
Greek shipowners are examined in more detail in the subsequent case studies, whilst 
this chapter concentrated on the usage of the European route. The international nature 
of the shipping industry entailed the long-standing existence of several European and 
international industry associations, with the UGS and the GSCC drawing from their
resources and networks. With the exception of ECSA which concentrates on 
European lobbying, the ICS, Intertanko/Intergarco and BIMCO were established with 
different mandates, turning their attention to the EU in the past decade. The sizeable 
representation in the memberships, the provision of technical expertise and the active 
attendance of internal meetings underpin the influential position of Greek shipowners 
in these industry associations.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4: The Greek shipowners and state-business relations
In the post-authoritarian years, the primary characteristics of Greek politics were an 
oversized, yet weak state, inept public administration, undeveloped civil society and 
the prevalence of party politics and clientelism (Featherstone 2005, Pagoulatos 2003, 
Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002, Lavdas 1997, Sotiropoulos 1993, Tsoukalas 1993, 
Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, Lyrintzis 1984, Mouzelis 1978). Attention was drawn 
to the central position of the political parties in penetrating the Greek state and stifling 
the development of alternative forms of political representation. Yet, there was 
increasing evidence that business associability did not follow the general pattern of 
weak interest politics. Rather, business interests were organised in associations that 
retained their autonomy from both state involvement and party penetration (Lavdas 
2005, Aranitou 2002, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Ioannou 2000, Lavdas 1997, Legg 
1969). Resting on this approach, this chapter analyses the patterns of interaction 
between the Greek state and shipowners. On the one hand, Greek ocean-going 
shipowners controlled the largest fleet of dry bulk and tanker vessels comprising 3338 
vessels and accounting for 17.1 percent of world tonnage (dwt) (Lloyd’s Register -  
Fairplay March 2006, UGS Annual Report 2004 -  05). On the other hand, Greek 
coastal shipowners were integral in transporting the largest number of ferry 
passengers in the EU for 2004 and contributing to the social cohesion and territorial 
integrity of the islands with the Greek mainland (ESPO National Statistics 2004). 
Hence, the primary question that emerges is to what extent this sizeable economic 
presence was manifested in the development of autonomous shipowner associations 
and the exertion of political influence? In tandem, drawing from existing theoretical 
interpretations of state-business relations, what were the patterns of interaction
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between the state and the Greek shipowners? This chapter provides an analysis of the 
domestic formal and factual veto points that constituted the domestic institutional 
arrangement as a basis for interpreting the political implications of European 
integration in the following chapters.
The chapter commences with an examination of the nature of the Greek state. Despite 
the extensive presence of the state in the regulation of the national economy and a 
large public sector, the Greek state is characterised by weakness. Resting on greater 
organisational resources, legitimacy and internal cohesiveness, the political parties 
penetrated and instrumentalised the state. Characterised by ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ 
and ‘machine politics’ the incumbent political party distributed favours and jobs to 
party loyalists through the state mechanisms. Against this background the 
organisational resources, legitimacy and internal cohesiveness of the Ministry of 
Mercantile Marine (YEN) are examined. Subsequently, the development of business 
associability and the autonomy of business interests are analysed. There was wide 
agreement that Greek civil society was weak and underdeveloped, underpinned by a 
political culture of mistrust and individualism. In parallel, party politics dominated 
civil society, stifling the emergence of alternative forms of political representation. 
However, it was argued that this approach downplayed the autonomy of business 
interests in the political process. The business associations of the ocean-going and 
coastal shipowners were examined in deciphering their political influence and 
autonomy vis-a-vis the state and political parties. Resting on the analysis of the nature 
of the Greek state and the autonomy of shipowner interests, the chapter turns to the 
interpretation of the interactions between the state and shipowners as a state 
corporatist arrangement. The emergence of this configuration is attributed to the
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autonomy and structural power of the shipowners and not the state domination of the 
shipping sector. Moreover, it is argued that ocean-going shipowners maintained a 
substantial degree of capital mobility as opposed to the coastal shipowners who were 
more embedded at the national level. In tandem, the ocean-going shipowners 
constitute the primary formal veto point, whilst the coastal shipowners contend with 
the influential factual veto point of the island communities. This provides empirical 
insights in relation to the existing literature on the structure and number of veto points 
for the process of political change.
4.1 The Weakness of the Greek state
The state was central to the economic development of Greece, underpinned by a 
cultural tradition that favoured state paternalism over the modem institutions of 
capitalism, (Diamandouros 1994: 11, Diamandouros 1993, Tsoukalas 1993: 62). The 
state exercised disproportionate influence over the economy, through regulation, 
protectionist measures, transfers and subsidies. However, these instmments were 
employed in a particularistic manner, favouring certain industrial sectors and business 
interests (Sotiropoulos 2004). The centrality of the state was primarily attributed to 
the late industrialisation of the Greek economy and its dependence on the Greek 
diaspora and foreign capital (Demertzis 1995, Mouzelis 1993, Mouzelis 1978). The 
foreign origin and employment of capital were associated to the emergence of a 
(semi-) peripheral, underdeveloped form of capitalism in Greece (Diamandouros 
1994: 23, Giner 1982: 176, Mouzelis 1978). Rather than manufacturing, these capital 
funds were directed by a ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie towards activities such as banking, 
commerce and shipping (Mouzelis 1978: 20 -  1). The ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie were
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members of the local bourgeoisie, including shipowners and not owning the means of 
production, acted as mediators of foreign capital (Harlaftis 1993: 66, Mouzelis 1978: 
27). Throughout the twentieth century indigenous Greek capital concentrated on the 
“non-manufacturing sector.. .shifting a considerable part of its profits to foreign banks 
or to shipping” (Mouzelis 1978: 28, 36 -  7, Boutros and Minoglou 2006). The state 
evolved in conjunction with a large and fragmented agricultural sector, a small 
industrial sector and a productive base consisting of small and medium-sized 
companies that were primarily family-owned (Pagoulatos 2004: 47, Demertzis 1995, 
de Jong 1995, Gianitsis 1988, Tsoukalas 1987, Mouzelis 1978: 27).
Despite its extensive presence in the Greek economy and society, the state was 
portrayed as ‘...a colossus with feet of clay’ (Mouzelis 1990). According to this 
perspective, the state was penetrated and instrumentalised by party interests (Mouzelis 
and Pagoulatos 2002, Charalambis 1996, Sotiropoulos 1995, Sotiropoulos 1993, 
Lyrintzis 1984). Particularly in the post-authoritarian years the terms ‘machine 
politics’ and ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ were employed in interpreting the penetration 
of the state by political parties (Mavrogordatos 1993, Lyrintzis 1984). This involved 
the “systematic infiltration of the state machine by party devotees and the allocations 
of favours through it’ as well as the expansion of existing and the establishment of 
new posts and departments in the public sector with the prime intention of preserving 
the party’s electoral base” (Lyrintzis 1984: 103). Patron-client relations referred to 
interpersonal ties that were not based on kinship, whilst ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ 
entailed the formation of clientelistic relationships between collectivities. It was 
argued that “...when the parties for the first time had the organisational capacity to 
reach the country’s remotest villages, and given the hugely increased resources now at
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their disposal, they were able to indulge in clientelistic practices on a much more 
massive scale” (Mouzelis and Sotiropoulos 2002). The employment and appointment 
of party cadres converted the state into a tool for the allocation of favours by the 
governing party (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002: 9, Featherstone 1990: 101-2, 
Lyrintzis 1984: 103). It was noted that the organizational structure of the socialist 
party PASOK involved the reconfiguration of interpersonal clientelist ties through the 
party mechanism, exchanging rewards and benefits for electoral votes. It was 
maintained that instead of an efficient provider of services, the state became a source 
of recruitment whilst public administration was unable to ensure policy consistency 
(Spanou 2000: 165, Sotiropoulos 1996: 144).
In comparison to political parties, it was argued that the state possessed limited 
organizational resources (Sotiropoulos 1993: 52). Firstly, Greek constitutions 
provided political parties with ample space to shape the procedures and institutions of 
the political process, including the bureaucracy, judiciary and electoral law. Secondly, 
the legitimacy of the state and public administration was low. In the words of one 
commentator, patronage eroded “...the legitimacy of the public administration, 
[whilst] legalism and formalism do not necessarily mean standardization, 
formalization and predictability” (Spanou 1998, Spanou 1996). In converse, the 
distribution of jobs and favours underpinned the legitimacy of political parties 
(Sotiropoulos 1993). Thirdly, the political parties possessed larger technical expertise 
compared to the state bureaucracy. Fourthly, the political parties were internally more 
cohesive than the state institutions. Absence of internal democracy combined with 
paternalistic leadership underscored the discipline and unity within political parties. 
Although internally the public administration was characterized by centralization,
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cohesion was undermined by a multiplicity of overlapping ministries and public 
organizations and the absence of an ‘esprit de corps’ (Sotiropoulos 1993).
As part of the state configuration, the Ministry of Mercantile Marine (Y7roupy£lo 
Ep7iopiicf|<; NauxiAiac;, YEN) was dedicated to shipping. The exigency for a 
specialised shipping Ministry was recognised from the early twentieth century with a 
series of initiatives culminating in the establishment of the YEN in 1936. Following 
the Second World War the YEN headquarters were transferred from Athens to the 
maritime centre of Piraeus in 1945. The purpose of the Ministry was to integrate all 
aspects of maritime transport into a single institution. The mandate of YEN 
encompassed “...the organisation, improvement, protection and development of 
shipping, its connections with the national economy, the promotion of sea tourism, the 
protection of human life and property at sea, Search and Rescue operations, the 
protection of marine environment, the safety of shipping and the formulation of port 
policy” (Article 1 Presidential Decree 242/99). In addition, YEN was responsible for 
maritime education, labour issues, the policing of vessels, ports, territorial waters and 
national borders (Article 1, paragraphs b, c, d, Presidential Decree 242/99).
The broad mandate of YEN included both the formulation of maritime transport 
policy and a policing mission. This was reflected in the institutional configuration of 
YEN with the Hellenic Coast Guard (EMtiviko Aipevuco E6pa, HCG) performing 
both shipping policy and policing functions. Unlike other EU member states, YEN 
and the HCG were intertwined (Interview with Maritime Transport Attache of Greece 
to the International Maritime Organisation April 2006). The HCG was founded in 
1919 with Law 1753 and was composed from personnel of the Directorate of
Merchant Navy and the existing coast guard. Subsequently, in 1936 with Law 345 the 
HCS was incorporated in YEN. It was a paramilitary organisation that operated under 
the political leadership of YEN and in times of war was transferred to the authority of 
the armed forces. Aside from the political leadership of YEN, consisting of the 
Minister, the Secretary General and the Secretary General of Ports and Ports’ Policy, 
the Ministry was composed almost entirely by HCG officers (Papoutsis MP Minutes 
of Hellenic Parliament June 25, 2001). The heads of the Branches and General 
Directorates were senior officers of the HCG. Hence, alongside its policing mission, 
the HCG formulated maritime transport policy, liaised with shipowners and 
represented Greece in international fora and the EU {Figure 1).
Figure 1: YEN Organisation Chart
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National policies on ocean-going shipping were consistent throughout the post­
authoritarian years. Unlike other industries, it was maintained that shipping policies 
were insulated from party politics (Interview with Chairman of GSCC March 2006, 
Interview with Greek Deputy Maritime Transport Attache to IMO April 2006, 
Interview with Greek Maritime Transport Attache to EU March 2006). The national 
policy on merchant shipping was underpinned by the principle of free and fair 
competition and opposition to any form of protectionist measures that could distort 
competition (Legislative Decree 2687/53). In tandem, the international nature of 
shipping necessitated a global, uniform and stable regulatory framework for its 
smooth operation (Interview with Greek Deputy Maritime Transport Attache to IMO 
April 2006, Interview with Vice-Chairman of Greek Shipping Cooperation 
Committee March 2006, Interview with Director of Hellenic Chamber of Shipping 
May 2006, Kefalogiannis 2005, Soumakis 1998, Manos 1998). Unilateral or regional 
measures were opposed as according to a former YEN Minister, the ensuing 
‘regulatory chaos’ “...would have been a plague for shipping, as implementation of
all these contradictory provisions -  if at all possible -  would have been extremely 
costly” (Soumakis 1998). Resting on this set of principles, the strategic objective of 
YEN was the protection and promotion of the competitiveness of Greek shipping. 
This was embodied in the repatriation (epanapatrismos) strategy of YEN with respect 
to Greek-owned shipping through the registration of their vessels on the Greek 
registry, the relocation of Greek companies to the national economy, the promotion of 
the port of Piraeus as an international shipping centre and the modernisation of 
maritime infrastructure (Kefalogiannis 2005, Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament 
Sessions March 2, 2006, Aspinwall 1995: 75, Harlaftis 1993: 143, Vlachos 1958). 
Notably, a favourable investment legislative framework and the tonnage tax regime 
were established to attract the repatriation of Greek-owned shipping.
The national policy on coastal shipping was the single exception to the liberal 
approach of the Greek state regarding the shipping industry (Interview with Member 
of the Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee Council March 2006). Coastal 
shipping was organised as a cabotage trade, reserving the provision of services solely 
to passenger ferries with a Greek flag. Central to the institutional configuration for 
almost three decades was the system of licences, allocated to coastal shipowners for 
specified routes and of indefinite duration (Interview with Director of Hellenic 
Institute of Transport April 2006, Interview with Legal Advisor of Attica Group 
March 2006). This was devised with the purpose of preventing ‘catastrophic 
competition’ between coastal shipowners, ‘predatory pricing’ against passengers, 
whilst ensuring the social cohesion and territorial integrity of the islands with 
mainland Greece. YEN was responsible for regulating market entry, issuance of 
operational licenses, setting the fares, crew composition, imposition of public service
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obligations and enforcement of licence terms (Interview with Legal Advisor of Attica 
Group April 2006, Giannopoulos and Aifandopulou-Klimis 2004, Psaraftis 1998). In 
allocating licences the YEN Minister was aided by the Coastal Transport Advisory 
Committee (TvcofjoSoTiKrj EmTpOTtrj AiczoTzXo'iKcbv ZvyKOivcovicbv, CTAC).9 Over the 
years, the coastal shipowners holding the licences remained largely unchanged fostering a 
‘machine politics’ arrangement with YEN. Notwithstanding affiliations with individual 
coastal shipowners, of two leading political parties neither PASOK nor New 
Democracy questioned the core principles of the system of licences throughout the 
post-authoritarian period.
The transference of the functions of YEN to other Ministries and the institutional 
separation from the HCG was a recurring theme in Greek politics (Interview with 
Member of Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee Council February 2006). 
Notwithstanding an interlude in 1971, YEN survived a number of calls for its 
integration within other Ministries. Notably in May 1969 on his first visit to YEN, the 
head of the military regime, George Papadopoulos stated “...according to which 
principles was it deemed necessary that YEN should consist of Coast Guard 
officers... this question remains unanswered even following today’s presentation” 
(Papadopoulos 1969, Papadopoulos 1968). Within two years YEN was converted into 
a deputy ministry within the Ministry of Transport and Communications (YME), 
whilst certain functions were transferred to the Ministries of National Economy and 
Labour. Nevertheless, due to difficulties in integrating the HCG into the YME and the 
opposition of the shipowners, an autonomous YEN was reinstated by the military
9 Six of the twelve members of the CTAC were government officials or appointed by the YEN 
Minister. The remaining six were split amongst four representatives of coastal shipping, a 
representative of the Piraeus Chamber of Commerce and Industry and one representative from the 
National Tourist Organisation as an articulator o f consumers’ interests.
regime in 1971 (Harlaftis 1993). Likewise, in the summer of 1985 the newly elected 
PASOK government initiated the replacement of YEN with a secretariat under the 
Ministry of National Economy as part of draft legislation on the reorganisation of the 
Ministries. Combined with resistance from the HCG, the UGS opposed the proposals, 
stating that the downgrading of YEN would accelerate the re-flagging of Greek- 
owned vessels to open registries. Within weeks, the proposals were withdrawn with 
the Minister of the Interior justifying the decision on the basis “...not only of 
historical and national, but also of special economic reasons” (Koutsogiorgas MP 
Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions July 10, 1985). In 1997 and again in 
2002, the reform of YEN and its disentanglement from the HCG were put forward {To 
Vima January 14, 2001, Naftemporiki July 22, 1997). The proposed amendments 
suggested the internal reorganisation of YEN and the assignment of a larger share of 
policy-making responsibilities to civil servants. It was argued that shipping policy 
should not be conducted by the coastal guard (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament 
Sessions February 16, 2001). Rather, the policing mission of the Coastal Guard and 
the policy-making responsibilities of YEN should be separated within a corresponding 
institutional configuration. This was a constant request of politicians from the left 
who sought the ‘democratisation’ of YEN and its disentanglement from the HCG 
(Skopelitis MP Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions February 16, 2001). In 
both instances the UGS and GSCC opposed the proposals as it was perceived that the 
reform of YEN would instigate broader changes to the existing regulatory framework. 
In tandem, it was claimed that the existence of YEN was a symbol of the significance 
of Greek merchant shipping and that maritime transport policy-making required the 
expertise and long experience of the HCG officers. A counter-proposal from the UGS
110
was the concentration of YEN on merchant shipping and the transference of coastal 
shipping to another Ministry.
Despite the continuity in maritime transport policy, YEN was not entirely insulated 
from party politics. Penetration of YEN by party politics was evident in the 
employment, promotion and evaluation of HCG officers. Illustratively, in 1993 the 
newly elected government almost immediately replaced five commodores, three 
admirals and the maritime transport attache to the IMO (Kathimerini November 16, 
1993). In the period from 1993 to 1995 it was claimed that over eighty HCG senior 
officers were prematurely retired for party-political reasons. In the words of the 
parliamentarian who quoted these numbers, in the HCG “...there is an absence of 
meritocracy, with employment and approval depending on party affiliations” (Varinos 
MP Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions June 25, 2001). Similarly, it was 
stated that the employment and promotion of HCG officers was to a large extent 
conducted according to political and not meritorious criteria, which was exemplified 
in the appointment of Maritime Transport Attaches in Greek embassies abroad 
(Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions January 12, 2004, Varvitsiotis MP 
Minutes of Hellenic Parliament Sessions June 25, 2003, Minutes of Hellenic 
Parliament Sessions December 12, 2002,). The procedures for the employment, 
evaluation and education of officers were the subject of several legislative initiatives. 
It was suggested that YEN and the HCG should adopt an organisational model similar 
to the leadership structure of the armed forces, which was partially insulated from 
party politics because of the absence of a General Secretariat (Pavlopoulos MP 
Minutes of Hellenic Parliament Sessions June 25, 2001).
Therefore, historically the Greek state had a large presence in the national economy 
through regulation, protectionism, transfer and subsidies, whilst an extensive public 
sector became a significant source of employment. Nonetheless, it was maintained 
that the state was weak, lacking in organisational resources, legitimacy, technical 
expertise and internal cohesiveness. Particularly in the post-authoritarian years, the 
state was penetrated and instrumentalised by party political interests, characterised by 
‘bureaucratic clientelism’ and ‘machine politics’. The prevalent patron-client relations 
were reorganised through the party mechanisms into clientelist ties between 
collectivities, exchanging rewards and favours for electoral votes and party loyalty. 
The employment and appointment of party followers converted the state into a tool 
for the allocation of favours by the governing party. In recognition of the importance 
of shipping for the Greek economy, YEN was established to integrate all aspects of 
maritime transport. Unlike other civilian Ministries, YEN was intertwined with the 
HCG and was predominantly composed of HCG officers. Hence, alongside its 
policing mission, the HCG was involved in the formulation of maritime transport 
policy, labour issues, maritime education and the representation of Greece in 
international fora such as the IMO and the EU. The disentanglement of the shipping 
policy and policing functions and the institutional separation of YEN and the HCG 
were the subject of a series of initiatives across the post-war years. The failure of 
these attempts was attributed to the resistance of the HCG and most importantly the 
influence of the Greek shipowners who favoured the status quo. Indeed, national 
policies on ocean-going and coastal shipping were consistent and continuous. 
PASOK and New Democracy when in power or as opposition parties shared the same 
principles and approach to shipping policy, pursuing on the one hand, the repatriation 
of Greek shipowners and the promotion of the competitiveness of the Greek flag and
on the other hand, the preservation of the cabotage trades and the ‘system of licenses’. 
Irrespective of the continuity in policy-making, YEN and the HCG were not insulated 
from the penetration of party politics. Reflecting clientelist practices across the state 
sector, the employment, promotion and evaluation of HCG officers were dictated by 
party affiliation.
4.2 The autonomy of Business interests
There was wide agreement that interest politics in Greece were underpinned by a 
weak civil society and a civic culture prone to individualism that obstructed 
cooperative and compliant behaviour (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, Diamandouros 
and Larrabee 1999, Diamandouros 1994, Tsoukalas 1993, Diamandouros 1983). In 
examining the Greek political culture, attention was drawn to the lack of trust in 
forming social collectivities and the prevalence of free-riding attitudes (Tsoukalas 
1993). Likewise, in employing the concept of social capital it was maintained that the 
prevalence of patron-client relations in Greek society suppressed civic engagement, 
social trust and cooperation (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002, Paraskevopoulos 2001, 
Paraskevopoulos 1998).10 Although there was empirical evidence of differentiation 
between regions, the low stocks of social capital across Greek society ‘stunted the 
very concept of the citizen’, as political ‘participation was triggered by personal 
dependency or private greed, not collective purpose’, ‘laws were made to be broken’ 
and ‘corruption was widely regarded as the norm’ (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002, 
Paraskevopoulos 2001, Levi 1996).11 In turn, this was attributed to the domination of
10 Robert Putnam defines social capital as “the features of social organisation, such as networks, norms 
and social trust that facilitate co-ordination for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, Putnam 1993). Robert 
Putnam’s research on Italy demonstrates the correlation between high stocks of capital and a robust 
civic community accompanied by economic growth and vigorous democratic practices. In explaining 
the differences in the economic and political performance of Northern and Southern Italy, Putnam 
draws attention to the horizontal networks of civic engagement of the former. These networks, 
consisting of associations, cooperatives and societies are central to the solution of the dilemmas of 
collective action.
11 Paraskevopoulos suggests five criteria for measuring the learning capacity of local institutions. First, 
the existence of fora, within which actors can come together to exchange ideas and information. The 
density of collaboration and communication between the public and the private spheres is the second 
criterion. A third criterion is the emergence of new institutions or changes to the existing ones as a 
result o f learning. In addition, the local actors must share a consensus regarding the major issues 
affecting their region. The fifth criterion is the adaptation of policy output, by which he seems to mean
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civil society by the incumbent political party, an extensive public sector and strongly 
developed party clientelism (Morlino 2005, Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002). It was 
maintained that Greek post-war politics were marked by the domination over civil 
society by the state and party politics, inhibiting the flourishing of effective forms of 
political representation (Morlino 2005, Featherstone 2005, Mouzelis and Sotiropoulos 
2002, Meynaud, Notaras and Merlopoulos 2002, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Lavdas 
1997, Lavdas 1996, Diamandouros 1983). It was argued that “...the logic of political 
partisanship and party clientelism permeated the whole of society and undermined the 
specific logic of all institutional subsystems, from education and sports to recreation 
and religion” (Mouzelis and Sotiropoulos 2002).
Nonetheless, it was maintained that research on Greek interest politics underplayed 
the empirical evidence of the autonomy of business interests (Lavdas 2005, Aranitou 
2002, Lanza and Lavdas 2000, Lavdas 1997). In the words of Lavdas (2005), business 
interests “...have been better organised, more independent from state institutions and 
much more influential than has been presented in the literature”. The autonomy of the 
business interests can be attributed to organisational resources, technical expertise and 
internal cohesion. Alongside access to senior political figures, business interests 
exercised indirect political influence by financing the campaigns of politicians and 
most importantly through capital mobility (Sotiropoulos 2004). Similarly, Tsoukalis 
(1997: 169) speaks of a weak state that was penetrated by both political parties and 
organized interests:
“The modem Greek state is both omnipresent and fundamentally weak. Its
pervasive influence is intimately linked to a clientele system, which it has
how policies are formulated and adapted to the particular problems that are affecting an area 
(Paraskevopoulos 2001: 224 -  9).
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been precisely intended to serve. It is extremely vulnerable to political parties 
and organized groups, while its institutions remain weak, inflexible and 
inefficient in performing its traditional Weberian functions”.
The autonomy of business interests was primarily manifested in the emergence of the 
associations of Greek industrialists and shipowners (Lavdas 2005, Kazakos 2004, 
Aranitou 2002, Ioannou 1999, Lavdas 1997, Lavdas 1996, Diamandouros 1994: 66, 
Sotiropoulos 1993: 51, Legg 1969). Amongst the most prominent business 
associations were the Federation of Greek Industries (Suvdeapoq EAXr|viK(bv 
Bioprixavidiv, SEV) and the Confederation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises of 
Greece (Tevucfi Suvopoo7cov8ia E7tayy8^paxi6v Bioxexvcbv Eprcopcov EAMSaq, 
GSEVEE) established in 1902 and 1919 respectively. Since more than ninety percent 
of firms in Greece were small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the boundaries 
between the two associations were not precise. Nonetheless SEV attracted the largest 
companies and capital intensive SMEs whilst GSEVEE consisted of artisans, traders 
and professionals. Although SEV was the most prestigious organization, its influence 
was circumscribed by the prevalence of SMEs in the Greek economy (Mouriki 2004, 
Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Ioannou 1999). Nonetheless, SEV derived its political clout 
from its participation in the negotiation of collective agreements on employees’ wages 
with the Greek General Confederation of Labour (revuci) Sovopocntovdia Epyax6v 
EXkabaq, GSEE). By contrast, the effectiveness of GSEVEE in the collective 
representation of SME interests was weak, underpinned by the fragmentation of 
industries and sectors that comprise its membership (Lavdas and Lanza 2000).
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The interests of the shipping industry were represented by a separate set of sectoral 
organisations. The primary distinction was between ocean-going shipping 
associations representing the interests of dry bulk and tanker operators and coastal 
shipping associations representing the companies plying the domestic cabotage routes. 
The Union of Greek Shipowners (Evcocrqc; EMrjvcov E(po7&iaxG)v, UGS) represented 
the interests of ocean-going shipowners located in Piraeus whilst the Greek Shipping 
Cooperation Committee (GSCC) comprised the Greek shipowners located in London. 
With respect to coastal shipping three organisations figured prominently, notably the 
Union of Coastal Shipowners (Evcooriq EAAfjvcov A k x o tcX o cd v , EEA), the Greek 
Shipowners Association for Passengers Ships (Evcoar) Ecpo^iaxcbv EmPaxriyrov 
ntaricov, EEEP renamed in 2004 to Xuvdeopo Emxeipfiaecov E7npaxr|yoij NauxiAiaq 
SEEN) and the Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Shipowners Union (E v c d o t i  Ecpo7tA.iox6v 
Meooyeiaiccbv Oopxr|yd)v rctaricDV, EEMFP). The EEA represented the interests of 
coastal shipowners operating passenger vessels on the domestic cargo trades, the 
EEEP consisted of passenger and cruise ship owners operating on international routes 
and the EEMFP represented short see cargo vessels owners. Neither SEV nor the 
GSEVEE maintained shipping companies in their memberships. With respect to 
ocean-going shipping companies it was argued that the distinctive nature of their 
business operating beyond the Greek territory required specialised institutional 
representation. In tandem, both ocean-going and coastal shipping associations 
maintained well-developed contacts with the government and especially YEN. It was 
believed that joining SEV would not add advantages as the shipping business 
associations were sufficiently influential (Interview with Member of the Greek 
Shipping Cooperation Committee Council March 2006).
The international nature of ocean-going shipping entailed the geographic dispersion of 
Greek shipowners. Throughout the course of twentieth century, Greek shipowners 
operated primarily from Piraeus, London and New York. Accordingly, this was 
reflected in the institutional representation of their interests. With the purpose of 
articulating the interests of Greek shipowners operating from Greece, the UGS was 
founded in 1916 at the port of Piraeus (UGS Annual Report 2004 -  05). In the 
interwar years the Anglo-Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee (GSCC) was 
established in London, whilst the New York Cooperation Committee (NYSC) was set 
up in New York, both representing expatriate Greek shipowners (Harlaftis 1993: 157, 
Frischauer 1968: 68, Stumey 1962: 359). Aside from representing interests, the initial 
mandate of these organisations was to facilitate the coordination of market 
arrangements in addressing the cyclicality of the shipping markets (Interview with 
Vice-Chairman of Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee March 2006). In the 
immediate post-war decades the relations between the three associations were 
harmonious involving regular meetings, exchange of information and consultation. 
Over these years, the GSCC maintained the largest membership and was the most 
influential of the three associations. Commencing from the 1960s and during the 
period of military dictatorship in Greece between 1967 and 1974, the relationships 
between expatriate and the shipowners located in Greece were strained. The UGS 
became inward-looking as it spoke for domestic business groups that were 
concurrently engaged in other business activities such as manufacturing, construction 
and finance. This tendency was embodied in the UGS President Andreades from 1960 
until 1974. The ‘Andreades Group’ maintained close ties with domestic industrial 
companies and was able to negotiate with successive Greek governments from a 
stronger position compared to the expatriate Greek shipowners (Lavdas and Lanza
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2000: 221, Lavdas 1997: 79 -  80). Nevertheless, in the post-authoritarian years, the 
divisions between the UGS and the GSCC were bridged. In parallel, with the decline 
of Greek-owned shipping operating from New York and the weakening of the NYSC, 
the UGS and SGCC became the primary channels for the articulation of Greek 
shipowning interests.
The UGS represented the interests of Greek-owned cargo vessels over 3,000 gross 
tonnage under the Greek and other flags. In 1974 the UGS was reorganised with the 
formation of a thirty-member Board of Directors with a three year term and a General 
Assembly (UGS Annual Report 2004 -  05). The allocation of voting rights 
corresponded to tonnage registered with the association and maximum number of 
votes per vessel. Although information on membership was not disclosed, it 
comprised all the major dry bulk and tanker companies located in Greece and was 
described as the largest national shipowners’ association in Europe (Lloyd’s List 
February 7, 1997). The GSCC represented more than one hundred Greek-owned 
shipping companies operating from London. It was organised in a similar structure 
with the UGS with a twenty-five member Executive Council and a General Assembly 
with voting rights corresponding to gross tonnage (GSCC Annual Report 2004 -  05). 
Due to its location in London the GSCC was obliged “...to keep a wary eye on the 
whims of two governments, not just one” CLloyd’s List April 27, 2004). In addition, 
permanent advisory teams on technical issues were setup, consisting of personnel 
from the members’ companies to improve the monitoring of IMO deliberations and to 
participate in IMO meetings through the capacity of Technical advisors to the Greek 
delegations. The UGS and the GSCC cooperated closely, conducting joint meetings of 
the executive councils whilst several shipowners were voted on the boards of both
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associations (Interview with Chairman of Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee 
March 2006). Regarding the national policies of the Greek government there was 
consensus between the two associations on the issues regarding the competitiveness 
of the national register, seafarer recruitment and maritime education (UGS Annual 
Report 2004 -  05). In addition, the UGS was responsible for the annual negotiation of 
the national collective agreement circumscribing the employment of Greek seafarers 
onboard Greek-flagged vessels. It was maintained that although the shipowner 
associations evolved in close cooperation with successive Greek governments, the 
UGS and the GSCC maintained considerable autonomy. Indeed, the Greek 
shipowners controlled the largest fleet operating in the dry bulk and tanker segments 
of the shipping industry (Lloyd’s Register -  Fairplay March 2006, OECD 2005).
The influence of the UGS and the GSCC with respect to the Greek government rested 
primarily on the capital mobility of Greek shipowners and the option to withdraw 
vessels form the Greek registry as well as transfer shipping operations to other 
countries. In addition, the shipping industry was historically an important sector of the 
Greek economy. This can be traced to the inception of the modem Greek state as 
indicated in an analysis by Bikelas (1868: 280),
“Greek commerce has taken a considerable development from the wars of 
the French revolution. At that time the grain trade of the Mediterranean 
was entirely in the hands of Greek merchants and shipowners. The wealth 
then amassed by them served to the regeneration of the country. The 
Philiki Etaireia which prepared and organized the revolution was 
principally an association of merchants, and it is with the capital of the rich
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shipowners of the islands that the fleets, during the revolution, were 
equipped and maintained”.
In the post-war years the shipping sector was a source of foreign exchange inflows, 
employment and technology transfer and shipowning capital was invested in a variety 
of domestic industries such as oil and coal manufacturing, chemicals, shipbuilding, 
finance, tourism, insurance and real estate (UGS Annual Report 2004 -  05, Harlaftis
1993).12 Foreign exchange earnings from shipping activities for the year 2005 
financed thirty-one percent of the balance of trade, whilst representing 4.8 percent of 
Greece’s GDP {Figure 1) (Bank of Greece Annual Report 2004: 247). For the same 
year, it was estimated that Greek shipowners controlled 22.4 percent of the world oil 
tanker fleet and 24.6 percent of the world bulk carrier fleet. In managing this fleet, 
approximately one thousand companies operated in Greece and in addition to service 
providers and seafarers, provided employment to onw hundred thousand persons 
(UGS Annual Report 2004 -  05). Furthermore, the merchant fleet is a strategic 
component of the national defence with the capacity to carry supplies and personnel at 
a time of armed conflict or national emergency. It is estimated that national defence 
expenditure would rise by 25 percent if the state could not rely on merchant vessels as 
a source of naval auxiliary vessels (Strati 1997: 263).
With respect to coastal shipping the shipowners concentrating on the domestic 
passenger segment were represented by the EEA, whilst the shipowners operating on 
the international passenger routes and the cruise industry were members of the EEEP. 
Nevertheless, there was an overlap in the membership of the two organisations and
12 Please refer to Chapter 6 of this thesis for more detail and examples o f the contribution of Greek 
merchant shipowners to the national economy.
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with respect to the liberalisation of the cabotage trades over the 1990s both 
associations were actively involved in the political process. The EEEP was 
established in 1921 and grew to encompass the major Greek passenger shipping and 
cruise companies culminating in sixty-four members in 2005, including Superfast 
Ferries, Strintzis Lines, Blue Star Ferries, Minoan Lines and ANEK Lines. 
Membership was restricted to companies owning a coastal passenger or cruise ship of 
over 50 gross registered tons under the Greek flag or a foreign flag issued at the Greek 
Seamen's Pension Fund (NAT). Voting rights were accorded to the tonnage a 
shipowner registered with the association, with a cap on the maximum numbers of 
votes per vessel. According to the statute of the EEEP, the primary objective of the 
association was “ ...the study and implementation, through the cooperation of its 
members, of the most appropriate measures for the improvement and renewal of 
passenger ships, according to evolving requirements and social needs, for the benefit 
of the public and the promotion of the interests of its members” (EEEP Statement of 
Purpose 2001). The EEA since its inception in 1926 represented the interests of the 
domestic coastal shipowners plying the routes between Greek mainland and the 
islands. The association emerged as the collective effort of a number of coastal 
shipowners to counter the adversarial market conditions prevailing due to the intense 
competition between coastal shipping companies. As with the other shipowner 
associations, tonnage was the basis of membership and voting rights with an eleven 
member Board of Directors with a three year term and a General Assembly. The EEA 
comprised of sixteen members with over eight percent of the voting rights held by 
Hellas Flying Dolphins, Anek Lines, Minoan Lines, G.A. Ferries, Blue Star Ferries 
and NEL Lines (Naftemporiki February 21, 2003). The members of the EEA were 
influential and maintained close ties with YEN and the Greek government. The
relationship between the coastal shipowners and the state rested on a system of 
licences, whereby a domestic route was allocated to a specific vessel for its entire 
economic life, forming high barriers of entry to competitors. This relationship was 
institutionalised through the Coastal Transport Advisory Committee (CTAC) that 
advised the YEN Minister of issues of coastal shipping including the allocation of 
licences. From the twelve members of the CTAC, four positions were reserved for 
representatives of the coastal shipowners. Aside from specific issues pertaining to the 
cruise shipping sector, the agenda of the EEEP and the EEA was similar throughout 
the 1990s, involving the liberalisation of the cabotage trades and European 
Commission proposals for amendment of respective national legislation, issues of 
maritime safety, the development of port infrastructure and the training of seafarers. 
With certain exceptions, the EEEP and the EEA were opposed to the liberalisation of 
the cabotage trades, yet as the members altered their commercial strategies, both 
associations were in support of the full liberalisation of the domestic coastal market 
with respect to routes and fares.
The EEMFP was established in 1940 as the Mediterranean Steamship Vessels 
Shipowners’ Union and represented the interests of Greek shortsea cargo owners 
irrespective of flag of vessel. The shortsea cargo segment was highly fragmented and 
this was reflected in the membership of EEMFP with one hundred and fifty members. 
Membership and voting rights were allocated according to the tonnage of the member 
companies with a nine member Board of Directors and a General Assembly. The main 
objectives of the EEMPF were the development of shortsea shipping in Greece, the 
improvement of the competitiveness of Greek-flagged shipping and the promotion of 
the principles of free and fair competition. Unlike the EEA and the EEEP, during the
EU negotiations on the liberalisation of the cabotage trades, the EEMPF in 
conjunction with the UGS were in favour of the opening of the domestic coastal 
markets. Likewise, the EEMPF maintained the Greek shortsea promotion centre as 
part of the EU Shortsea Network and the EU initiatives to promote shortsea shipping 
as an alternative to other modes of transportation (Interview with Shortsea Shipping 
Advisor of EEMFP April 2006, Interview with European Commission official 
Directorate Energy and Transport April 2006). The shortsea promotion centre was 
established in collaboration with YEN, mandated to monitor EU initiatives on 
shortsea shipping and make proposals to YEN within the EU guidelines (EEMFP 
Annual Review March 2006). The EEMFP was not as influential as the ocean-going 
and coastal shipowner associations due to limited organisational resources, legitimacy 
and significance for the national economy.
Unlike the shipowner associations, the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping was a state 
institution mandated to provide technical expertise and advisory services to YEN and 
the Greek government on shipping affairs as well as arbitration services to shipping 
companies and charterers (Law 989/1979). Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
were established by government decrees as ‘mandatory, autonomous associations of 
natural and legal persons with business activities’ for the collective articulation of 
business interests and the provision of advice to the government (Law 2081/1992). 
The Hellenic Chamber of Shipping (HCS) was founded in 1934 and operated in close 
cooperation and under the supervision of YEN. Nevertheless, it maintained a certain 
degree of autonomy as it was governed by internally elected shipping industry 
representatives and was self-financed. The membership of HCS comprised the major 
shipowner associations including the UGS, EEA, EEEP and the EEMFP. Historically
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the HCS was dominated by the ocean-going shipowners with the senior positions 
filled with members of the UGS. Nonetheless the HCS was a technocratic body that 
sought to provide technical expertise and research in the deliberative process of 
legislation (Interview with Director of Hellenic Chamber of Shipping May 2006).
In sum, there was agreement in the literature that Greek civil society was weak, 
underpinned by a political culture that did not foster civic engagement and social 
trust. At the same time, political parties dominated interest politics, inhibiting the 
development of alternative forms of political representation. This interpretation of 
interest politics underplayed the autonomy of business interests. Business 
associability emerged in early twentieth century and was manifested in the formation 
of associations that possessed organisational resources and were largely autonomous 
from the state and political parties. This was reflected in the shipping industry with 
the emergence of several sectoral associations representing the interests of 
shipowners. With respect to ocean-going shipping the UGS and the GSCC were 
influential in representing the interests Greek shipowners located in Piraeus and 
London. The strategic importance of merchant shipping for the Greek economy 
combined with the capacity of Greek shipowners for capital mobility, underpinned the 
influential position and autonomy of their associations. In coastal shipping, although 
the EEA, the EEEP and secondarily the EEMFP maintained autonomy, their 
relationship with YEN was underpinned by a different regulatory framework. This 
rested on the system of licences that were allocated by YEN to the vessel of a 
shipowner for its entire economy life. This resulted in the formation of closed system 
involving successive Greek governments and certain coastal shipowners who were 
insulated from competition by high institutional barriers to market entry. Following
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the pattern of other Greek Chambers of Commerce, the Hellenic Chamber of 
Commerce was not an autonomous representative institution for shipowners’ interests. 
Although it consisted of the shipowner associations with the prevalence of the UGS, 
the HCS was an extension of the state machinery in providing advice and technical 
research on legislation under deliberation.
4.3 State-Business relations
Despite an extensive public sector and prominent position in the regulation of the 
economy, the Greek state was interpreted as weak and penetrated by party politics. In 
parallel, sectoral associations representing the interests of Greek shipowners were 
autonomous from party politics, possessing organisational resources and political 
influence. Resting on these interpretations, attention turned to the interrelations 
between the state and Greek shipowners. Several theoretical interpretations of state- 
business relations were advanced drawing from pluralism and corporatism (Lavdas 
2005, Sotiropoulos 2004, Pagoulatos, Pagoulatos 2003, Pagoulatos 1999, 
Mavrogordatos 1998, Lavdas 1997, Kioukas 1997, Sotiropoulos 1995, Tsoukalas 
1993, Mouzelis 1986). As the theoretical approaches of pluralism and corporatism 
were developed in interpreting state-business relations in industrialised countries, 
there were difficulties in their application to late industrialised countries such as 
Greece. In the words of one commentator, the societies of Southern Europe were 
“...subject to the ambiguities, strains and endemic polarizations generated by the 
simultaneous presence on their soil of a number of contradictory trends and uneven 
stages of economic development” (Giner 1982: 173). In acknowledging the inherent 
contradictions in the Greek political process, state-business relations were
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characterised by a ‘disjointed corporatism’ (Lavdas 2005, Molina and Rhodes 2002: 
308, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Lavdas 1997). This entailed ‘a pluralist arena of 
competition for state favours’ that resisted a corporatist interpretation (Lavdas 1997). 
Against the background of extensive state involvement in the economy, the regime 
discontinuities of twentieth century Greek politics generated a patchwork of state- 
business relations that differed across sectors. This fragmentation of interest 
representation discouraged the adoption of social pacts and inter-sectoral agreements, 
with the exception of collective wage arrangements. In recognizing overarching 
patterns of ‘disjointed corporatism’ the discussion concentrated on state-business 
relations at the sectoral level and specifically the shipping industry.
Drawing from (neo-) pluralism, attention was drawn to the privileged position of 
business interests in the political process (Held 1996: 216, Smith 1993, Dunleavy and 
O’Leary 1987: 292 -  3, Jordan and Richardson 1987). Although power was distributed 
amongst a large number of interest groups, it was acknowledged that influence was 
‘widely not equally, dispersed’ (Williamson 1989: 53). As the relations between 
interest groups and government agencies evolved, certain groups gained more access 
and influence (Smith 1999: 203). It was emphasised that neither the state was neutral 
in representing a distinct set of objectives, nor all interests groups were equal with 
business exerting disproportionate influence over the state. The influence of business 
associations emanated from more organisational resources, access to senior politicians 
and the financial support of electoral campaigns. Furthermore, some pluralist theorists 
pointed to the accommodation of business interests becoming a structural imperative 
of the political system (McLenna 1997: 57, Wilson 1990: 11). Explicitly, it was 
maintained that,
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“...it becomes a major task of government to design and maintain an 
inducement system for businessmen, to be solicitous of business interests, and 
to grant them, for its value as an incentive, intimacy of participation in 
government itself’ (Dahl and Lindblom 1997: 58).
Within the context of Greek state-business relations the application of pluralism was 
intertwined with the prevalence of political parties. Resting on the theorisation of a 
weak state penetrated by party politics, it was maintained that state-business relations 
were characterised by ‘parentela pluralism’ (Pagoulatos 1999: 162). Unlike the 
‘clientela’ contacts between interest groups and the state bureaucracy, ‘parentela’ 
relationships were forged between organised interests and the incumbent government. 
Hence, interest groups gained policy influence and access to state resources by 
attachment to the ruling party. Incumbent political parties acted as gatekeepers in 
overseeing the access of interest groups to decision-making, setting the agenda and 
deciding on priorities amongst varying demands (Morlino 2005). In converse, 
‘clientela pluralism’ involved a state that lost its autonomy and was captured by 
business interests. This occurred if the relevant state agency was poor in resources and 
the sole objective of the state was the prosperity of the sector. Organised business 
provided resources whilst dominating the policy-making process, to the neglect of 
other organised interests (Pagoulatos 1999: 203, Atkinson and Coleman 1989: 55). 
Neither ‘parentela’ nor ‘clientela’ pluralism were appropriate in interpreting the 
relations between the state and the Greek shipowners. Although it cannot be denied 
that the Greek state was weak and penetrated by party politics, there was an absence 
of evidence indicating direct relationships between certain ocean-going and coastal 
shipowners with specific incumbent governments. National policies on both segments
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of shipping were consistent and continuous for most of the post-war years and 
certainly during the post-authoritarian years. The succession of New Democracy and 
PASOK governments involved neither changes in national policies nor preferential 
treatment of certain shipowners. In the words of one commentator, shipping interests 
“...won many special considerations in Greece regardless of the government in 
power” (Legg 1969: 113).
The consistency of national shipping policies was demonstrated with the repatriation 
strategy of YEN involving Law 2687/1953 on invested capital from abroad, the 
tonnage tax system and the competitiveness of the flag. Legislative Decree 2687/1953 
“on the investment protection of capital from abroad” included the vessels of 
expatriate Greek-owned shipping companies. It was stated that Greek registered 
vessels above 1,500 gross registered tons were considered to constitute capital from 
abroad (Law 2687/53). In essence the registration of a ship under the Greek flag was 
equivalent to investing with shipowners benefiting from the taxation and foreign 
exchange privileges afforded to foreign investors (Harlaftis 1993, Freris 1986). In 
addition, with Law 27/1975 the Greek government introduced a tonnage tax regime 
for Greek flagged vessels regardless of the nationality of the shipowners. Instead of 
on corporate earnings, taxes were calculated on the income from vessels taking into 
account vessel type, gross tonnage and age. In addition, taxes were not imposed on 
capital gains from the sale of vessels, whilst ships that were built and registered in 
Greece were exempt from taxation for a period of six years. Similarly, there was a 
reduction in taxes paid for vessels that were repaired in Greece and below the age of 
twenty years (Law 27/1975). However, as other EU member states adopted similar tax 
regimes, the competitive advantage of the Greek tonnage tax regime declined (Selkou
I ^and Roe 2004). Hence, the option of undermining the repatriation objectives of the
Greek government by re-flagging vessels became a growing source of influence for
Greek ocean-going shipowners. The capital mobility of the Greek shipowners
underpinned interpretations such as “...business power vis-a-vis the state has been
exceptional” and “that shipping enjoys...unlimited access” to the Greek government
(Pallis 2002: 183, Aspinwall 1995: 75, Ronit 1995: 188). Nonetheless, the Greek
government and YEN retained autonomy as indicated in the deliberations on
improving the competitiveness of the Greek flag and reforming the tonnage tax
system. For several years the UGS and the GSCC sought from the Greek government
the reduction of the tax rates and reform of the manning requirements with respect to
Greek officers and seafarers (GSCC Annual Report 2004 -  05). It was argued that
national crewing requirements were amongst the strictest in the EU as ocean-going
vessels must be operated by Greek officers and a crew of at least sixty percent Greek
nationals (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions December 12 2005,
Naftemporiki June 28, 2000, Naftemporiki February 7, 1997). At the same time, by
maintaining considerable tonnage under the Greek flag, Greek shipowners were in a
position to influence IMO negotiations on international safety and marine pollution
prevention standards (Interview with Deputy Maritime Transport Attache to the
International Maritime Organisations April 2006). The sizeable fleet registered under
the Greek flag corresponded to a place for Greece in the Executive Council of the
IMO. Indeed, the GSCC maintained that Greece replaced the UK as leading country
in the formulation of international maritime regulation at the IMO and the EU.
Against the background of the decline of the UK fleet, it was maintained that the UK
Department of Shipping and British shipowners lost their position of prominence in
13 Tonnage tax regimes were adopted by the following EU member states: Denmark (2002), Finland 
(2002), Germany (1999), Ireland (2001), Netherlands (1996), Spain (2003), UK (2001) see (Selkou and 
Roe 2004).
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maritime transport policy formulation leaving behind a policy void (Lloyd’s List 
November 30, 2004).
With respect to coastal shipping the continuity of policies was reflected in the system 
of licenses that prevailed for three decades. Under the cabotage regime, the domestic 
coastal transport shipowners were protected from international competition and 
offered subsidies for services for the provision of services on unprofitable routes and 
islands (Interview with Chief Executive of Interferry March 2006, Interview with 
Legal Advisor of Attica Group March 2006). The continuity beyond party politics 
was evinced during the EU negotiations on the liberalisation of the cabotage trades in 
the period between 1986 and 1992. In the 1990 national elections the socialist 
PASOK was replaced by New Democracy that supported liberalisation, deregulation 
and free competition. Nevertheless, at the EU level Greece remained opposed to the 
liberalisation of the domestic cabotage trades and fought vehemently for the 
preservation of the status quo. This can be partly attributed to the small majority the 
incumbent government held in the Hellenic Parliament, although both governments 
were in agreement on the regulatory framework on coastal shipping by not 
questioning the principles underlying the ‘system of licenses’. Upon completing the 
EU negotiations, the derogation of eleven years was hailed as a success by the 
government and the coastal shipping associations.
Departing from pluralism, it was argued that state-business relations in Greece were 
characterised by state corporatism (Mavrogordatos 1998). Although the definition of 
corporatism was contested, the predominant designation referred to a small number of 
hierarchically structured interest groups that were engaged in non-competitive
relations and monopolised access to the government (Siaroff 1999, Schmitter 1997, 
Lijphart and Crepaz 1991, Wilson 1990, Cohen and Pavoncello 1987, Schmitter 
1977). With reference to the negotiation of social pacts, it was maintained that peak 
associations commanding semi-public authority were involved in the decision-making 
whilst the state was an active participant steering negotiations and institutionalising 
interaction (Wilson 1990). The ideal-type of corporatism entailed “a system of interest 
intermediation in which the constituents parts were organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and 
granted a deliberate representational monopoly in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” 
(Schmitter 1977: 9). Within the context of state-shipping relations in Greece, a 
number of theoretical criticisms of corporatism were pertinent (Molina and Rhodes 
2002, Cohen and Pavoncello 1987, Panitch 1980: 168 -  170). Firstly, the definition of 
corporatism offered by Schmitter (1979, 1977) implied the flow of power moving 
from the state to organized interests, with the state distributing influence through the 
process of granting representational monopoly. This denied the possibility of business 
associations maintaining autonomy by possessing independent organizational 
resources and legitimacy that were beyond the control of the state (Cohen and 
Pavoncello 1987: 119 -  121). Secondly, there were difficulties in the empirical 
application and operationalisation of the notion of corporatism. In ascertaining the 
corporatist nature of state-business relations, a distinction was drawn between 
associational and decision-making properties (Schmitter and Grote 1997). The 
associational properties encompassed monopoly of representation, hierarchical 
coordination across associations, formal recognition by the state, semi-public status
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and involuntary membership. Accordingly, the decision-making characteristics 
entailed concertation, regular interaction, privileged or exclusive access, consultation 
prior to legislative deliberation and active consent. In interpreting state-business 
relations as corporatist, it was not required that all the properties were present 
(Schmitter and Grope 1997).
Despite the autonomy of shipowner associations, it was argued that the relations 
between the state and shipowners were characterised by state corporatism (Lavdas 
2005, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Lavdas 1997). Firstly, this was manifested in the 
monopolistic representation, hierarchical coordination and formal recognition by the 
state of the UGS as the representative of ocean-going shipowners and the EEA for 
coastal shipping. The GSCC articulated the interests of the Greek shipowners in 
London in close cooperation and consultation with the UGS which was the sole 
organisation representing shipowner interests in the annual negotiations on the 
national collective agreement with seafarers. Similarly, the EEA represented the 
interests of the domestic coastal shipowners and was again responsible for negotiating 
collective wage arrangements with the seafarers. The delineation of the mandates of 
the EEA and the EEEP were questioned only in the late 1990s because of internal 
divisions between the coastal shipowners with respect to the liberalisation of the 
domestic cabotage trades. Similarly, internal discipline was tight as indicated in the 
confrontation of the EEA with the Greek government in 2004 and 2005. The EEA 
decided that its members companies should not submit compulsory documentation in 
applying to operate vessels on specific routes. It was stated that any member company 
not adhering to this decision would be expelled from the EEA. Secondly, with respect 
to decision-making there was regular interaction, privileged access and consultation
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prior to legislative deliberation between the Greek state and the shipowner 
associations. The UGS and the GSCC meet regularly with the Prime-minister, YEN 
Minister, YEN General Secretaries, representatives of other Ministries and MPs. 
Consultation on draft legislation was conducted informally and formally through the 
National Chamber of Shipping and the National Shipping Policy Council (Zuppoutao 
EOvucfjc; NauxiA.iaKf|<; no^micrjq, NSPC). The NSCP possessed a broad mandate, 
bringing together the peak shipping associations and government representatives with 
the purpose of coordinating national shipping policy (Legislative Decree 3158/03).14 
In addition to the HCS and the NSPC, the coastal shipowners interacted on a monthly 
basis with YEN through the CTAT that was replaced with the Council of Coastal 
Transport (CCT) in 2002. Furthermore, it was argued that the close ties between the 
shipping industry and YEN were reflected in the large number of YEN officers 
joining shipping companies upon their retirement. (Lafazanis MP Minutes of the 
Hellenic Parliament February 16, 2001).15 In spite of these state corporatist features, 
the locus of power was not heavily on the side of the state, as theorists of corporatism 
would anticipate. The peak associations of the ocean-going and coastal shipowners 
evolved in cooperation with the Greek state but also retained considerable autonomy. 
Alongside the strategic importance of shipping for the national economy, Greek 
shipowners, especially in the ocean-going segment maintained capital mobility. 
Indeed, in the words of one commentator, “...the fact that state corporatism was 
present in a sector marked by capital mobility indicates that this form of coercive
14 Although composition varies according to the topic of the meeting, representatives from the 
following bodies are entitled to attend: General Secretaries of YEN, representatives from the Hellenic 
Chamber of Shipping, the UGS, EEA, EEEP, EEMFP, Pan-Hellenic Seamen Federation (PNO), 
Hellenic Ports Association (ELIME), Members of the Hellenic Parliament and representatives from 
other Ministries and local authorities.
15 In one daily newspaper reportage it was revealed that YEN retirees had taken senior positions in the 
following institutions: Director of UGS, Director of EEA, Deputy Director o f EEA, Director of EEEP, 
Director of the GSCC as well as managerial positions in a number of ocean-going and coastal shipping 
companies (Eleftherotypia December 11, 2004).
134
interest intermediation and policy-making was associated with business power and 
labour weakness rather than state domination of interest politics in general” (Lavdas 
2005: 305, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Lavdas 1997).
Thus, the relations between the state and business were characterized by ‘disjointed 
corporatism’ with different patterns of interaction developing across industry sectors. 
In the shipping sector, the relations between the state and shipowners took the form of 
state corporatism. However, the emergence of a state corporatist arrangement was 
attributed to the autonomy and influence of the shipowners rather than the state 
domination of the sector. Firstly, this was reflected in the monopolistic representation, 
hierarchical coordination and formal recognition by the state of shipowner 
associations. The UGS and the EEA were the primary representatives of the ocean­
going and the coastal shipowners in articulating their interests and negotiating 
collective wage contracts with seafarers. Secondly, with respect to decision-making 
there was regular interaction, privileged access and consultation prior to legislative 
deliberation between the Greek state and the shipowner associations. The UGS, 
GSCC, EEA and the EEEP maintained informal and formal access to senior political 
figures and Ministry representatives, whilst their consultation on legislative measures 
was institutionalised through the National Shipping Policy Council, the Hellenic 
Chamber of Shipping and the Council of Coastal Transport.
Table 4: State -  Shipowners interdependence
State Corporatism Coastal Shipping Ocean-going Shipping
State
S h ip o w n e rs
Regulatory Framework 
-Licences 
-Routes 
-Fares
-Subsidies
Regulatory Fram ework  
-Quality Ship Registry 
-Tonnage Tax Regime 
-Investment Legislation
- International Representation: 
IMO, EU
State
S h ip o w n e rs
Coastal transport services 
-Affordable 
-Reliable 
-Safe
-Non-profitable routes 
Structural Power 
-Em ploym ent 
-Investments
Capital M obility  
-Open Registries 
-Relocation
Structural Power 
-Em ploym ent 
-Balance of Payments 
-Investments
In deciphering the interdependence between YEN, ocean-going and coastal 
shipowners, attention was drawn to the regulatory framework, capital mobility and 
structural power. Coastal shipowners provided the transportation services that ensure 
the social cohesion and territorial integrity of the islands with the Greek mainland. 
Over the twentieth century, the provision of efficient coastal transport services across 
all the inhabited Greek islands was fraught with difficulties as evinced by the 
‘catastrophic competition’ between shipowners, ‘predatory pricing’ against 
passengers and a number of maritime accidents. As a result, coastal shipping was 
organized as a cabotage trade, underpinned by the system of licenses that were 
allocated to coastal shipowners for specified routes and of indefinite duration. During 
a period of three decades, the coastal shipowners holding the licenses remained largely 
unchanged forging close ties with YEN. In parallel, due to the international nature of the
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shipping industry, the Greek ocean-going shipowners maintained capital mobility 
with the option to re-flag their vessels away from the Greek registry and relocate 
operations to alternative international maritime centres. In tandem, Greek ocean-going 
shipping was a significant source of foreign exchange earnings, employment and 
investment. Unlike other industries that were embedded at the national level, the 
Greek state was at a disadvantage seeking to attract and sustain the presence of 
shipowners by offering a quality ship registry, favourable investment legislation and 
the tonnage tax system. At the same time, a sizeable operation of vessels under the 
Greek flag granted legitimacy to the Greek state as a major participant in international 
and European policy-making on maritime transport. Illustratively, the registration of 
tonnage under the Greek flag secured a place for Greece in the Executive Council of 
the IMO.
4.4 State corporatism, the Greek state and shipowners
Against the background of extensive state involvement in the economy, regime 
discontinuities in the history of Greek politics spawned differentiated patterns of 
interaction between the state and business interests across industry sectors. In 
recognizing overarching patterns of ‘disjointed corporatism’ this analysis 
concentrated on state-business relations at the sectoral level. The evidence suggestes 
that the relations between the state and Greek shipowners were characterized by state 
corporatism. However, the development of this arrangement was attributed to the 
autonomy and influence of the shipowners rather than state domination of the sector.
The evidence demonstrates the state corporatist features of the relations between the
state and shipowners with respect to monopolistic representation, formal recognition 
of the associations, regular interaction, privileged access and consultation prior to the 
adoption of legislation. The UGS and the EEA emerged as the peak associations in 
the ocean-going and coastal shipping segments and were responsible for the 
negotiation of collective wage agreements with seafarers. In tandem, the GSCC 
articulated the interests of the Greek shipowners located in London whilst the EEEP 
and the EEMFP represented respectively passenger shipowners on international routes 
and shortsea cargo shipowners. These associations maintained informal and formal 
access to senior government figures, MPs and Ministry officials whilst their 
consultation on legislative measures was institutionalized through the National 
Shipping Policy Council, the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping and the Council of 
Coastal Transport. Moreover, acknowledging the significance of shipping for the 
Greek economy, YEN was established as a Ministry devoted to maritime transport 
affairs. Departing from the composition and operation of other civilian Ministries, 
YEN was intertwined with the Hellenic Coast Guard. Alongside policing functions, 
HCG officers were involved in the formulation of maritime transport policy, labour 
issues, maritime education and the representation of Greece in international fora such 
as the IMO and the EU.
National policies on maritime transport were consistent and continuous, irrespective 
of party politics and the succession of governments in the post-authoritarian years. 
PASOK and New Democracy when in power or as opposition parties shared the same 
principles and approach to shipping policy, pursuing on the one hand, the repatriation 
of Greek shipowners and the promotion of the competitiveness of the Greek flag and 
on the other hand, the preservation of the cabotage trades and the system of licenses.
It could be argued that the prevalence of the HCG within YEN may have insulated 
this institution from party politics. This was compounded by the close ties between 
YEN personnel and the shipping industry, with many HCG officers joining upon 
retirement shipping companies. Indeed, it was theorized that the institutialisation of 
direct relations between the state and business interests involved the displacement of 
political parties (Golden 1986: 281). However, a closer examination of the 
employment, evaluation and promotion practices of HCG officers demonstrated the 
penetration of party politics. Nonetheless, in analyzing the continuity of national 
policies, attention was drawn to the capital mobility and structural power of the Greek 
shipowners. On the one hand, the provision of coastal shipping was integral to the 
social cohesion and territorial integrity of the islands with the Greek mainland, 
transporting the largest number of passengers in the EU for 2004 (ESPO National 
Statistics 2004). The autonomy of the coastal shipowner associations was 
underpinned by the system of licenses that were allocated to shipowners for specified 
routes and of indefinite duration. Over a period of three decades, the coastal 
shipowners holding the licenses remained largely unchanged fostering close ties with 
YEN and the incumbent governments. On the one hand, the member companies of the 
UGS the GSCC controlled a significant share of the Greek-owned fleet that accounted 
for 17.1 percent of world tonnage (dwt), generating 4.8 percent of Greece’s GDP. The 
strategic importance of merchant shipping for the Greek economy combined with the 
capacity of Greek shipowners for capital mobility, underpinned the influential 
position and autonomy of their associations. Greek ocean-going shipowners 
maintained capital mobility with the option to re-flag their vessels away from the 
Greek registry and relocate operations to alternative international maritime centres. 
As a result, the state corporatist arrangement that emerged in the shipping industry
was not characterised by state domination as the theorists of corporatism would 
anticipate. Rather, this arrangement was shaped by the autonomy and structural power 
of the Greek shipowners.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5: The liberalisation of the Greek coastal shipping market
Fourteen percent of the Greek population resides in 124 out of the 3,500 islands 
surrounding the mainland. Greek coastal shipping is amongst the largest in the EU 
with numerous ferries connecting the economies of the islands and the mainland. The 
coastal transportation network is complex with thirty-one coastal routes connecting 
ninety-six island ports with forty-two ports on the mainland (Institute of Local 
Administration 2006). In 2005 an estimated 17.8 million people were transported 
through Greek ports, the largest number in the EU (National Statistical Service of 
Greece 2006, XRTC Annual Ferry Report 2007).
Figure 2: Greek Ferry Passenger Traffic (1997 -  2005)
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However, there are considerable disparities in demand for routes with the ports of 
Piraeus, Crete, the Cyclades and the Dodecanese representing a disproportionate share
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of total traffic. Over the years, a two-tier market has developed separating the islands 
and lucrative routes that attract the interest of coastal companies and the islands that 
are partially or completely unprofitable. For 2005 the largest passenger traffic was on 
the Pireaus-Argosaronikos route (3.3 million), followed by the Pireaus-Crete route 
(2.5 million) and the Eastern Cyclades route (2.2 million) encompassing the islands of 
Siros, Tinos, Myconos, Paros and Naxos. Illustratively, the routes representing the 
largest passenger traffic for 2005 are presented in the graph below:
Figure 3: Greek Ferry Passenger Traffic per route (2005)
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For most of the past decades, coastal shipping was a cabotage trade, reserving its 
provision solely to passenger ferries with a Greek flag. Central to the institutional 
configuration for almost three decades was the ‘system of licences’, affording the 
Ministry of Mercantile Marine (YEN) substantial discretion in issuing licenses to 
coastal shipowners for specified routes and of indefinite duration. The position of the 
incumbent coastal shipowners was solidified as the arrangement entailed high
institutional barriers to market entry and stifled competition. The relationship between 
the Greek state and the coastal shipowners was characterised by state corporatism 
(Mavrogordatos 1998, Schmitter and Grote 1997, Lavdas 1997, Schmitter 1979). This 
was manifested in the monopolistic representation and formal recognition of the 
Union of Coastal Shipowners (EEA) and the Greek Shipowners Association for 
Passengers Ships (EEEP). In tandem, there was regular interaction, privileged access 
and consultation on legislation was institutionalised through the Coastal Transport 
Advisory Committee, Hellenic Chamber of Shipping and National Shipping Policy 
Council. Moreover, the island communities constituted an influential factual veto 
point to reforms as their participation in coastal shipping policy-making was not 
institutionalised. This state corporatist arrangement spawned a coastal shipping 
market that involved old passenger ferries, haphazard services and a poor safety 
record (Lekakou 2001, Panagopoulos 2000, Alexandratos 2000, Psaraftis 1998, 
Psaraftis 1996).
In the mid-1980s as part of the broader project on the completion of a single market, 
the European Commission proposed the abolition of cabotage trades. In the ensuing 
negotiations the formal and factual veto points of YEN, the coastal shipowners, island 
communities and the trade unions opposed reform. Although the opening of the 
domestic coastal market was eventually encapsulated in Regulation 3577/92, a 
derogation period of eleven years was recognised in the case of Greece. In the ensuing 
years and beyond the formal deadline of January 2004, the terms of liberalisation 
were negotiated by the Greek government, the coastal shipowners, the European 
Commission and the island communities. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the 
domestic impact of the Europeanisation of coastal shipping on the state corporatist 
configuration between the Greek state and the coastal shipowners.
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The chapter begins by outlining the development of coastal shipping in Greece during 
the post-war years. This sets the historical background for an appreciation of the 
concerns for ‘destructive competition’ and ‘predatory pricing’ that underpinned the 
regulatory framework that prevailed for three decades until the late 1990s. From 1975 
YEN held a central position in this arrangement by overseeing and regulating the 
provision of licences to private operators. Subsequently, the growing regulatory 
presence of the EU is presented in seeking the abolition of cabotage trades. This leads 
on to a detailed account of the market changes that ensued in the form of industry 
consolidation, corporate restructuring and fleet modernisation. In turn, market 
transition had political implications altering the internal composition of industry 
associations and reconfiguring the constellation of veto points. Nevertheless, the 
incumbent Greek government was unwilling to proceed with the reform of the 
regulatory framework ahead of the completion of the derogation period. The maritime 
accident of the Express Samina served as a catalyst for the reform process initiated by 
the European Commission. Yet, despite the completion of the derogation period, the 
terms of liberalisation remain under negotiation between the coastal shipowners, the 
Greek government, the European Commission and local island communities.
5.1 From the Post War years to 2001
5.1.1 The immediate Post War Years
In the post-war years the coastal shipping industry was characterised by the extensive 
regulatory presence of the state. In October 1945 the government formed a Committee 
of Experts to discuss alternatives for the provision of coastal shipping services, 
ensuring the provision of sea transport services to the disparate island communities
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(Lekakou and Fafaliou 2003, Lekakou 2001, Lekakou, Papandreou and Stergiopoulos 
2002, Stumey, Panagakos and Psaraftis 1994). The proposed schemes encompassed 
state ownership and operation of coastal vessels, state regulation and private 
ownership under conditions of market competition and a state organised private 
monopoly (Lekakou 2001). In 1946 the shipowner Aristotle Onassis argued that the 
provision of coastal transport services was a natural monopoly. A framework was put 
forward whereby domestic sea and air transport was operated as a monopoly. Central 
to this arrangement was a limited company with private equity equalling the value of 
eight coastal vessels and three aircraft that would be granted tax exemptions and 
privileges (Lekakou 2004, Lekakou 2001). The proposed scheme was not accepted by 
the Committee of Experts citing the inadequate number of coastal vessels and the 
unfavourable fares for passengers and shippers.
The Greek government established a regulatory framework resting on the provision of 
coastal transport services by the shipowners that operated the domestic routes before 
the Second World War (Lekakou 2001). Firstly, the design of the coastal shipping 
network was centralised with the port of Piraeus directly linked to all major 
destinations. This was a departure from the preceding decentralised system with large 
island ports serving as regional centres. Secondly, passenger vessels under state 
control were sold to the Union of Coastal Enterprises (Evcoar| Akto71^oikg)v 
E7n%8tpf|a8C0V, EAKTE). Thirdly, exemptions and prerogatives were granted to the 
coastal shipowners. These included the donation of three cargo ships, wavering tariffs 
on the importation of fuel and favourable crew requirements. In 1950 four ships were 
delivered from Italian shipyards as part of Second World War rectification. From 
these vessels (Miaoulis, Kanaris, Karaiskakis and Kolokotronis) three were bought by
146
the Nomikos family (Thiraiki Coastal Shipping) and one by the Potamianos family 
(Epirotiki Line) under favourable terms and payment facilitations. During this period, 
the Potamianos family were prominent in coastal shipping with Anastasios 
Potamianos heading the Greek Shipowners Association for Passengers Ships (EEEP) 
which was the principal industry association. The Potamianos family remained 
protagonists in coastal shipping throughout the post-war years (Interview with 
Shipowner, March 2006). In total the main domestic routes were serviced by 
seventeen shipowning companies operating thirty vessels (Lekakou 2001).
Nevertheless, over the 1950s a persistent problem was the shortage of vessels in 
servicing the islands (Lekakou, Papandreou and Stergiopoulos 2002). This was 
compounded by the development of the Greek islands as a tourist destination. The 
numerical shortage was accompanied by poor safety standards and the obsolete 
technical characteristics of the passenger ships plying the routes. There were thirty- 
five vessels active in coastal shipping but these were deemed insufficient in covering 
passenger demand for island transportation. In tandem, costal shipping was 
fragmented into a number of small businesses that we unable to provide the required 
level of services. With the intention of improving the quality of services, the 
Committee of the Ministries of Coordination and Merchant Marine proposed a 
package of measures in 1959, involving the provision of state loans with favourable 
conditions for the purchase of passenger ships, the regulation of market entry by state 
authorities and the arrangement of five-year contracts for coastal shipowners servicing 
unprofitable routes (‘thin lines’) (OECD 2000: 31, Sturmey, Panagakos and Psaraftis
1994).16 Although most of these proposals were not materialised with market entry
16 Exact translation would be ‘infertile lines’: ayoveq ypappeq.
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remaining open to competition, the provision of island transportation continued to be 
haphazard and inefficient. By the mid-1960s the main domestic lines were serviced by 
forty-one passenger ships owned and operated by sixteen shipping companies.17 Thus, 
over the first two decades following the Second World War, coastal shipping was 
provided by shipowners who owned and operated the passenger vessels. Although the 
regulatory role of the state was extensive, market entry and exit were not restricted. 
Nonetheless, alongside the difficulties in addressing transport demand, especially on 
less profitable routes, the services were poor and passenger safety was low (Lekakou 
2001, Psaraftis 1998, Psaraftis 1996).
5.1.2 The Heraklion accident
On the eighth of December 1966 the passenger vessel Heraklion capsized near the 
island of Falkonera in the Cretan Sea on its overnight voyage from Crete to Piraeus. 
From the 281 passengers and crew on board, only 47 survived. The vessel was owned 
and operated by Typaldos Lines, the family company of the Typaldos brothers and a 
major provider of coastal shipping services. The accident generated public uproar and 
considerable controversy in identifying the causation. It was recognised that as the 
vessel sailed through heavy seas, a vehicle in the car deck broke loose and smashed 
through the loading hatch (Efoplistis 2005, Focus on IMO 1997). This was attributed 
to poor safety measures and construction weaknesses of the passenger ship. In 
addition, it was subsequently revealed that the seaworthiness certificates of the 
Heraklion were counterfeit. In March 1968 the Criminal Court issued sentences of 
five to seven years imprisonment to the owner, the director of Typaldos Lines and two
17 In 1963 the Greek Organisation of Tourism (EOT) ordered another three passenger/vehicle vessels 
from Italian shipyards as part of the Italian World War II Rectification.
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officers who were onboard the vessel (To Vima March 22, 1968). Notwithstanding the 
ensuing bankruptcy of Typaldos Lines, the Heraklion accident had extensive 
repercussions on the market structure and regulatory framework of coastal shipping.
Alongside the introduction of stringent legislation, a new type of company emerged in 
the form of the ‘people-based’ coastal shipping company (Eiaipefec; XaX\d\q paar|<;) 
(Psaraftis 2005, Lekakou and Fafaliou 2003, Lekakou 2001).18 The market structure 
was altered with the establishment of people-based shipping companies by the island 
communities of the Aegean. The emerging consensus was that as coastal shipping 
primarily serviced the transport needs of island residents, coastal companies should be 
owned and operated by the island communities. Hence, island communities would be 
in a position to provide safe, reliable and affordable coastal transport services and 
reduce their reliance on the central government and private companies that did not 
maintain any local affiliation. By contrast, the people-based companies retained 
strong local and regional ties, sourcing financial and human resources based on 
‘ascribed trust’ (Harlaftis 2004: 229). A multiplicity of local organisations and 
individuals, encompassing local politicians, officials, the church, Chambers of 
Commerce, trade associations, entrepreneurs and residents pooled their resources in 
founding coastal shipping companies and purchasing vessels. This form of corporate 
structure was initiated at the city of Chania on the island of Crete. In April 1967 
ANEK (Maritime Company of Crete Ltd) was established as a joint stock company 
with the prime objective of offering safe transportation for Cretans between their 
island and Piraeus (Fairplay July 2004). ANEK became the pioneer of the people- 
based shipping company and in September 1970 began operating the passenger vessel
18 Notably this resulted in the policy on banning sailings in case of adverse weather conditions. In 
accordance with Beaufort scale the Hellenic Coast Guard may prohibit the sailing of vessels.
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Kydon on the Piraeus-Chania route (Kumelis 2000, Tsamopoulos 2000). Aside from 
the sale of stocks to island residents, the Cretan character of the company was 
institutionalised in the composition of the Executive Board. According to the 
company’s charter, from the fifteen members of the Executive Board four positions 
corresponded to the Bishop of Kissamou and Selinou (President), the elected Mayors 
of Chania and Rethimno and a member of the Association of Certified Economists of 
Chania.
Due to its initial success, the ANEK corporate model was replicated across the other 
major islands of the Aegean. Yet, the transition to people-based companies was 
accelerated by another accident in the early 1970s when a fire onboard the vessel 
Eleana spawned the demise of its owner, the Efthimiadis Company. Subsequently, in 
1974 one of the vessels of the Efthimiadis Company was purchased by Minoan Lines, 
a newly established people-based shipping company located at Heraklion, the capital 
of Crete. Likewise, emulating the corporate structure of ANEK a number of islands 
established people-based coastal shipping companies including Lesvos, Naxos, 
Samos, Chios, the Dodecanese, Simi, Rethymno and Lathisi. Notable amongst these 
companies were the Maritime Company of Lesvos (NEL) and the Dodecanese 
Maritime Company (DANE) which were to become leading providers of coastal 
shipping services in the following three decades. In subsequent years there were 
several similar initiatives, yet not all were commercially viable. Indeed, in the period 
from 1975 to 1985 the islands of Chios, Cephalonia, Samos, Naxos and Ikaria were 
involved in the formation of people-based coastal companies that were eventually 
abandoned (Lekakou 2001). Overall the large islands were able to maintain people-
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based shipping companies that in addition to providing a safe and reliable service to 
island residents gradually became profitable.
Nevertheless, the increasing number of operators entering the coastal shipping market 
was accompanied by the adverse implication of ‘destructive competition’. In response 
the government adopted in 1976 a licensing system for incumbent and prospective 
coastal shipowners. Central to this system was the local element as each company had 
carved out its own monopoly. The majority of the companies operating vessels were 
of limited size, lacking the financial capacity and competition incentives to add 
newbuildings with modem technical features. The companies specialised in specific 
routes in correspondence to their affiliation to particular islands (Harlaftis 2004: 232, 
Lekakou 1996). More specifically, ANEK Lines and Minoan Lines held the licences 
for the Cretan routes, especially the lucrative routes to the ports of Chania and 
Heraklion. Similar arrangements emerged across the Aegean with Agapitos Lines 
servicing the Cycladic islands, Agoudimos Lines the Dodecanese and Strintzis Lines 
Cephalonia in the Ionian Sea. The Rhodes-based company DANE operated in the 
Dodecanese, Cyclades and on routes towards the port of Thessaloniki. In the Northern 
Aegean NEL serviced almost exclusively the islands of Mytilini and Chios. In 
addition, several small family companies operated on less profitable itineraries 
including Moulopoulos, Moiras, Lazopoulos, Stathakis, Tyrogalas, Kavounides, and 
Frangoudakis.
Therefore, the regulatory framework that was developed in the immediate post-war 
years spawned haphazard coastal shipping services, characterised by poor safety 
records. This culminated in the Heraklion accident that instigated the emergence of
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the ‘people-based’ coastal shipping company. This company model spread across the 
Aegean as island communities pooled resources in founding coastal shipping 
companies that would service their particular needs. Notably these companies 
maintained a strong affiliation with the island communities. By the 1980s the people- 
based shipping companies were in a strong position, especially those servicing 
lucrative routes. In carving out their local monopolies these companies were at an 
advantage in comparison to private operators. Moreover, the regulatory framework 
adopted in 1976 institutionalised the position of these companies through the 
distribution of licenses to coastal operators.
5.1.3 The Regulatory framework
Over the entire post-authoritarian period and until 2001 the coastal shipping sector 
was extensively regulated by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine (YEN) (Interview of 
Director of Hellenic Chamber of Shipping May 2006, Interview with Legal Advisor 
of Attica Group March 2006, Interview with Director of Hellenic Institute of 
Transport March 2006). Although coastal ferries were owned and operated by the 
private sector, the parameters of the market were determined by the state. The 
principles underlying the provision of coastal shipping services were the prevention of 
‘destructive competition’ between coastal shipowners, the protection of passengers 
from ‘predatory pricing’ and the provision of regular, safe and affordable sea 
transport to the inhabited islands. The regulatory regime was a patchwork of legislative 
measures that were adopted at various historical junctions. In the aftermath of the 
Heraklion maritime accident, there was considerable social mobilization demanding 
the reform of the regulatory framework with its origins in pre-war legislation
(Lekakou 2001, Goulielmos and Lekakou 1992). As a result, in 1973 the Code for 
Public Maritime law was endorsed containing a chapter on coastal shipping. The 
Code entailed a comprehensive approach to coastal shipping incorporating the flag 
and privileges of Greek vessels, types of vessels, routes, crewing, price determination 
and the obligations of travel agents. It was stipulated that the maximum age for 
vessels in operation was 35 years and the vessels exceeding this limited would be 
withdrawn from operation. Most importantly, coastal shipping which was defined as 
the transport of passengers and cargo between Greek ports was recognised as a 
cabotage trade and was reserved solely for vessels carrying the Greek flag (Article 11 
of the Code for Maritime Public Law). Subsequently, for the approval of the 
registration it was required that the vessels were recognised as Greek, whereby they 
were at least fifty percent owned either by Greek nationals or a Greek legal entity of 
which fifty per cent of its equity was owned by Greek nationals (Article 5 of the Code 
for Maritime Public Law).
Nevertheless, the haphazard and problematic supply of coastal transport between the 
islands persisted and with the fall of the dictatorship, Presidential Decree 684 of 1976 
was adopted to prevent ‘catastrophic competition’ between the coastal shipowners. 
The Decree was of paramount importance as it stipulated the issuance of licences per 
vessel in allocating routes between coastal shipowners. This measure was interpreted 
as an institutional obstacle to the entry of new coastal shipowners, sheltering 
incumbent shipowners from market competition (OECD 2000, Goulielmos and 
Lekakou 1993). Indeed, over the years there were many instances of licence 
applications that were rejected by YEN (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Session 
June 13 2001). Central to the system of licences was YEN which was granted
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considerable discretionary power in regulating the coastal industry (Giannopoulos and 
Aifandopulou-Klimis 2004, Selkou and Roe 2004, Athinaios 2002, OECD 2000, Psaraftis 
1998, Psaraftis 1996). More specifically, YEN regulated market entry, issuance of 
operational licenses, setting the fares, crew composition, imposition of public service 
obligations, enforcement of licence terms, certification and inspection of operational and 
environmental safety. Indeed, certain sections of the legislation dated back to 1926 
specifying the number of cooks and stewards, the prices of on board meals as well as a 
the concessions to a variety of social groups such as Members of Parliament, journalists, 
students, actors, military personnel and the elderly (OECD 2000, Psaraftis 1996).
The Minister was aided by an advisory body, the Coastal Transport Advisory 
Committee (rvcQ/joSonicrj EmTpoTrrj AktokXoikwv Xvyxoivcovicbv CTAC) that advised 
on all aspects of the coastal industry (Steer Davies Gleave 2005, OECD 2000: 28, 
Sturmey, Panagakos and Psaraftis 1994: 3). Although the CTAC was designed to 
offer non-binding recommendations, its opinions on licences and prices were almost 
without exemption accepted by the Minister (OECD 2000: 28). Prior to the reform of 
the CTAC in 2000, the weighting of the criteria for licensing was not transparent. 
Six of the twelve members of the CTAC were government officials or appointed by 
the Minister. The remaining six were split amongst four representatives of coastal 
shipping, a representative of the Piraeus Chamber of Commerce and Industry and one 
representative from the National Tourist Organisation as an articulator of consumers’ 
interests.
The YEN Minister issued a license corresponding to a specific vessel for a specified 
itinerary. The licenses had indefinite duration, as the intention was to assign a vessel to 
a route for the entirety of its economic life (OECD 2000: 29, Alexandratos 2000,
Psaraftis 1996). Complying with the age limit of the Code for Maritime Public Law, a 
passenger ship entering a route could not exceed 20 years and as long as the terms 
were respected could continue plying its trade until the threshold of 35 years. In 
submitting an application for a license, technical information on the vessel was 
required, including displacement dimensions, carrying capacity of vehicles and 
passengers and service speed. In addition, a feasibility study was mandatory with data 
on operating costs, transportation flows on the requested route, port capacity as 
evidence of commercial viability of the application. Further, it was required that the 
crew of Greek nationals was employed and on the payroll throughout the year, 
whether the vessel was operating or idle, and regardless of the seasonal variation in 
traffic. It was stipulated that the passenger ships remained idle for sixty to ninety days 
annually for dry docking, maintenance, repairs, surveys, and inspection. Fares 
charged complied with the levels set by YEN. Furthermore, vessels were required to 
transport mail free of charge and were available for requisition by the Greek state for 
reasons of national security.
In allocating licenses a persistent problem was the provision of coastal services on 
routes that were not commercially viable. The provision of services for unprofitable 
routes was regulated by the Code for Maritime Public Law and a series of Ministerial 
decisions of which the most significant was the YEN decision on the ‘general terms 
for conducting competitions to service main thin and thin tourist routes’ (YEN 
Decision, No. 90062/090279). Within this framework there were two categories of 
unprofitable islands. The first category consisted of the ‘public service islands’ that were 
serviced as intermediate stops in a licensed itinerary to or from a mainland port, as a 
condition of the license. In essence the services to these islands were cross-subsidized
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by other passengers. The second category was serviced by ‘unprofitable routes’ 
comprising primarily inter-island routes. The routes were defined by joint Ministerial 
decrees (YEN, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Development) and issued on 
request or proposal by the local authorities or other interested parties and upon advice 
from the CTAC. The definition of a route as unprofitable was placed under review 
every five years. Yet, the provision of the service was allocated annually by tender 
with companies competing for minimum subsidy. The exact amount of the subsidy 
was subject to considerable negotiation (Steer Davies Gleave 2005, Sturmey, 
Panagakos and Psaraftis 1994: 4).
The regulation of voyage fares became a subject of Greek legislation since 1926. The 
purpose of the legislators was to prevent the ‘predatory pricing’ by coastal shipowners as 
had happened in the early 1920s. The intention of the legislator was to protect the 
passengers as well as the shipowners from ruinous competition. Laws dating from the 
1930s stipulated that the maximum and minimum fares imposed on passengers and 
shippers were proposed by the CTAC and approved of the YEN Minister (Law 
5304/140132). This system was substituted by the imposition of a specific fee, whereby 
the fees for main and secondary routes were determined by decision of Minister, whilst 
fees on local routes were determined by the respective Port Authority and approval of 
the Minister (Article 178 in Code of Public Maritime Law). Resting on the respective 
YEN Decision, the shipowners were entitled to discount the fares by twenty percent on 
passenger ships (YEN Decision, No. 100558/10903). Subsequent YEN Decisions 
authorised lower fees for special social groups. Indicatively, these groups encompassed 
MPs, journalists, students, soldiers, merchant navy veterans, members of athletic 
organisations, actors and prison wardens. However, differentiation of fares in accordance
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with differences in the quality of services was not stipulated in the respective legislation 
(Psaraftis 1998).
Thus, the regulatory framework underlying the provision of coastal shipping services 
sought to prevent ‘destructive competition’ between coastal shipowners, protect 
passengers from ‘predatory pricing’ and ensure the territorial integrity of the inhabited 
islands with the Greek mainland. The framework that emerged in the post-authoritarian 
years afforded YEN considerable discretion in circumscribing the parameters of the 
coastal shipping market. This was reflected in the ‘system of licenses’ whereby resting 
on the advice of CTAC, the YEN Minister decided on the allocation of operational 
licenses to coastal shipowners. Licenses were issued for specific passenger ships, usually 
for the entire economic life of the vessel. The approval process was opaque primarily 
involving YEN and the representatives of the coastal shipowners. Apart from the 
fulfilment of economic and technical criteria, the decisions on issuing licences were not 
transparent and tended to favour the incumbent shipowners whose position remained 
insulated from market competition. Alongside family-owned companies, these licenses 
were held by the people-based companies that carved out their local monopolies. The 
primary shortcoming of the regulatory framework was the persisting difficulties in 
servicing unprofitable routes and islands. Despite the long duration of the licenses and 
the subsidisation of the services, coastal transportation to these islands remained 
haphazard.
5.2 Negotiating the EU Maritime Cabotage trades (1986 -1992)
Against this background and within a few years of the accession of Greece to the 
European Community (EC), the European Commission made proposals for the 
completion of the single market in maritime transport. With the objectives of 
preparing for the single market, establishing countermeasures against the protectionist 
policies of third countries and enhancing the competitiveness of the EC merchant 
fleet, the European Commission proposed a package of measures in 1985 (CEC COM 
90/85). The completion of the single market in maritime transport services was a 
mixture of internal and external measures. A central feature of the proposals was the 
abolition of the cabotage trades across the EU member states. This was opposed by 
the Greek government and the coastal shipowners that favoured the preservation of 
the regulatory status quo (Interview with Shortsea Shipping Advisor to the 
Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Shipowners Union March 2006, Interview with Legal 
Advisor to Attica Group March 2006).
In March 1985, the European Commission released the Communication on the 
“Progress towards a Common Transport Policy” (CEC COM 90/85). The usage of 
open registries and the adoption of protectionist policies by third countries were 
recognized as significant challenges to the competitiveness of the EC merchant fleet. 
In response, the European Commission proposed that the completion of the EC 
internal market would allow for countermeasures against the discriminatory policies 
of third countries. Specifically, six Directives and Regulations were presented 
concerning the free provision of services, the application of competitive mles and
retaliatory measures against restricted access to cargoes and unfair pricing by third 
countries (CEC COM 90/85). Subsequently, in 1986 the Council adopted the first 
maritime transport policy package consisting of four Regulations. Council Regulation 
4056/86 laid down the rules for the application of competition rules to maritime 
transport, whilst Council Regulations 4057/86 and 4058/86 were respectively 
concerned with unfair pricing and restrictions by third countries to the free access to 
ocean trades. Council Regulation 4055/86 applied the principle of freedom to 
“member state nationals (and non-Community shipping companies using ships 
registered in a Member State and controlled by Member State nationals) the right to 
carry passengers or goods by sea between any port of a Member State and any port or 
off-shore installation of another Member State or of a non-Community country”. 
However, the cabotage trades involving the reservation of coastal shipping for the 
national flag were exempt. Hence, EC shipping companies were not granted access to 
the coastal transport trades between the domestic ports of member states (Selkou and 
Roe 2004, Pallis 2002, Aspinwall 1995, Kiriazidis 1994, Bredima-Savopoulou and 
Tzoannos 1990).
The liberalisation of the EU cabotage trades juxtaposed the Northern member states 
that favoured market competition and the opening of the cabotage trades against the 
Southern member states that supported the reservation of coastal shipping routes for 
domestic companies (Interview with Director of Hellenic Chamber of Shipping Ma 
2006, Interview with Director of Danish Shipowners Association March 2006, 
Aspinwall 1995, Bredima-Savopoulou and Tzoannos 1990). Greece had aligned its 
position with the Southern member states seeking the preservation of the domestic 
cabotage. It was maintained that Greek was in favour of completing the internal
market as long as the island cabotage trades were not reformed. Similarly, the Greek 
coastal shipowners were vehemently opposed to the reform of the regulatory 
framework and increased exposure to foreign and domestic competition. This position 
was reiterated by the industry associations of the shipowners, the Union of Coastal 
Shipowners (EEA) and the Greek Shipowners Association for Passenger Ships 
(EEEP). It was advanced that the coastal shipowners required several years in 
preparing for heightening of competition that the abolition of the cabotage trades 
entailed. In conjunction, there was apprehension that larger coastal companies from 
the Northern EU member states would be entering the domestic Greek market. These 
companies possessed more resources and were experienced in the operation of 
passenger vessels in a competitive market environment (Interview with Chief 
Executive Officer of Interferry March 2006). Moreover, it was argued that foreign 
competitors would offer lower fares on the lucrative routes by making use of second 
registries that would reduce labour costs (Aspinwall 1995: 75). Similarly, the seafarer 
unions were opposed to reform and according to the Pan-Hellenic Seamen’s 
Federation (PNO) half of its active membership was employed in cabotage trades 
{Lloyd’s List January 15, 1998). However, there were a handful of shipowners in 
favour of the deregulation of the market with the owner of Strintzis Lines, Gerasimos 
Strintzis being the most vocal. This divergence in approaches was manifested in the 
internal meetings of the EEA with Strintzis advocating the benefits of the abolition of 
the cabotage trades. Likewise, the Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Shipowners Union 
(EEMFP) representing Greek shortsea cargo shipowners supported reform as it would 
allow access to the Italian and Spanish cargo trades. Indeed, amongst the founding 
principles of the EEMFP were the promotion of short sea shipping and the 
safeguarding of free and fair competition (Interview with Shortsea Shipping Advisor
to the Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Shipowners Union March 2006). Moreover, the 
Union of Greek Shipowners (UGS) was in favour of the abolition of the domestic 
cabotage trades (Interview with Shipowner March 2006). However, as the UGS 
represented the interests of ocean-going shipowners, the abolition of the cabotage 
trades was of low salience and there was an absence of mobilization at the national 
and European levels. As a result of the consultations between YEN and the coastal 
shipowners, the Greek government sided with the status-quo proponents and opposed 
the abolition of the cabotage trades at the EU level. The primary argument articulated 
by the Greek government was that archipelagic morphology of the Greek islands 
rendered coastal transportation into an indispensable service in ensuring the social 
cohesion and territorial integrity of the islands with the mainland. This was 
safeguarded by the extensive regulatory role of the YEN and the ‘system of licenses’, 
securing coastal transportation for all the inhabited islands irrespective of commercial 
criteria (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions November 2 2000).
The discrepancy between the approaches of the Northern and Southern EC member 
states brought the negotiations on the abolition of the cabotage trades to an impasse. 
The European Commission put forward several formulae in seeking to overcome the 
stalemate and most notably a second package of proposals in August 1989 (CEC 
COM 921/89 and CEC COM 266/89). The proposals concentrated on broader issues 
affecting the shipping industry and especially the declining competitiveness of the EC 
fleet. The package involved measures on improving the operating conditions for 
Community shipping as well as fiscal and financial benefits for shipping companies 
that maintained their vessels in EC member ship registries. Pivotal to the package was 
the establishment of the Euros EC Ship Registry that would complement the ship
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registries of the member states (Interview with former Managing Director of 
European Maritime Cooperation Agency March 2006). As the substitution of national 
flags was unfeasible it was proposed that the Euros would supplement existing 
national registers (European Parliament Report A5-0413 November 2003). It was 
proposed that only vessels featuring on this supplementary register would gain access 
to the EC cabotage trades (Aspinwall 1995: 145). In addition, the package was 
designed to harmonise the interests of shipowners and seafarers, as the protection of 
employment was not emphasised in the 1985 proposals. Hence, all the officers and 
half of the seafarers manning Euros registered vessels were required to be EC 
nationals. Anticipating the objections of shipowners to the higher operational costs, 
fiscal and financial incentives were attached to the common register and Euros- 
registered vessels would be favoured in the carriage of EC food aid. Hence, state aid 
was on offer in exchange for accepting a number of obligations with respect to 
manning with Community nationals. Further, vessels flying the EC flag “...would be 
a powerful reminder of the Community presence in global trade and a symbol of the 
Community as a single trading entity” (Stevens 2004: 131).
Despite the attempts of the European Commission, the Greek state and the coastal 
shipowners were resolute in their resistance to the abolition of the cabotage trades. 
Nevertheless, the EEA and the EEEP were not engaging directly with the European 
Commission in seeking to influence the policy-making process. There was limited 
evidence of interaction between the Greek coastal shipowner association and similar 
organisations in other Southern EC member states. Likewise, with the exception of 
the international shipowner association Interferry, there was an absence of 
institutional forms for the voicing of the coastal shipowner positions at the EU level
(Interview with Chief Executive Officer of Interferry March 2006). The primary 
shipowner association with respect to EC policy-making was the European 
Community Shipowners Associations (ECSA). Nevertheless, ECSA concentrated on 
issues concerning the ocean-going shipowners and liner shipping (Interview with 
Executive Advisor of European Community Shipowners Associations March 2006). 
In the same vein, although the UGS was in favour of competition in international 
shipping, it articulated its opposition with respect to the single EC Registry which was 
perceived as unworkable (Interview with Member of the Greek Shipping Cooperation 
Committee Council March 2006). In aligning its position with the coastal shipowners 
the Greek government continued to oppose any change to the domestic status-quo. 
However, the intention of the European Commission to safeguard the employment of 
European seafarers began to sway the trade unions, including organisations 
representing Greek employees in the merchant marine. Despite internal disagreements 
between sectoral organisations within the Pan-Hellenic Seamen’s Federation (PNO), 
the seafarers joined the EEA and the EEEP in opposing the abolition of the domestic 
cabotage trades (General Confederation of Greek Labour 1998).
The Greek government in coordination with the Southern European member states 
postponed the adoption of a decision for over three years following the 1989 
European Commission package of proposals. Greece was supported by the 
governments of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal that maintained similar protectionist 
measures (Aspinwall 1995: 146, Ronit 1995, Kiriazidis 1994). In March and then 
again in December 1991 the European Commission submitted a second and third 
version of the proposed Regulation (CEC COM 91/54 and CEC COM 91/483). 
Subsequently, resting on a German-Dutch paper and after arduous negotiations the
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European Commission proposed a revised approach that was able to win a majority 
within the Council of Ministers. This led to the adoption of Council Regulation 
3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport 
within member states. Article 1 of the Regulation stipulated the freedom to provide 
maritime transportation services within the EC single market to all ships flying the 
flag of any EC member state commencing from January 1, 1993. However, a set of 
derogations were adopted for the coastal trades of Greece, France Spain and Portugal. 
In the case of Greece there was temporary exemption from the Regulation until 1 
January 1999, for cruise ships and vehicle ferries over 650 gross tons sailing between 
mainland ports. Most importantly, Article 7, paragraph 3 stated that “for reasons of 
socio-economic cohesion, the derogation ... shall be extended for Greece until 1 
January 2004 for regular passenger and ferry services and services provided by 
vessels over 650 gross tons” (Council Regulation 3577/92). Subsequently, the 
European Commission persisted on the Euros ship registry by revising the proposal 
once more in 1994 (Interview with Managing Director of European Maritime 
Cooperation Agency March 2006). Nonetheless, the proposal for the establishment of 
a single ship registry was abandoned with the European Commission’s 1996 White 
Paper, ‘Towards a New Maritime Strategy’ (CEC Com 96/81). Thus, commencing 
with 1986 package of proposals and after six years of negotiations the European 
Commission accomplished the abolition of the coastal shipping cabotage trades across 
the EU member states. At the same, although the coastal shipowners and the Greek 
government were categorically opposed to the abolition, through the negotiations 
derogation periods were achieved with particular reference to the longest period for 
any EU member state of eleven years for the passenger shipping sector (Interview
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with Director of Hellenic Institute of Transport March 2006, Interview with Professor 
of Maritime Transport at the National Technical University of Athens March 2006).
In sum, the European Commission initiatives and the proposed abolition of the 
cabotage trades was an issue of considerable salience for the Greek coastal 
shipowners. The EEA, the EEEP and YEN represented substantial formal veto points 
in obstructing reform at the domestic level. At the same time, the island communities 
constituted a factual veto point to reform. The Greek coastal shipowner associations 
neither engaged directly with the European Commission or the Economic and Social 
Committee nor pursued indirect influence through European industry associations. 
Certainly, the Greek coastal shipowners in the late 1980s and early 1990s had not 
adjusted to the changing regulatory landscape involving the EC. It was believed that 
the EC initiatives were a ephemeral trend, as requests to the Greek government for the 
repeal of Regulation 3577/92 persisted throughout the decade of the 1990s (General 
Confederation of Greek Labour 1998). Rather, there was evidence of close 
cooperation and consultation between the EEA, the EEEP and the Greek government. 
The latter became the access point of the Greek coastal shipowners with the EC 
institutions. It is noteworthy that the policy-making process at the EC level was less 
complex than present with the Council being the primary locus of power. The Greek 
government in coordination with other Southern European member states resisted the 
abolition of the cabotage trades seeking the longest possible derogation periods. In 
proposing the formation of the Euros ship registry, the European Commission sought 
the completion of the internal market by linking several outstanding issues. Although 
there were segments of organised shipping as well as individual shipowners who were 
in favour of liberalisation, primarily the EEMFP, their capacity to influence YEN and
the Greek government was limited. Individual commercial enterprises such as 
Strintzis Lines and Attica Group despite their attempts were not in a position to 
decisively shape the power dynamics within the respective industry associations. 
Similarly, although the UGS was in favour of international competition, their 
concentration on ocean-going shipping did not justify the commitment of resources 
and influence in persuading YEN to pursue the reform of coastal shipping. Due to 
their disparity and lack of coordination, the domestic interests in favour of reform 
were unable to make use of EU material and immaterial resources in altering the 
domestic status quo. Eventually the EEA and the EEEP declared their satisfaction 
with the eleven-year derogation period which was deemed sufficient in preparing for 
the opening of the market (Interview with Technical Director for Attica Group March 
2006, Interview with representative of Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Shipowners 
Union March 2006). Therefore, aside from the emergence of the EC as a source of 
regulation, an additional dynamic was the internal conflict between coastal 
shipowners that defined subsequent attempt in the liberalisation of Greek coastal 
shipping. On the one side, there were the traditional coastal companies and primarily 
the people-based companies that vehemently opposed the overhaul of the system of 
licences and sought to maintain monopolies on their routes. On the other side, there 
were the coastal shipowners who were largely excluded from the system of licences, 
adopting a corporate approach to the provision of services and propagating the 
liberalisation the domestic market. Strintzis Lines commenced the reorganisation of 
their corporate structure and the renewal of their fleet, declaring that the deregulation 
of the coastal marker would be inevitable. Indeed, Greek coastal shipowners began to 
utilise EU ‘policy instruments’ in exploring the possibility of providing coastal 
shipping services within other EU member states.
5.3 Abolishing Cabotage
5.3.1 Industry consolidation and fleet modernisation (1993 -  2000)
In the immediate aftermath of the EC negotiations the regulatory framework remained 
unreformed with the greater part of change occurring to the market structure of Greek 
coastal shipping. The primary features of change were industry consolidation, fleet 
modernisation and corporate restructuring. A handful of large companies emerged 
whilst erstwhile dominant companies were weakened or entirely disappeared through 
a wave of mergers and coalitions in the 1990s. In turn, this altered the composition 
and internal dynamics of the industry associations, EEA and EEEP and consequently 
to their relations with YEN. Nevertheless, the opposition to reform of the ‘system of 
licences’ remained robust with YEN and the island communities resisting the 
implementation of Regulation 3577/92. At the same time, domestic actors became 
increasingly familiar with the EC institutions, utilising material and immaterial 
resources in pursuing their interests at the domestic and European levels.
5.3.1.1 The Adriatic Sea Corridor
The provision of coastal transport services in the Adriatic Sea corridor linking Greece to 
Italy became the forerunner of changes to come in the Greek domestic market (Interview 
with Director of Hellenic Institute of Transport March 2006, Interview with Deputy 
Technical Director of Attica Group March 2006, Interview with Professor of Maritime 
Transport at the National Technical University of Athens March 2006, Yercan 1999). The 
corridor connected the Greek ports of Patras, Igoumenitsa and Corfu to the Italian ports of 
Brindisi, Bari, Ancona and Trieste. These routes were historically serviced by state- 
owned Italian shipping companies. However, the EU induced liberalisation formed the
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parameters for Greek coastal companies to enter the coastal trades within and between 
other EU member states. By contrast to the Greek market, plying the Adriatic routes 
required neither a Greek-flagged vessel nor a year-round service. In tandem, the fares 
were not determined by YEN. Indeed, anticipating the arrival of Greek coastal 
companies, the Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (MIT) requested from the 
European Commission an earlier lifting of the cabotage in the Greek market. In the 
words of Giorgio Giaccardi, Principal Private Secretary at the MIT “...we simply 
don’t accept this most favourable of treatments” (Journal o f Commerce July 3, 1997).
From 1993 the people-based coastal company Minoan Lines and the newly 
established Superfast ferries, a subsidiary of the Attica Group foreseeing the growth 
opportunities of the Adriatic corridor, placed the first newbuilding orders for modem 
and fast passenger ferries with large vehicle transportation capacity (Interview with 
Deputy Technical Director of Attica Group March 2006). On April 15, 1995 
SuperFast I  sailed from the port of Patras to Ancona in less than twenty hours, 
reducing the time required for this route by forty percent (Naftemporild April 18, 
1995). In the same year, a joint venture was formed between Minoan Lines and Blue 
Star Lines, deploying modem passenger ferries on the Patras-Venice route and 
absorbing a large portion of demand for the Ancona port.19 Concurrently, ANEK and 
Blue Star Lines entered the Adriatic market by acquiring modem second-hand 
passenger ferries. Following the success of the first newbuildings, Minoan Lines and 
Superfast ferries ordered a second wave of newbuildings. In parallel, in 1995 Minoan 
Lines introduced the newbuilding Aretousa on the Patras-Ancona route, rapidly 
gaining a substantial market share (Kathimerini May 21, 1995). At the same time,
19 After the dissolution of the joint venture, Minoan Lines maintained a market share above 60 percent 
for the port o f Venice.
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operators with older tonnage were unable to compete and removed their vessels from 
the Adriatic corridor.
The EU coastal markets and international competition began to figure prominently in 
the corporate strategies of the four leading coastal shipping companies (Lloyd's List 
November 25, 1992). Following a similar business model, Superfast Ferries 
subsequently entered the Hanko (Finland) -  Rostock (Germany) and the Rosyth 
(Scotland) - Zeebrugge (Belgium) routes. For the latter service, Superfast Ferries was 
selected by an open tender receiving partial financing by the EU through the 
Community programme Pilot Action for Combined Transport (PACT) (Loyola de 
Palacio 2002). After winning the international tender to ply the Scottish routes the 
Managing Director of Superfast Ferries commented, that “...the Scottish economy 
will reap many benefits from a direct connection with its European Union partners 
using our brand new luxury vessels” (Panagopoulos 2002). Similarly, upon adding 
two more ferries to their fleet in November 1999, the Chief Executive Officer of Anek 
argued that “ ...with the purchase of the two ferries we are accelerating the renewal 
plan of our fleet which is becoming established as a dominant force in the European 
ferry shipping industry” (Naftemporiki November 25, 1999). Thus, ahead of the 
opening of the domestic coastal market, the leading Greek coastal companies became 
exposed to conditions of market competition in the Adriatic Sea corridor. The 
employment of new passenger ferries and the adoption of modem corporate practices 
underpinned the prevalence of Greek coastal companies on the Greek-Italian sea 
routes. This approach would be gradually emulated in the Greek coastal market in 
anticipation of the completion of the derogation period and the abolition of the 
domestic cabotage trades.
5.3.1.2 The Greek coastal transport market
Certainly, the domestic coastal shipping sector was transformed in the years following 
the adoption of Regulation 3577/92 on the freedom to provide maritime transport 
services across the EU member states (Panagopoulos 2005, Strintzis 2005, 
Panagopoulos 1999, Sfinias 1999, Strintzis 1999, Agoudimos 1999). In parallel to the 
commercial initiatives taken in the Adriatic corridor, the Greek coastal shipowners 
instituted changes in strengthening their position. This was characterised by corporate 
restructuring, industry consolidation and fleet renewal. Particularly the introduction of 
modem passenger vessels was perceived as an imperative for coastal shipowners in 
preparing for the opening of the market in January 2004. Throughout this period the 
urgency of corporate reform was compounded by circulating rumours of the eminent 
liberalisation of the sector by the government (Interview with Shortsea Shipping 
advisor to the Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Shipowners Union March 2006).
Industry consolidation took place coalescing around three corporate groups Attica 
Group, Minoan Lines and ANEK (Steer Davies Gleave 2005, Panagopoulos 2005, 
Strintzis 2005, Zambetakis 2005, Panagopoulos 2000, Kivotos 2000). Attica Group 
entered the domestic coastal market by acquiring a controlling stake in Strintzis Lines 
which was subsequently renamed to Blue Star Ferries.20 Likewise, ANEK entered the 
Lesvos and Dodecanese routes by acquiring stakes in NEL and DANE as well as 
absorbed two smaller Cretan ferry operators, LANE and Rethymniaki Lines 
(Zambetakis 1999).
20 Attica Group purchased 48.8 percent of Strintzis Lines in 1999. In 2005 it purchased 10.2 percent of 
Minoan Lines and 12.3 percent of Hellenic Seaways.
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Figure 4: Greek Ferry Market Share (passenger traffic 2006)
■ Blue Star Ferries m Minoan Lines □ NEL Lines □ ANEK Lines m Hellenic Seaways*
Source: XRTC Annual Ferry Report 2007 (*MFD was the predecessor o f Hellenic Seaways).
Nonetheless, the trend towards consolidation was embodied in Minoan Flying 
Dolphins (MFD). In contrast to the EU induced movement towards liberalisation and 
competition, MFD sought to incorporate the entire Aegean coastal trade within its 
commercial operation. Established in 1998, MFD was the product of a merger 
between Minoan Lines and Ceres Flying Dolphins.21 As Minoan Lines was 
concentrated on the Piraeus-Crete route and the Adriatic corridor, the formation of 
MFD was seen as a corporate vehicle for entering the Aegean island trades (Sfinias 
1995). Ceres Flying Dolphins was operating a fleet of hydrofoils and catamarans 
across an extensive network of Aegean islands (Naftemporiki February 19, 2000). 
Subsequently, the Managing Director of MFD and concurrently President of the EEA, 
Pantelis Sfinias orchestrated a string of mergers and acquisitions with smaller
21 Minoan Lines owned 70 percent and Peter Livanos’s Ceres Group the remaining 30 percent.
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companies. Smaller operators were persuaded to join their vessels in a larger MFD 
that would be in a position to compete with leading EU ferry operators (Klironomos 
2001, Kapranos 2000, Sfinias 1999). Most notably, in 1999 thirty-two ferries were 
purchased from long-standing companies including Agapitos Lines, Goutos Lines, 
Nomikos Lines, Moulopoulos, Moiras, Lazopoulos, Stathakis, Tyrogalas, 
Kavounides, Frangoudakis and Efthymiadis. In return, the smaller shipowners 
received MFD shares corresponding to their tonnage.22 Amongst the major routes that 
were not serviced by MFD was Piraeus-Crete which was already operated by the 
parent company, Minoan Lines. The capacity of MFD to extend its operations across 
the Aegean island networks raised controversy and criticism was levelled against the 
alleged close relationship between the incumbent Greek government and the senior 
management of Minoan Lines (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions October 2 
2000, Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions November 2 2000).
Industry consolidation and fleet modernisation were intertwined with the transition in 
the corporate practices of passenger ferry operators (Panagopoulos 2005, Zambetakis 
2005, Klironomos 2001, Panagopoulos 2000a). Departing from the employment of 
second-hand passenger ships the coastal shipowners ordered newbuildings for the 
domestic shipping market. Historically coastal companies either purchased second­
hand ferries or other types of vessels which were subsequently converted into 
passenger ferries at Greek shipyards. In the period 2000-2005 the Greek ferry fleet 
development and age profile are presented in the graph below:
22 Two subsidiaries, Hellas Ferries and Saronikos Lines were founded to operate the vessels, covering 
Sporades and the Saronic Gulf islands. In February 2000 MFD acquired a large portion (46 percent) of 
GA ferries with licences corresponding to almost half the Dodecanese islands. Furthermore, MFD was 
granted two controversial licences for the route to islands of Chios and Mytilini, ending the 
longstanding monopoly o f local NEL Lines.
Figure 5: Greek Ferry Fleet Development and Age Profile (2000-2006)
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In an effort to raise the necessary capital, the five largest operators, Attica Group, 
Minoan Lines, Strintzis Lines, Anek and NEL concluded initial public offerings on 
the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). In tandem, the public flotation of coastal 
companies was made possible by an amendment to the regulatory framework of the 
ASE. Amending preceding legislation, Law 1982/1990 stipulated the conditions for 
the listing of shipping companies. This was a considerable break from the financial 
practices of the family-owned or people-based coastal companies that historically 
relied on private equity, retained earnings and corporate loans. Illustratively, the public 
listing of ANEK raised the funds to place an order for its first newbuilding. Similarly, in 
May 1998 NEL Lines was granted two licences by the YEN to employ two high­
speed ferries on the Piraeus-Dodecanese routes. The required funds were raised 
through a secondary offering on the ASE (Naftemporiki June 26, 1998).
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Thus, in anticipation of the abolition of the cabotage restrictions, the Greek coastal 
shipowners adjusted their commercial position through industry consolidation, 
corporate restructuring and fleet renewal (Steer Davies Gleave 2005, Panagopoulos 
2005, Strintzis 2005, Zambetakis 2005, Panagopoulos 2000, Zambetakis 1999). 
Instigated by the commercial decisions of the shipowners the domestic coastal marker 
underwent adaptation. Emulating the business practices prevailing in the Adriatic Sea 
corridor, a handful of large companies emerged that were publicly listed on the ASE 
with modem corporate structures and renewed fleet of passenger ferries. Industry 
consolidation was exemplified by the expansion of MFD encompassing numerous 
smaller coastal companies. It was maintained that by early 2000 MFD controlled 
seventy-five percent of the domestic coastal shipping market (Minutes of the Hellenic 
Parliament Sessions November 2 2000). Moreover, the commercial adjustment 
entailed political implications that were not foreseen by the coastal shipowners.
5.3.2 Reforming the ‘system of licences’
Ahead of the EU induced liberalisation of the coastal shipping market, the coastal 
shipowners were involved in commercial adjustment. In tandem, the division from the 
period of the EC negotiations between the supporters of the status quo and the 
advocates of reform was reconfigured. Reflecting the change in the market structure 
of coastal shipping, there was growing consensus amongst the major coastal 
shipowners in favour of the opening of the cabotage trades. Departing from their 
original opposition to reform, internally the EEA and the EEEP were divided on the 
issue of liberalisation. At the same time, YEN and the island communities opposed
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reform, primarily due to significance of coastal shipping in ensuring the social 
cohesion and economic development of the inhabited islands. Central to the 
disagreement was the ‘system of licences’ that was designed as an institutional barrier 
of entry to the island shipping trades.
Throughout this period the coastal shipping policy of YEN indicated unwillingness to 
reform the ‘system of licenses’ and open the domestic coastal shipping market to 
competition. The system of licences remained intact with Minoan Lines and ANEK 
sharing the Cretan routes, DANE and GA Ferries operating on the Dodecanese by 
DANE, Blue Star Ferries on the Cycladic Islands and HFD operating across these 
island networks. Without questioning the principles underlying the exisiting 
regulatory framework, it was maintained that licences would be issued for 
newbuildings or modem passenger ferries and for coastal shipowners offering 
competitive fares (Soumakis 1999, YEN Minister Press Conference July 10, 1999). 
The national policy on coastal shipping encompassed the preservation of affordable 
fares and concession prices for various social groups, securing services on the 
unprofitable routes and islands and the renewal and modernisation of the passenger 
ferry fleet. In tandem, the renewal of the fleet was associated to EU measures with 
respect to the age of passenger vessels. Within the Greek coastal industry it was 
anticipated that the European Commission would be pursuing the reduction of the 
maximum age for passenger ferries from thirty-five to thirty or even twenty-five years 
(Athinaios 2002). Existing national legislation stipulated a withdrawal age of thirty- 
five years, with the passenger fleet averaging twenty-five years. Thus, there were 
concerns amongst the Greek coastal shipowners that YEN would reduce the average 
age in line with EU measures in accelerating the renewal of the fleet. It was estimated
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that if the age limit was decreased, more than half of the existing passenger ferry 
tonnage would have to be replaced by 2004.
In parallel to the unwillingness of YEN to proceed with the liberalisation of the 
coastal shipping market, the coastal shipowners were unable to agree upon a coherent 
position regarding this issue (Potamianos 2000, Potamianos and Sfinias 2000, 
Panagopoulos 2000b, Panagopoulos 1999, Strintzis 1999, Agoudimos 1999, 
Zambetakis 1999). In 1999 the EEEP submitted a Memorandum to YEN with its 
position on the reform of the regulatory framework of coastal shipping. The EEEP 
stressed that coastal shipping should be opened entirely to the forces of free and fair 
competition. It was emphasised that solely for the routes and islands that did not 
attract commercial interest, would it be justified for YEN to organise open tenders and 
provide Public Interest Contacts with subsidies attached. In addition, it was requested 
that the EU and national legislation were harmonized on manning requirements 
aboard passenger ferries. It was maintained that manning should be opened to EC 
nationals, excluding crews from developing countries (Panagopoulos 1999). By 
contrast, the EEA under the leadership of Pantelis Sfinias was unable to formulate a 
coherent position due to internal divisions juxtaposing Minoan Lines and its allies 
against the coastal shipowners that supported the opening of the cabotage trades. In a 
public statement the President of the EEEP chastised Minoan Lines and MFD for 
nurturing oligopolies in the coastal shipping market (Panagopoulos 2000b). It was 
argued that “ ...no competent shipowner favours the preservation of monopolies and 
the obstruction of the modernisation of coastal shipping. By contrast, some are seeing 
to mislead the Greek public in order to retain the existing situation until 2004 or with
176
their own interpretations of Regulation 3577/92 seek the preservation of the current 
arrangement in eternity” (Panagopoulos 2005b).
This discrepancy between the coastal companies was evident in the internal 
proceedings of their industry associations. In April 2000 for the elections of the EEEP
9 ^Executive Board Minoan Lines and MFD elected two members. Most prominently, 
they were joined by the reaffirmed President, Andreas Potamianos (President since 
1981) and representatives of the Attica Group and Strintzis Lines.24 The presence of 
the Minoan Group in the EEEP Executive Board was interpreted as the confrontation 
within the EEA moving to the EEEP (Naftemporiki April 4, 2000). Within days of the 
election of the new Executive Board, Minoan Lines registered thirty-four vessels with 
the EEEP increasing its influence within the association. Indeed, the President of 
Minoan Lines proposed the amalgamation of the EEA and the EEEP in forming a 
single voice to represent the interests of coastal shipping. The proposed scheme was 
made public by the Presidents of the EEEP and the EEA, stating the intention of 
creating a unified platform for promoting the interests of the coastal industry 
(Potamianos 2000, Potamianos and Sfinias 2000, Sfinias 2000). It was claimed that 
this would amplify the voice of the coastal shipowners at the national and European 
levels. In converse, several coastal shipowners including the representatives of the 
Attica Group, Strintzis Lines, ANEK and NEL opposed the amalgamation of the two 
associations. The proposed arrangement was perceived as the intention of the senior 
management of Minoan Lines to control the institutional representation of the coastal 
shipowners. It was asserted that if the EEEP and the EEA merged, the coastal
23 The President of Minoan Lines Kostas Klironomos and the General Manager o f MFD, Nicholas 
Vikatos.
24 The President of Attica Group, Periklis Panagopoulos, President of Superfast Ferries Alexander 
Panagopoulos and the Managing Director of Strintzis Lines, Gerasimos Strintzis.
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shipowners that opposed the initiative would respond by forming a new association 
(Panagopoulos 2000, Strintzis 2000).
In the late 1990s the differences within the coastal shipping industry were exemplified 
by the confrontation between Attica Group and the Cretan shipowners over operating 
licences for the Cretan routes. In September 1997 the Attica Group and Strintzis Lines 
applied to YEN for a licence to introduce a high-speed ferry on the Piraeus-Heraklion 
route (Steer Davies Gleave 2005, Interview with Legal Advisor to Attica Group Marcj 
2006). As with the Adriatic Sea corridor, it was estimated that the employment of a 
modem vessel on the route would reduce travelling time by thirty percent whilst 
concurrently lowering fares by twenty percent. ANEK and particularly Minoan Lines 
that held the license for the Piraeus-Heraklion route vehemently objected the entry of 
Attica Group and Strintzis Lines. Following a meeting between YEN Minister and the 
Cretan operators, the Minister Stavros Soumakis stated that “...we are not going to 
upset stability in coastal shipping in the name of competition” (Naftemporiki October 
5, 1997). Eventually, YEN did not grant a licence, maintaining that the route was 
sufficiently serviced by the exisiting operators and that the Heraklion port facilities 
could not accommodate the passenger ferry proposed. At the same time, the 
incumbent licensee, Minoan Lines made a public commitment to introduce a high­
speed passenger ferry in the near future and continue servicing “unprofitable islands”. 
Nevertheless, it took three more years for Minoan Lines to introduce discount 
packages and reduce the cost of fares (Panagopoulos 2000, Panagopoulos 2000b, 
Sfinias 2000). It is noteworthy that the reduction in the fares was not the consequence 
of pressures from YEN. Rather, it was the response to local pressures embodied in the 
requests of Cretan Associations for reduced fares to facilitate travel between Piraeus
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and Crete. Indeed, in a letter sent by the Cretan Associations to a local newspaper, a 
commitment was made that the half a million Cretan residing in Athens would 
continue to support Cretan companies once the cabotage was abolished (Naftemporiki 
August 7, 2000).
At the same time, the Greek coastal shipowners utilised EU resources in shaping the 
domestic policy-making process and pressurising the Greek government to abolish the 
cabotage restrictions. In May 2000, the European Commission gave its first formal 
response to the complaints of the coastal shipowners regarding Law 2932/92. It was 
acknowledged that the complaints of the coastal shipowners were valid, particularly in 
relation to the system for administering licences to coastal companies. However, it 
was noted that the European Commission was not in a position to initiate legal 
procedures against the Greek government with respect to the implementation of 
Regulation 3577 before the end of the derogation period in January 2004 (EEA 
Petition to European Commission 995/2002).
One the other hand, the PNO trade union continued to oppose the deregulation of the 
market. As during the EU negotiations in the early 1990s the primary reason cited was 
that half of its membership was employed in the coastal industry. It was anticipated 
that increased competition would oblige shipowners to minimise crew costs. Even 
further, the trade unionists were concerned that the YEN discretion in designating 
crew composition would be reduced. With the influx of foreign competitors and open 
ship registries crews from developing countries would be employed, dislocating the 
Greek crews with their larger wages, pension and health care expenses. In the words 
President of the Greek Masters and Mates Union, “...most of the community ships 
which will be eligible to compete will be manned with low-waged foreign crews”
(Kouzilos 2000). Already in the Adriatic corridor trades most of the vessels owned by 
Greek passenger companies were under the flag of Cyprus. Hence, the vessels were 
not operating under the obligation to maintain a specified quota of Greek crew 
members. Aside from exercising pressure on YEN and the Greek government, PNO 
sought to utilise new lobbying opportunities that emanated from the entrance of the 
EU in the domestic institutional configuration. The International Transport Workers’ 
Federation and European Transport Workers’ Federation already maintained a strong 
presence within the EU institutions. Through these institutions the PNO exercised 
pressure for the repeal of Regulation 3577/92. Meetings were arranged with European 
Commission officials and secondarily the European Parliament. Indicatively, in 
January 1998 the PNO General Secretary met with the European TEN Commissioner 
‘with the aim of maintaining cabotage for Greece's passenger shipping’ (PNO Press 
Release January 14, 1998). However, unlike the early 1990s the interests of the 
coastal shipowners and the trade unions did not coincide. Indicatively, the President 
of the EEA described the actions of PNO and the trade unions were described as 
‘pride-saving’.
Therefore, the commercial adjustment of the coastal companies in anticipation of the 
opening the domestic cabotage trades was not reflected in the regulatory framework. 
Irrespective of the adoption of Regulation 3357/92, the ‘system of licenses’ was 
central to the operation of the coastal shipping market. This was illustrated in the 
attempts of Attica Group and Strintzis lines to gain access to the lucrative Cretan 
routes. A constellation of actors encompassing the Cretan shipping companies, Cretan 
associations and YEN opposed the opening of the routes to competition. The divisions 
between coastal shipowners on the issue of liberalisation were heightened, effectively 
disabling the EEA as the institutional voice of the industry. Yet, both the supporters
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and the detractors of liberalisation were employing EU material and immaterial 
resources in advancing their interests. There was evidence of coastal shipowners, 
YEN, island communities and trade unions using EU material and immaterial 
resources in strategic and legitimising ways to shape domestic policy-making.
5.4 Express Samina and the acceleration of reform
Against the background of industry consolidation and the divisions separating the 
coastal shipowners, new leadership was appointed to YEN in April 2000. The 
appointment of the former European Commissioner Christos Papoutsis as YEN 
Minister was interpreted as an indication of the Government’s intention to accelerate 
the reform of the regulatory framework (Panagopoulos 2000b). It was anticipated that 
liberalisation and the promotion of competition would figure prominently on the YEN 
agenda. At the same time, the European Commission and the TEN European 
Commissioner were vocal in reminding the Greek government, YEN and the coastal 
industry of the upcoming lifting of cabotage. On many occasions the TEN European 
Commissioner reiterated that “...Greece by 2004 will have a modem, forward- 
looking framework for maritime cabotage services”. The new leadership of YEN 
setup a Committee of Experts to examine proposals on the liberalisation of coastal 
shipping within the parameters of Regulation 3577/92. The recommendations of the 
Committee would underpin legislation that would be put before the parliament within
2001. In addition, the internal composition of the CTAC was expanded to island 
representatives with the objective of enhancing transparency in the ‘system of 
licences’.
Nevertheless, within a few months the Greek government, YEN and the coastal 
shipowners were faced with the worst ferry accident since the 1966 sinking of the 
Heraklion. On September 26th 2000, the passenger ferry Express Samina sank off the 
island of Paros after hitting the rocks of Portes, resulting in eighty deaths of 
passengers and crew. The public outcry and media attention were substantial exerting 
pressures on the Greek government and the coastal shipping industry for the reform of 
the existing regulatory framework. Illustratively, the daily newspaper Kathimerini 
(October 1, 2000) wrote that the sinking of Express Samina was “...the tragedy 
necessary to shake the foundations of state protectionism over both trade union 
interests and big capital in the shipping industry”. In tandem, the Express Samina 
accident instigated a broader discussion on the unregulated expansion of MFD in the 
late 1990s. The opposition party, New Democracy called for an enquiry into MFD’s 
position in the Aegean islands coastal trades and the close relations between the 
political leadership of YEN and the owners of MDF. Criticism was levelled against a 
close-knit community of Ministry advisers that allowed the MFD to acquire a 
dominant position in the Aegean coastal trades (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament 
Sessions November 2, 2000, Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions October 2, 
2000). Within days from the occurrence of the accident, the European Commission 
requested information and a detailed account of the accident from YEN and the Greek 
government to be delivered within a month (Gantelet 2000). The European 
Commission Director General on Energy and Transport sent a letter criticising the 
poor safety standards of the Greek coastal shipping fleet and requesting that the Greek 
authorities observe the respective EU maritime transport regulations. As the letter was 
leaked to the Greek press, the YEN Minister in turn criticised the European 
Commission for making unfounded claims and supported the strong safety record of
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coastal shipping and compliance to EU safety regulations. According to the YEN 
Minister, “the safety of passenger ships remains the primary aim of the Merchant 
Marine Ministry. Our country has an obligation to adapt all passenger ships to the 
demands of international conventions and European Directives and our government 
sticks to this strictly and conscientiously” (YEN Press Briefing October 2000).
Nonetheless, the accident became the catalyst for the reform of the regulatory 
framework and the acceleration of liberalisation. Alongside issues of negligence of 
the crew onboard the Express Samina, there was growing consensus that the primary 
cause of the accident was the lack of transparency in the allocation of licences and the 
absence of competition in the provision of coastal transport. In its recommendations, 
the Committee of Experts proposed accelerating the lifting of cabotage before the 
January 2004 completion of the derogation period. Indeed, the Greek government and 
YEN announced a timetable for the adoption of legislation on the abolition of 
cabotage and the dismantling of the system of licences commencing from November
2002. In addition, YEN proposed reducing the age ceiling for ferries from thirty-five 
years to a maximum of thirty years by 2008, the strengthening of safety regulations, 
improving the training of seafarers by establishing private nautical colleges and 
establishing a vessel traffic control system for the Aegean island network {Lloyd's 
List, October 9, 2000, To Vima, June 25, 2000). Prior to the adoption of national 
legislation, the TREN European Commissioner sent a letter to the Greek Government 
and YEN to commend the earlier opening of the cabotage trades. However, it was 
noted that several provisions contravened respective EU legislation (Letter of TREN
25 YEN discharged the Head of the Ministry’s Inspectorate Commodore Damianos Doumanis and eight 
senior officers and appointed an investigative committee of two officers and three experts nominated 
by the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping, the Technical Chamber and PNO (Kathimerini, October 24, 
2000).
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Commissioner Loyola de Palacio to Greek government June 6, 2001). This was 
followed by a second warning letter to the Greek government on December 17, 2001 
(European Parliament Committee of Petitions December 13, 2004).
Following three decades since the adoption of the system of licences with Presidential 
Decree 684/1976, in June 2001 the Greek parliament passed Law 2932 on the “Free 
provision of coastal maritime transport services and other issues” (EtaoGepr) Tuxpoxn 
Y7rr|peaicbv cm <; GaXaotnsq evSopexacpopsq K a i aXkzc, diaxafyiq). The Law stipulated 
the liberalisation of the coastal shipping sector for vessels operating under EU 
member state flags commencing from November 1, 2002 in accordance with 
Community legislation and in particular Regulation 3577/92. Hence, licences were 
abolished and the coastal shipping sector was open to any operator compliant with EU 
requirements and able to provide documentation demonstrating their capacity to 
provide the service as well as a letter of guarantee. In parallel, the Law stated the 
reduction of the age limit of passenger ferries from thirty-five to thirty years from 
2005. The criteria for granting a license to an applicant were limited to compliance 
with safety requirements, the obligation to be in service for a minimum of ten months 
per year and suitability of the passenger vessels for the respective ports. Regarding 
the allocation of licences, Law 2932/01 stated that applications were submitted once a 
year in January with the prospect of commencing operation in November of the same 
year. By contrast to the indefinite duration of the licences under the previous regime, 
it was specified that the duration of the licence was one year. Therefore, by the end of 
May of each year, one-year contracts should be authorised and signed (Giannopoulos 
and Aifandopulou-Klimis 2004, Goulielmos and Sambrakos 2002, Antapassis 2002).
26 The documentation included tax, social security, insurance documents, criminal record, information 
on routes, frequency, duration of services, economy class fares and the adequacy of respective ports.
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With respect to the intractable issue of the unprofitable islands (lifeline services), 
these would be determined by the free market. The islands that were not the subject of 
applications made in January each year would qualify for the provision of services 
through Public Service Contracts (PSCs). Upon completion of the application process 
the Council of Coastal Transport (CCT), (in replacement of the CTAC) compiled the 
list of island services that did not receive applications. These were subsequently 
combined into routes that were made available through competitive tender as 
subsidised services in April of each year. Following historical practise the subsidies 
were calculated per nautical mile and were funded from the national budget and a 
surcharge of three percent that was applied on the fares on there entire coastal 
shipping network. In tandem, the Law 2932/01 specified the requirements for the 
PSCs including frequency, period of operation, the existence of contingency vessel, 
standards for passenger capacity and vehicle deck, safety and fares involving a ceiling 
on economy class and discounts for concession passengers. Apart from PSCs, YEN 
was authorised to impose Public Service Obligations (PSOs) in the instances that 
frequency requirements were not met on certain routes, without any obligation of 
further subsidies.
Within the new regulatory framework YEN maintained a central position in ensuring 
safe, efficient and affordable coastal transport services. During the first round of 
applications in January of each year, YEN was not allowed to interfere in selecting 
between coastal shipping operators. YEN could only solicit changes if an 
overwhelming number of operators requested identical or overlapping time intervals 
for arrival and departure at ports. However, ports withheld the right to block licences
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on the grounds of limited capacity and port congestion (Giannopoulos and 
Aifandopulou-Klimis 2004, Goulielmos and Sambrakos 2002). The risk was 
shouldered entirely by the operator in providing services within the required 
parameters. Although some flexibility was recognised in the determination of fares, 
YEN continued to determine concession fares for a variety of social groups. In 
addition, the vessels operating in the coastal market were obliged to employ Greek 
crews or alternatively demonstrated Greek language proficiency for non-Greek crew 
members.
In addition, Law 2932/01 stipulated the formation of a new authority, the Regulatory 
Authority of Domestic Sea Transport (RATHE) to oversee free and fair competition 
in coastal shipping. RATHE was interpreted as a vehicle for the promotion of the 
competition principles of the European Commission. Moreover, RATHE was 
authorised to ensure that coastal shipping competition was in line with EU legislation 
and to prohibit or penalise cartel practices in setting prices and sharing routes. 
Offenders provided explanations for their practices and RATHE had the authority to 
impose fines. According to the legislative framework, the members of RHATE were 
appointed by the YEN Minister for a period of five years. In addition, the appointment 
of the President and Vice-President required the opinion of the Maritime Transport 
Committee of the Hellenic Parliament. The existing YEN bureaucracy was sceptical 
of the new authority as its responsibilities were seen to overlap with the Ministry’s 
mandate (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions April 22, 2004).
The coastal shipowners were partly satisfied with the stipulations of the new 
regulatory framework. However, a major consequence of the Express Samina accident
was that the divisions separating coastal shipowners were bridged. In response to the 
criticism levelled against MFD as the operator of the Express Samina, its President, 
Pantelis Sfinias committed suicide. Sfinias had presided over the EEA for 
approximately seven years and was largely responsible for the rupture within the 
association and its inability to formulate a coherent policy on the liberalisation of 
coastal shipping. Elections were held in 2001 and the Chief Executive Officer of 
ANEK (Stelios Zambetakis) became the new president of the EEA. The proposals for 
amalgamation with the EEEP were abandoned and the EEA proceeded by articulating 
a coherent position on the new regulatory framework. There was a broad consensus 
that Law 2932/01 was hastily drawn and the coastal shipowners were not sufficiently 
consulted. Although there was satisfaction with the transparent mechanism for 
allocating licences, the one-year duration was seen as narrow entailing considerable 
bureaucratic coordination every year. In addition, there was largely agreement with 
the role of RHATE as an independent adjudicator of free and fair competition 
(Panagopoulos 2005, Interview with legal advisor of Attica Group April 2006, 
Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions April 22, 2004). However, the EEA 
stated its opposition to the continuing interference of YEN in setting fares, the 
reduction of the maximum age for ferries from 35 to 30 years and provisions related 
to the Greek manning of passenger ships (Zambetakis 2005, Strintzis 2005, 
Panagopoulos 2000b).
Resting on an internal consensus, the EEA expanded its lobbying efforts at the 
domestic and EU levels on amending provisions of Law 2932/01 that were in conflict 
with EU legislation. The EEA utilised material resources in the form of EU 
institutions and policy instruments in countering the YEN and the stipulations of the
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national legislation. The EEA lodged a legal challenge with the Council of State, the 
highest court in the Greek judicial system and the respective EU judicial organs over 
the harmonisation of Greek with Community legislation regarding the thirty-five year 
age limit for vessels and the determination of fares and crew composition by YEN 
(Naftemporiki September 21, 2002). At the same time, a petition was sent to the 
European Commission to bring to its attention the discrepancies between national and 
Community legislation (EEA Petition to European Commission 995/2002). The 
European Commission responded in December 2003 confirming the points raised by 
the EEA and stating that “...Law 2932/2001 does not fully liberalise these trades” 
(European Commission Response to Petition 995/2002, December 12, 2003). 
Nevertheless, EEA and the European Commission disagreed over the commencement 
of the infringement, with the former stating “as from the publication” of Regulation 
3577/92 and the latter maintaining “as from the 1st of January 2004”. Consequently, 
the European Commission was not in a position to initiate infringement proceedings 
against the Greek government before January 2004.
Nonetheless, in the context of the new regulatory framework, further changes were 
endorsed in the operation of the coastal shipping market. After its failed attempts in 
the late 1990s to obtain licences in the Aegean island trades, Superfast Ferries through 
Blue Star Ferries secured licences to operate on the lucrative Piraeus-Crete and 
Piraeus-Rhodes routes. Yet again, Minoan Lines and ANEK opposed the YEN 
decision with the President of Minoan Lines publicly condemning the YEN Minister 
of collusion with the senior management of Superfast Ferries and threatening the 
latter “...not to dare commence its service to the Cretan ports” (Klironomos 2000). 
Minoan Lines went on to call upon Cretans not to use the Superfast ferries in the
collective interest of Crete. Nevertheless, Superfast Ferries maintained that the 
liberalisation of coastal shipping was irreversible and requested the further 
liberalisation of the coastal shipping market (Strintzis 2001, Panagopoulos 2000b). It 
was maintained that their comparative advantage was the introduction of a modem 
fleet of high-speed ferries, raising the expectations of passengers (Zambetakis 2001). 
Overall, since the adoption of Law 2932/92, most applications for licences were 
authorised. The exemptions were applications that were not accompanied by a 
guarantee letter as this was an indispensable document for the enforcement of 
requirements (Steer Davies Gleave 2005, Interview with Legal Advisor of Attica 
Group March 2006, Interview with Director of Hellenic Transport Institute March 
2006).
Therefore, the Express Samina accident became a catalyst for the reform of the 
coastal shipping regulatory framework and the dismantling of the ‘system of licenses’. 
In response to public and media pressures, the Greek government accelerated the 
abolition of the cabotage trades with Law 2932/01. The issuance of licenses by YEN 
was replaced with a more transparent and market-based arrangement for the operation 
of passenger ships on island routes. In conjunction, YEN maintained its competence 
in the determination of fares, there were compulsory restrictions on manning and the 
maximum age for passenger ships was reduced to thirty years. The partial 
liberalisation that the new regulatory framework encapsulated was criticised by the 
coastal shipowners and the European Commission. Rather than resolving the 
problems in the provision of coastal transportation, Law 2932/01 entailed further 
negotiations of the terms of liberalisation between the coastal shipowners, the Greek 
government, the European Commission and the island communities.
5.5 January 2004 and the shortage of vessels
The arrival of the formal date for the opening of the cabotage trades on January the 
first 2004 according to Regulation 3577/92 was accompanied by disagreement and 
controversy on the terms of liberalisation. The coastal shipowners through the EEA 
and the EEEP advocated for the complete liberalisation of coastal shipping and looked 
to the European Commission for support in influencing YEN. The European 
Commission had already claimed there was a discrepancy between national and EU 
legislation and with the advent of January 2004 was eligible to initiative infringement 
proceedings against the Greek state. At the same time, YEN maintained that Greek 
coastal shipping was an exceptional case and legislation should safeguard the social 
and economic cohesion of the islands. Island communities exerted their influence 
through traditional means and the usage of EU resources in addressing the 
shortcomings of the coastal transportation system.
Following January 2004, the EEEP and especially the EEA issued statements, 
memoranda and sent letters to YEN detailing the position and requests of their 
members. The principal requests involved the complete liberalisation of the domestic 
market according to EU legislation, the abolition of compulsory concession fares, the 
amendment of the thirty-year maximum age limit for passenger vessels and the review 
of state aid in line with EU guideline. In the words of the President of the EEA, 
“...with the application of EU rules, state intervention will be lifted and coastal 
shipowners will be able to plan their routes, determine each ship's timetable and fares, 
and operate competitively” (Sarris 2006). In accentuating the obstacles for Greek
coastal shipowners, comparisons were drawn to the Adriatic corridor with the 
employment of modem passenger ferries providing a reliable, safe and 
environmentally friendly service within a competitive market environment. In 
contrast, it was claimed that this quality of service was not be replicated in the Greek 
coastal market characterised by state intervention (Maniadakis 2005, Sakellis 2005, 
Panagopoulos 2005). Against the background on rising oil prices, the liberalisation of 
fares was a sensitive issue for coastal shipowners. It was calculated that the level of 
fares determined by YEN were sixty-two percent lower than the amount coastal 
shipowners were entitled due to arbitrary reductions over the period from 1993 to
2003. Compared to the price structures prevailing in other EU member states, it is 
maintained that fares in Greece were one-third of the prices for the same distances, 
with approximately thirty percent of the price corresponding to state taxes 
(Panagopoulos 2005a). According to the President of Attica Group “...the 
government is imposing a price cartel ... disrupting the emergence of tmly liberalised 
domestic market” (Panagopoulos 2005a).
In May 2004, in the General Assembly meeting, it was decided that the member 
companies of the EEA would proceed with the ‘self-liberalisation’ of the coastal 
transport market. Resting on the principle of the legal superiority of EU Regulation 
3577/92 over national legislation, the coastal shipowners unilaterally announced that 
they would be increasing fares by ten percent. The necessity for the increase was 
attributed to increased costs related to fuel and bunkers. The President of the EEA 
pointed out that “...de facto, European legislation overrides member state legislation”. 
In a similar move, the members of the EEA did not submit letters of guarantee in their 
January 2005 applications. The objective was to weaken the position of YEN in
identifying the unprofitable routes and disrupt the coastal shipping service cycle 
commencing in November 2005. Certainly, the EEA demonstrated its strength by 
asserting that any member company submitting letters of guarantee would be 
automatically expunged from the association (Naftemporiki, October 21, 2004). 
Similarly, ahead of the January 2006 application session, the EEA explained that its 
members would not be submitting three forms of documentation, the letter of 
guarantee, a price-list for economy class fares and a declaration of assurance that the 
ports serviced would not present any problems for their vessels. Particularly the third 
type of documentation was an issue of disagreement in itself between the coastal 
shipowners and YEN. As port infrastructure in many islands was poor, mooring 
modem vessels was seen as a risk that should not be shouldered solely by the 
shipowners (Strintzis 2005a, Sakellis 2005). In a memorandum sent to YEN it was 
maintained that most of the ports were at an unacceptable state of repair, citing the 
ports of Andros, Syros, Samos, Leros, Patmos, Folegandros and Kythera (Naftika 
Chronika September 16, 2005).Likewise, individual shipowners stated their 
unwillingness to comply with national legislation and the decisions of YEN. The 
Managing Director of Hellenic Seaways publicly declared the refusal of the company 
to cooperate with YEN if the existing regulatory framework remained unchanged 
(Strintzis 2005b). On a different occasion he complained that “...we were given 
promises but have not seen any signs of change... today ferries were controlled by the 
government and in many cases operators were asked to provide uneconomic services 
without getting paid” (Strintzis 2005c). Concurrently, coastal shipowners belonging to 
the EEEP were institutionalising their presence at the European level. Within the 
existing framework of the European Community Shipowners Associations (ECSA) 
Superfast Ferries was instmmental in reviving the High Level Ferry Group (HLFG)
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with the primary purpose of representing the interests of passenger shipping at the EU 
level (Interview with Interview with Chief Executive Officer of Interferry March 
2006, Interview with Executive Advisor of European Community Shipowners 
Associations March 2006).27 Indeed, the President of Superfast Ferries was 
unanimously elected as Chairman of the HLFG. Following the election he took the 
opportunity to reiterate the significance of a single EU coastal shipping market, 
stating “...our industry should move towards the creation of a European-wide 
commercial level-playing-field for all operators” (Superfast Ferries Press Release 
June 6, 2003).
Alongside complete liberalisation, the EEA was pressing YEN for the amendment of 
the age ceiling for passenger ferries, scheduled for thirty-five years by 2008. 
According to projections of the EEA, thirty-six ferries currently serving key lines 
were due for withdrawal from service by 2008, corresponding to fifty percent of the 
existing fleet (Sakellis 2005, Xiradakis 2005). At the same time, there were only three 
orders for newbuildings and absence of any activity in the second-hand market. This 
would result in a shortage of vessels and demand across large parts of the island 
network would remain unsatisfied. Once again, coastal shipowners attributed this 
discrepancy to the lack of competition and the incomplete implementation of 
Regulation 3577/92 that did not justify capital investments in passenger ferries 
(Panagopoulos 2005, Maniadakis 2005, Strintzis 2005, Sakellis 2005). As a contrast, 
coastal shipowners pointed to the Adriatic corridor with predominantly modem high­
speed ferries plying the routes under conditions of open competition. In the words of
27 The HLFG comprises the following member companies: Brittany Ferries, Color Line AS, Corsica 
Ferries, DFDS Seaways, Hellenic Mediterranean Lines (Yannoulatos), Irish ferries, P&O Ferries, 
Rederi AB Gotland, Scandlines, Sea Container Ferries, Sea France, Silja Line Oy, Societe Nationale 
Maritime Corse-Mediterannee, Stena Line AB, Superfast Ferries, TT-Line, Viking Line AB.
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the Managing Director of Blue Star Ferries, . .operators are reluctant to proceed with 
further investments...plans were cancelled in 2002 when we realised the government 
was ignoring its obligation to apply EU regulations on liberalisation.. .we are now just 
a step away from going to the European Court of Justice.. .the result of non­
competition is catastrophic” (Sakellis 2005).
With the advent of 2004 the European Commission was in a position to legally uphold 
the liberalisation of Greek coastal shipping. Since the adoption of Law 2932 in 2001, 
the European Commission had informed the YEN on the existence of inconsistencies 
with EU legislation. As YEN and the Greek government did not make any 
amendments to the national legislation, infringement proceedings were initiated by 
the European Commission (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions April 14m 
2006). In February 2004 the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice to 
Greece regarding the incorrect application of European legislation on freedom to 
provide services to maritime transport within member states. Firstly, it was noted that 
the Greek regulatory framework subjected the entire coastal transport network to 
requirements with respect to the provision of a public service and specifically for 
routes, frequency, duration (ten months per annum) and economy passenger fares. 
Secondly, Law 2932/01 stipulated that the non-Greek members of the crew should 
hold a certificate proving their knowledge of the Greek language. According to the 
European Commission this moved beyond Community legislation which referred only 
to crew with duties relating to passenger safety. Thirdly, the age ceiling of thirty-five 
years was not contained in the respective Regulation. Fourthly, Greek legislation was 
overly restrictive in requiring a representative and an office located in Greece 
(European Parliament Committee on Petitions December 13, 2004). In response, YEN
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requested an additional month to prepare its response to the European Commission 
questions, transferring the deadline from early April to early May (Naftemporiki, 
March 29, 2004). As there was an absence of progress, in December 2005 the 
European Commission sent a reasoned opinion, referring Greece to the European 
Court of Justice for failure to comply with EU coastal transport legislation. Alongside 
the issues raised in the initial letter of notice, it was noted that Greek legislation on the 
regulation of issues such as ship equipment, percentage of economy class passengers 
and the pricing of food on board was overly restrictive on the freedom of coastal 
shipowners to operate their vessels (European Commission Reasoned Opinion to 
Greece December 19, 2005).
It was believed that the actions of the European Commission and the referral of 
Greece to the ECJ would force YEN to accelerate the harmonization of Greek with 
EU legislation (Sarris 2006, Panagopoulos 2004). This coincided with the election of 
the New Democracy party into government in March 2004. In the words of the newly 
appointed YEN Minister “.. .the first issue that I found on my desk left behind by my 
predecessor was the imminent referral to the ECJ” (Kefalogiannis Records of Hellenic 
Parliament September 27, 2005). Subsequently, YEN was in consultation with the 
European Commission to formulate an appropriate policy and halt the infringement 
proceedings. YEN explained to the European Commission that the provision of 
coastal transport was not an instance of perfect competition. Rather, it naturally 
tended towards an oligopoly with ‘destructive competition’ and market failure 
ensuing (YEN Press Briefing May 20, 2004). This was compounded by the seasonal 
character of the market. According to YEN, if the market were to be completely 
liberalised private operators would gravitate towards providing services in the
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summer months. Considerable subsidising would be required to attract shipowners in 
operating vessels during the winter months. Nonetheless, YEN proceeded with the 
liberalisation of fares for routes from four Ports, Kimi, Lavrion, Rafina and Eleusina.
In addition, the new leadership of YEN dissolved RATHE, the authority established 
with Law 2932/01 to ensure free and fair competition in the coastal shipping market 
(Interview with Director of Hellenic Institute of Transport March 2006, Interview 
with Shortsea Shipping Advisor to the Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Shipowners 
Union March 2006). Instead the mandate for overseeing competition in coastal 
shipping was transferred to the Competition Committee. In an intense discussion at 
the Hellenic Parliament, it was claimed by the YEN Minister that in the three years of 
its existence RHATE was ineffective, costly and opaque. In his words, “.. .RATHE 
was overly costly...the members of the Executive Board were appointed for a five 
year term with extravagant wages.. .whilst one of the members of the Board happened 
to be a close relative of the former YEN General Secretary” (Kefalogiannis Minutes 
of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions April 22, 2004). The YEN Minister who oversaw 
the formulation and adoption of Law 2932/01 defended RHATE as an independent 
body that was suitable for the particularities of Greek coastal shipping. As opposed to 
the Competition Committee it was maintained that RHATE could act preventively in 
monitoring prices and formulating guidelines as well as issuing penalties for the 
violation of competition rules. Similar bodies were established in industries of public 
interest such as telecommunications and energy (National Telecommunications 
Commission EET, Regulatory Authority for Energy RAE). Further, the former YEN 
Minister argued that RATHE was an effective organ and over its life span reviewed 
over three hundred reports of violations and issued a number of guidelines on issues
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of free and fair competition (Papoutsis Minutes of Hellenic Parliament Sessions April 
22, 2004). The decision to abolish RHATE was described as an example of the 
‘selective state interventionism’ of the new leadership of YEN (Pipergias MP Minutes 
of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions September 27, 2005, PASOK 2005b).
In September 2005, YEN announced a package of ten measures for coastal shipping 
in an effort to demonstrate progress in complying with EU legislation. First, fares 
would be liberalized on routes with three or more companies that transported at least 
150,000 passengers per annum (YEN Press Briefmg September 7, 2005). Indeed, in 
January 2006 the CCT proposed the liberalisation of the routes from Pireaus, 
Heraklion, Chania, Siros, Tinos, Mykonos, Paros, Naxos, Santorini, Chios and the 
Dodecanese. Second, free tickets would be provided for inter-island voyages to the 
residents of ‘unprofitable islands’ with population less than 3,100 people. Third, the 
duration of PSCs was extended from one to five years with the objective of attracting 
newbuildings and improving the quality of service. Fourth, qualitative criteria would 
be applied in the signing of PSCs with a preference for passenger vessels under the 
average age of the Greek fleet at sixteen years. Sixth, loans with favourable 
conditions were made available for coastal companies to encourage the employment
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of young passenger vessels on routes with PSCs. In relation to this measure YEN 
supported the establishment of local shipping companies servicing the less profitable 
routes between small islands. In the words of the YEN Minister “.. .we should see the 
emergence of local shipping companies that operate services between islands at lower
28 In July 2005 YEN signed a Protocol for the Financing of Seaports in the Territory of the Hellenic 
Republic of 3 billion Euros with the European Investment Bank. Apart from port infrastructure, the 
Protocol incorporates the financing of vessels for the formation of connections between the ports of 
thin lines. The credit facility conditions included 25-year maturity and interest moratorium o f 7 years 
(YEN Press Release July 12, 2005).
costs. The big companies will link large islands that act as hubs. So it will be a two- 
tier market, with a lot of potential for increasing traffic and revenues” (Naftemporiki 
December 13, 2005). Fifth, an official record of mechanical failures would be kept 
with the objective of penalizing coastal shipowners operating substandard tonnage, 
including the annulment of the PCS. Sixth, in line with an initiative at the EU level, 
YEN announced the Charter of Rights for the Passengers of coastal vessels. This 
incorporated standard procedures for processing complaints, the apportionment of 
compensation, the prompt notification of delays or cancellations and the appointment 
of staff within coastal companies with the responsibility of overseeing quality control 
(YEN Press Briefmg September 7, 2005, PASOK 2005). In relation to the refusal of 
EEA members to submit the required documentation, the YEN Minister described 
such actions as illegal and in contravention to Law 2932/01. YEN maintained that 
unilateral actions could not be condoned and prior consultation with the state 
authorities was indispensable. With the continued refusal of the EEA to submit the 
required documentation, YEN announced PSCs of five-year duration on the Piraeus- 
Chania and Piraeus-Heraklion routes. The YEN Minister went on to invite foreign 
operators to enter these routes (Kefalogiannis 2006, Minutes of the Hellenic 
Parliament Sessions April 14, 2006).
At the same time, the unprofitable routes and islands were unable to attract the 
commercial interest of coastal shipping companies. Although the new regulatory 
framework was in place since November 2002, the provision of coastal transport 
services across the entire island network remained an intractable problem. In 2004 
approximately seventy routes were tendered for PSCs, several of which were 
subjected to new tenders and renegotiation. For these routes subsidy provision was
37.1 million Euros, compared to 9.4 million Euros in 2001 which was the final year of 
the previous regulatory regime (Kefalogiannis MP Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament 
Sessions December 22, 2005). The coastal transport framework of the previous 
decades excluded local administration from participating in coastal shipping policy 
making, resulting in the formation of three separate groupings of islands. The first 
category consisted of the large commercial and tourist islands that faced problems 
satisfying demand in the summer months and limited frequency of services over the 
remaining seasons of the year. The second category comprised the large number of 
medium sized and even large but distant islands (Dodecanese, East Aegean islands) 
that confronted transportation problems on a permanent basis. The third category was 
the small islands that were isolated irrespective of season (Institute of Local 
Administration 2006).
Following the principle that safe, reliable and affordable coastal shipping services 
were a social right, the island communities were opposed to the liberalisation of fares 
and the abolition of concessions. There was concern that the EEA was overly 
influential in pressuring YEN to fully adopt Directive 3577/92. Nevertheless, unlike 
the preceding decades the voice of the island communities in coastal shipping had 
become institutionalised through participation in the CCS and the National Shipping 
Policy Council. The Central Union of Municipalities and Communities of Greece 
(KEDKE) comprising elected representatives of local authorities was granted a 
position in the CSC whilst the NSPC on issues of coastal shipping included MPs from 
island constituencies, mayors and heads of local authorities (YEN Press Briefing 
December 13, 2004). The island communities employed the traditional channels of 
influence in pressing YEN, YPAI and the Greek government to address their transport
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needs. Island-based transport committees were organised to coordinate the actions of 
local authorities, associations and Chambers of Commerce in promoting their 
interests. On the island of Chios the ‘Committee for Coordinated Struggle for Coastal 
Shipping’ was formed whilst a Pan-Aegean Committee was established to coordinate 
the activities and interests of islands communities across the Aegean. Alongside the 
usage of channels of influence towards central government, committees organised 
protests and demonstrations at the ports of their islands.
Moreover, with the EU expanding the opportunity structure, islands communities 
employed the strategic use of EU policy instruments in increasing their influence on 
domestic coastal shipping policy-making (Surel 2000). The island communities 
sought direct contact with European Commission officials and Greek MEPs whilst 
indirectly raising their concerns through European associations with membership 
from various levels of local government, including Insuleur and the Islands 
Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMRE). 
Insuleur featured prominently (Network of the Insular Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry of the European Union) with the participation of the Group of the Chambers 
of Commerce for the Development of Greek islands (EOAEN) and a number of 
individual island chambers of commerce.29
The channels of influence utilised by island communities was illustrated by the case 
of coastal shipping services to the island of Kea, one of the closest islands of the 
Cyclades to Attica. The island was serviced by three ships with two forming part of an 
‘unprofitable route’ passing three time per week and one vessel plying solely the Kea-
29 Chambers o f Commerce of Chios, Corfu, Cyclades, Dodecanese, Evia, Heraklion, Kephalonia & 
Ithaki, Lasithi, Lesvos, Magnesia, Piraeus, Rethymno, Samos, Zakynthos.
Lavrion route owned by the TNC (Tzia Maritime Company). The TNC vessel was 
unable to cater for the transport needs of Kea due to the irregularity of services and 
frequent technical problems. Hence, the two vessels plying the ‘unprofitable route’ 
ensured coastal transportation for the island of Kea. However, the owner of TNC 
complained to YEN and YPAI for unfair competition from the operation of the two 
subsidised vessels, threatening to abandon the route. Subsequently, with a Ministerial 
Decision (10627/26.10.2004) the collection and delivery of passengers was prohibited 
by the subsidized vessels transiting Kea. The island authorities and residents 
responded by utilizing every possible channel of influence. Their efforts were 
coordinated by the Municipal Committee for the Transportation of Kea (MCTK) 
which was established by the Municipality of Kea and authorized to undertake 
political and legal action in solving the transportation problems of the island. The 
MCTK proclaimed that the TNC held a monopoly at the detriment of the economic 
development of the island. YEN and YPAI were criticized for acquiescing to pressure 
from the coastal shipowner and violating EU legislation on the liberalisation of 
coastal shipping. As a first step the MCTK sent a formal complaint requesting the 
repeal of the Ministerial Decision. With a new Ministerial Decision 
(11839/24.11.2004) the YEN Minister allowed only one of the remaining vessels to 
service Kea once per week. However, coastal shipping services remained haphazard 
and in February 2005 the MCTK sent another complaint to the YEN Minister, 
emphasizing that the unsuitable size of the TNC vessel and irregular schedule were 
undermining the economic development of the island and discouraging the attraction 
of tourists (Official Complaint of the Citizens of Kea, February 21, 2005). Similarly, 
the Hellenic Parliament MPs for the Cyclades and Athens submitted formal questions 
to YPAI requesting the reinstatement of the third service (Chomatas Memorandum to
201
Hellenic Parliament December 13, 2004, Question to Hellenic Parliament, November 
3, 2004). In tandem, utilizing EU resources the MCTK announced that they would 
proceed by seeking recourse at the European Court of Justice (Municipal Committee 
for Transport of Kea, Press Declaration December 2, 2004).
Furthermore, there is evidence of the increased relevance of experts in the reform
process for coastal shipping (Ladi 2005: 293). In response to the intractable problems
of coastal shipping, research and policy proposals were generated by research
institutes affiliated to the state and KEDKE. In 2002 YPAI mandated the Hellenic
Institute of Transport (I.MET) to assess the alternatives and propose measures to
address the ‘market failure’ regarding coastal transportation to unprofitable islands
within the parameters of EU legislation (Interview with Director of Hellenic Institute
of Transport March 2006). Subsequently, I.MET prepared two reports proposing the
purchase of twelve passenger vessels by the state, operated by a new organisation that
would take the form either of a private company or cooperative of local authorities.
The vessels would be employed on unprofitable routes under PSCs and Public Service
Obligations with duration of twelve years (Pavlidis MP Minutes of the Hellenic
Parliament Sessions September 27, 2005, Giannopoulos and Aifandopoulou 2004).
Moreover, in April 2006 the Institute of Local Administration, the research institute of
KEDKE prepared a report proposing the redesign of the coastal shipping network.
Commencing from the principle that coastal transport was a public good and should
be safeguarded by the state, a set of measures were advanced. Firstly, the formation of
unified decision-making body mandated to design, coordinate and monitor intermodal
transportation across the islands. Secondly, the establishment of an organisation to
30 This was reminiscent of the state-controlled coastal company Hellenic Coastal that was established 
by the state-owned bank ETVA in September 1985. The company went bankrupt in 1991.
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provide coastal transportation to unprofitable islands, financed primarily from public 
sources. Thirdly, the founding of an observatory to generate research and statistics 
and assess market conditions in island transportation (Institute of Local 
Administration 2006).
Thus, the completion of the eleven-year derogation period in January 2004 was not 
accompanied by the liberalisation of the domestic coastal market. Resting on the 
incompatibility between national legislation and Regulation 3577/92, the European 
Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Greece. The main differences 
between the Greek government and the coastal shipowners were the liberalisation of 
fares, the maximum age for passenger ferries and compulsory manning requirements. 
Alongside the use of EU resources, the Greek coastal shipowners utilised the new 
regulatory framework in advancing their interests. This entailed the refusal to submit 
the required documentation with their annual applications for routes and the increase 
of fares without prior consultation with YEN. At the same time, the incumbent Greek 
government refused to fully liberalise the coastal market citing the necessity of 
ensuring the social cohesion and economic development of the inhabited islands. 
Similarly, the island communities were mobilizing at the national and European levels 
in securing affordable and reliable coastal transport services. Corresponding to the 
turbulent history of Greek coastal shipping throughout the post-war years, the terms 
of liberalisation remained under negotiation between the coastal shipowners, the 
Greek government, the European Commission and the island communities.
5.6 Coastal shipping, Greek politics and the European Union
According to the schedule of Regulation 3577/92 Greece was the final of the EU 
member states to liberalise its coastal shipping regime in January 2004. The Express 
Samina accident spawned the formulation of Law 2932/01 with the intention of 
opening competition in November 2002, earlier than the EU timetable. With the 
lifting of the cabotage regime, EU-flagged passenger ferries were eligible to apply to 
operate on Greek coastal routes. Nonetheless, four years elapsed from the opening 
date stipulated by Greek legislation, including two years from the EU deadline and the 
terms of liberalisation remain under negotiation between the coastal shipowners, the 
Greek government, the European Commission and island communities.
The effect of the European level negotiations in the period between 1986 and 1992 
was minimal on the domestic institutional framework. Over this period and until well 
into the 1990s the formal and factual veto points in the form of YEN, the coastal 
shipowners and local communities were opposed to the reform of the longstanding 
system of licences. Exceptions were the industry association EEMFP and individual 
coastal companies, namely Attica Group and Strintzis Lines. Hence, in a unitary state 
with weak ‘integrated leadership’, the convergence of veto points against reform 
denoted that EU adaptation pressures could not reshape the domestic institutional 
configuration. Even if EU material and immaterial resources became available, the 
domestic actors were unable or unwilling to utilise these in order to effect domestic 
change.
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Initially, it was the anticipation of reform in January 2004 that generated changes to 
the structure of the coastal shipping market with industry consolidation, corporate 
restructuring and fleet modernisation featuring prominently. In conjunction, the 
availability of equity capital through the burgeoning ASE provided further impetus 
for fleet expansion and market growth. The emergence of a handful of leading coastal 
companies had pervasive political implications. The EEA and the EEEP gradually 
shifted from detractors to supporters of reform, exposing internal divisions between 
the coastal shipowners. This was illustrated by the efforts in the late 1990s of the 
Attica Group and Strintzis Lines to secure licences from YEN to operate vessels on 
the Cretan routes. The relationships between YEN, the Cretan shipping companies 
and local politics, underpinned was sufficiently robust in deflecting competing 
companies from entering the lucrative Cretan routes. Concurrently, the European 
Commission intermittently reminded the domestic actors of the 2004 deadline and 
encouraged the adoption of legislation accelerating reform. The formal and factual 
veto points of YEN and the island communities remained firmly opposed to the 
liberalisation of the coastal shipping market. Nonetheless, actors across the reform 
spectrum began to acknowledge the legitimacy of the European Commission in 
regulating the domestic coastal shipping market with growing evidence of the usage 
of EU material and immaterial resources in shaping policy-making.
As previously in maritime history, the Express Samina accident was a catalyst for 
reform. Under considerable public pressure, YEN and the Greek government took the 
first tangible steps towards reforming the coastal shipping regulatory framework. Law 
2932/92 was adopted to harmonise EU and national legislation by abolishing licences 
and engendering non-discriminatory conditions for competition. The application
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process became more transparent and the composition of the Council of Coastal 
Shipping was expanded to include local government. At the same time, the Greek 
authorities were concerned with preventing instances of ‘destructive competition’ and 
‘predatory pricing’ whilst safeguarding territorial integrity and ensuring the economic 
and social cohesion of the islands. Indeed, prior to the adoption of the legislation, the 
European Commission had warned the Greek government and YEN of the 
inconsistencies with Regulation 3577/92.
In spite of the advent of January 2004 the coastal shipping market remained partly 
liberalised whilst the island network, especially the unprofitable islands, were 
contending with haphazard coastal shipping services. As signalled, the European 
Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Greece for incorrect 
application of EU legislation on the liberalisation of coastal shipping. The newly 
installed leadership of YEN (following the March 2004 elections) commenced a 
consultation process with the European Commission and announced a package of ten 
measures to resolve the impasse of coastal shipping. YEN declared the liberalisation 
of fares for profitable routes, the provision of free inter-island tickets to the residents 
of small islands and the arrangement of preferential credit facilities to encourage 
orders of newbuildings. Nevertheless, at the time of writing of this thesis several 
issues remained unresolved, including the European Commission infringement 
proceedings and the complete liberalisation of coastal shipping, the age ceiling of 
thirty years and the projected shortage of vessels in 2008, the application 
documentation for routes and the unreliable coastal shipping services to the island 
network, particularly unprofitable islands.
The market and regulatory reform of the coastal shipping industry was accompanied 
by the breaking of the mould of the state corporatist arrangement that prevailed for 
three decades (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, Ioakimidis 1996, Schmidt 1996). A 
weakening in the preferential ties between YEN and the coastal shipowners that held 
the operating licences was documented. With the abolition of licences in Law 2932/01 
the coastal shipowners were not in a position to control island routes for indefinite 
duration. A more transparent and market-based system of allocating routes was 
installed. Concurrently, new actors joined the political process, most notably the 
European Commission the pressed for domestic reform. Similarly, participation in 
coastal shipping policy-making was widened with the admittance of a KEDKE 
representative at the CTC and the involvement of various levels of local government 
at the National Shipping Policy Council. However, although local government was 
not a formal veto point under the preceding regulatory framework, local politics were 
central to the political process.
In the aftermath of the adoption of Law 2932/01, there was a heightening in the usage 
of EU material and immaterial resources by the respective actors in shaping domestic 
coastal shipping policy outcomes. Regarding immaterial resources, there was 
primarily evidence of the usage of legitimizing resources by domestic actors. YEN, 
industry associations, local communities and trade unions employed the notions of 
‘European interests’, ‘European constraints’, ‘European economy’, ‘European 
competition’ and the ‘European Idea’ in furthering their interests. The EU as a 
legitimizing device was used by both supporters of reform as well as defenders of the 
status quo. In parallel, material resources in the form of EU institutions and policy 
instruments were used by national actors in shaping domestic political results. The
EEA submitted a petition to the European Commission emphasizing the discrepancies 
between EU legislation and Law 2932/01. The coastal shipowner associations cited 
innumerable times the EU Directive 3577/92 in statements, speeches, declarations, 
memoranda and letters in seeking policy reform. Alongside meetings with YEN and 
the Greek government, direct contact was pursued by the EEA and the EEEP with 
officials in DG TREN and Greek MEPs. At the same time, Superfast Ferries was 
instrumental in the revival of the High Level Ferry Group within ECSA as an indirect 
channel of influence. Due to its long presence in Brussels, ECSA was perceived as a 
suitable vehicle for voicing the interests of coastal shipowners in the EU institutions. 
Concurrently, the international industry association Interferry was an additional 
source of resources and influence in shaping EU-level and domestic policy-making. 
The trade unions implemented analogous strategies, combining national means of 
influence with European mobilization in seeking to repeal Regulation 3577/92. Yet, at 
the EU-level the trade unions were largely reliant on the resources and connections of 
the International Transport Workers’ Federation and in particular the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation. Compared to the trade unions, the island communities 
developed a strong presence at the EU level. There was evidence of mobilisation 
through island and inter-island committees, public demonstrations and participation in 
European associations. Direct contact was established with DG TREN and Greek 
MEPs whilst indirect influence was pursued through Insuleur and the Islands 
Commission of the CPMRE.
Therefore, over the past decade the centrality of the Greek state in regulating the 
coastal shipping sector has been weakened. The constellation of formal and factual 
veto points opposing reform is reconfigured. The direct causation between EU
integration and the reform of the domestic institutional configuration cannot be 
unequivocally established. However, the EU was instrumental in triggering the 
process of reform, maintaining momentum in anticipation of January 2004 and 
altering the political opportunity structure for domestic actors. There was agreement 
that “...without external pressure the old system would not be still in place” 
(Interview with Director of Hellenic Institute of Transport March 2006, Interview 
with Shortsea Shipping Advisor to Mediterranean Cargo Vessels Owners Union 
March 2006). A new actor, the European Commission muscled into the political 
process, whilst existing actors were afforded additional opportunities in articulating 
their interests. Alongside the top-down effects of European integration, EU material 
and immaterial resources were made available to the domestic actors. Irrespective of 
their position on the liberalisation of coastal shipping, domestic actors recognised, 
legitimised and used the EU in shaping domestic coastal shipping policy. The 
pressures from the European Commission for the complete liberalisation of coastal 
shipping, combined with the responses of the domestic actors altered the state 
corporatist arrangement that prevailed for over three decades. The loosening of the 
preferential ties between YEN, and the coastal shipowners that held the operating 
licenses was evinced (Morlino 2002, Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, Schmidt 1996). 
Rather, a more transparent arrangement emerged that fostered market competition and 
institutionalized the participation of a representative of the local communities in the 
CTC and the involvement of various levels of local government in the National 
Shipping Policy Council. This was attributed to the unitary nature of the state, its 
inability to exercise ‘integrated leadership’, the incongruence between EU and 
domestic policies, the limited capacity of coastal shipowners for capital mobility and 
the presence of an influential factual veto point in the form of the island communities.
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Furthermore, some broader comments can be made on the patterns of change and 
continuity with respect to party politics and the political autonomy of island 
communities (Featherstone 2005, Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002, Featherstone and 
Kazamias 2001). The mode of party domination described as ‘bureaucratic 
clientelism’ is not prevalent in the coastal shipping sector. Rather than the governing 
party acting as a collective patron for the coastal shipowners who belonged to its 
active supporters, the holders of the licences remained fixed for almost three decades 
(Sotiropoulos 1993, Lyrintzis 1984). The impetus for reform was initiated at the EU 
level with the Express Samina accident serving as a catalyst. Notwithstanding 
affiliations with individual coastal shipowners, neither of two leading parties PASOK 
or New Democracy questioned the core principles of the system of licences. This was 
exemplified in the period of the EU negotiations preceding the adoption of Regulation 
3577/92. Irrespective of the change in government in 1990, both the governments of 
PASOK and New Democracy negotiated hard at the EU level for the preservation of 
the domestic cabotage trades. This is partly attributed to the structural power of 
coastal shipowners but as importantly it unearths the autonomy of local politics. In the 
case of coastal shipping there is extensive evidence of local political autonomy 
initially with the establishment of people-based companies and subsequently with 
political mobilization that was divorced from political parties and central government. 
This offers an illustration of Greek civil society and local politics that may not be as 
vulnerable to state domination and party politics as theorised in the literature 
(Sotiropoulos 2004, Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002).
Chapter 6
Chapter 6: Greek Shipping, Maritime Safety and the EU
The Greek owned fleet is the largest in the world, corresponding to 3,397 vessels of 
various types and 16.1 percent of the world fleet deadweight (Lloyd’s Register- 
Fairplay March 2006). It is estimated that Greek shipowners control 22.4 percent of 
the world oil tanker fleet and 24.6 percent of world bulk carrier fleet. Accordingly, 
Greek merchant shipping represents a substantial proportion of the national economy 
(Kefalogiannis 2005, Soumakis 1998, Harlaftis 1993, Freris 1986, Pantelidis 1979). It 
is estimated that foreign exchange earnings from shipping activities financed thirty- 
one percent of the deficit of the balance of trade, whilst generating 4.8 percent of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (UGS Annual Report 2004 -  05). Aside from 
foreign exchange flows, the shipping industry is a source of employment, technology 
transfer and investments in other sectors such as energy, banking, insurance and 
tourism. At the same time, the shipowners maintain considerable capital mobility with 
the option of transferring their vessels away from the Greek flag.
Maritime transport is an inherently international industry, operating within a 
framework of transnational rules and regulations (Kumar and Hoffman 2002, Zacher 
1996, Yannopoulos 1986, Farthing 1987). Beyond the internationally accepted 
standards, overly stringent regulation would place shipowners operating in a 
particular jurisdiction at a competitive disadvantage. Hence, the contribution to the 
national economy combined with the capacity of shipowners for capital exit, 
underpinned the state corporatist relationship between the industry associations of the 
Greek ocean-going shipowners, the UGS, the GSCC and the Greek state. Against this 
background, the EU increased its presence in the regulation of maritime safety and the
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prevention of marine pollution. Particularly from the early 1990s with the 
establishment of a legal basis for EU transport safety regulation, several measures 
were adopted at the EU level. Two high-profile maritime accidents involving the 
single-hull vessels Erika and Prestige provided the catalyst for the European 
Commission to expand its regulatory authority. Amongst the initiatives pursued, the 
accelerated phasing-out of single-hull vessels and the establishment of criminal 
sanctions for ship source pollution were sternly opposed by the Greek shipowners. In 
the negotiations that ensued the European Commission was confronted with a 
constellation of formal and factual veto points spanning the national, regional and 
international levels. Drawing from these cases, the objective of this chapter is to 
analyse the impact of EU involvement in maritime safety regulation on the state 
corporatist arrangement encompassing the UGS, the GSCC and the Greek state.
The chapter begins by outlining the international regulatory framework with particular 
reference to measures on the phasing-out of single-hull tankers and the designation of 
criminal sanctions for ship-source pollution. Although stringent regulations were 
adopted at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), there were shortcomings in 
the consistent implementation and uniform enforcement of these measures. This was 
exemplified by the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA ’90) with the decision of the US 
administration to pursue unilateral measures in the phasing-out of single-hull tankers. 
Maritime accidents involving the single-hull tankers Erika and Prestige in EU waters 
provided the impetus for the European Commission to propose measures that departed 
from international maritime safety standards. As part of the EU response, the phasing- 
out of single-hull tankers and the designation of criminal sanctions for ship-source 
pollution were the most contentious for Greek shipowners. The chapter analyses the
usage of EU material and immaterial resources by the Greek shipowners in seeking to 
amend the European Commission proposals. Concurrently, as EU competence grew in 
maritime safety, the domestic impact of Europeanisation on the relations between the 
Greek ocean-going shipowners and the state is examined.
6.1 Ocean-going Shipping and the Greek economy
The ocean-going shipping industry is a vital link in international trade, with ocean­
going vessels representing the most efficient and often the only method of 
transporting large volumes of basic commodities and finished products. The industry 
is highly fragmented into numerous operators with small fleets. The price for 
transporting commodities, referred to as freight rates, is set in highly competitive 
markets and is determined through the interaction between demand and supply of 
tonnage. Indeed, the freight markets satisfy several features of the perfect competition 
model. The market consists of a large number of participants, the service is 
homogeneous, entry and exit barriers are low and information dissemination ensures 
a high degree of transparency. Notably, the industry is cyclical with attendant 
volatility in charter hire rates and profitability. The inherent cyclicality of the tanker 
segment is displayed in the graph below (Stopford 1997):
Figure 6: History of Tanker Freight Rates
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Throughout the post-war years, the Greek shipowners have maintained a prominent 
position in the international seaborne transportation of raw materials, both dry (coal, 
iron ore and grain) and wet cargoes (crude oil). In 1956 Greek-owned vessels 
accounted for 15 percent of the total tanker fleet in terms of capacity (Strati 1997). At 
the time, the closure of the Suez Canal resulted in an expansion of ton-miles with 
demand outpacing available tonnage, bolstering the profitability of Greek shipowners. 
For the following decade, in the context of favourable macro-economic conditions, 
the Greek shipowners expanded their fleets, contributing to a sizeable orderbook. 
However, due to the combination of over-supply and reduced demand during the 
1970s (primarily related to the oil crises), the business activities of the Greek 
shipowners were adversely affected. Despite a temporary recovery in the early 1980s, 
the shipping industry underwent the most pronounced crisis of oversupply in the 
second part of this decade. Between 1981 and 1988, it is estimated the Greek owned 
merchant fleet declined from 70 million dwt to 33 million dwt. Subsequently, the fleet 
has steadily grown, reflecting the vicissitudes of the global economy.
As of early 2006, the Greek owned fleet was the largest in the world, corresponding to 
3,397 vessels of various types and 16.1 percent of the world fleet deadweight (Lloyd’s 
Register-Fairplay March 2006). It was estimated that Greek shipowners controlled
22.4 percent of the world oil tanker fleet and 24.6 percent of world bulk carrier fleet. 
The Japanese-owned fleet was the second largest, numbering 2,945 vessels and 
representing 14 percent of global capacity, while Germany’s was third with 2,615
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ships and 6.9 percent of total capacity (UNCTAD 2005, OECD 2004). Within the 
context of the EU, Greek owned vessels flying EU member state flags amounted to
51.5 percent of EU tonnage in deadweight (UGS Annual Report 2004 -  05). As a 
result, it was estimated that the Greek shipping segment contributed 4.8 percent to 
Greece’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (UGS Annual Report 2005-06, Skordilis 
2007).
Figure 7: Greek-owned fleet (no. of vessels) Figure 8: Greek-owned fleet (Dwt MM)
4.000
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1,000
500
0
240
Source: Fairplay-Lloyd’s Register March 2006, Hellenic Chamber o f Shipping 2006.
Moreover, through mid-2007 this prominence was set to continue as Greek 
shipowners expanded their fleets either through the purchase of second-hand vessels 
or by placing orders for newbuildings. Over the first months 2007, it was estimated 
that the Greek owned fleet rose to 3,699 vessels, aggregating 218 million deadweight 
tons. Furthermore, a substantial portion of the global orderbook comprised 
newbuilding orders that were made by Greek shipowners. Illustratively, it was 
assessed that Greek shipowners had placed orders for 612 vessels totalling 45 million 
dwt. The new orders for 2007 represented 9.2 percent (vs. 7.2 percent in 2006) of the 
total number of vessels ordered and 15.2 percent of additional deadweight capacity
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(11.2 percent in 2006) (survey by Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay as quote in Kathimerini, 
March 2007). Moreover, a portion of the ordered vessels were registered with the 
Hellenic Register with the corresponding fleet rising to 969 vessels in comparison to 
910 vessels in 2006. The remaining vessels were registered with the other flags that 
are preferred by the Greek shipowners, notably an additional 83 with the Panama 
register (total of 583 ships), 71 with Malta (502 vessels), 51 with Liberia (361 vessels) 
and 51 with Cyprus (360 vessels). Hence, the Hellenic register was third amongst the 
flags that benefited from the expansion in the Greek fleet.
Figure 9: World Bulk Fleet by Top 10 Flags (Dwt) 2006
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Another aspect of the contribution of Greek shipping on the national economy is 
related to foreign exchange income (Kefalogiannis 2005, Soumakis 1998, Harlaftis 
1993, Freris 1986, Pantelidis 1979). It was estimated that foreign exchange earnings 
from shipping activities financed thirty-one percent of the deficit of the balance of 
trade, whilst generating 4.8 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (UGS 
Annual Report 2004 -  05).
Figure 10: Foreign Exchange Earnings from Shipping ($US Millions)
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Aside from foreign exchange flows, the shipping industry is a sizeable source of 
employment, with an estimated 100,000 employees and workers in Grece, 
representing 3% of the total workforce employed in shipping-related sectors as of 
early 2006. Indicatively, in excess of 18,000 are employed as officers and sailors on 
Greek-owned vessels, 10,000 in shipping companies with headquarters in Greece and 
the remainder in related segments such as shipbuilding, ship repairs, ship 
management, insurance, legal services and banking. Furthermore, there are indirect 
effects on the Greek economy which cannot be measured with accuracy in the form of 
foreign direct investment in other sectors of the economy such as media, energy, 
banking, insurance and tourism.
6.2 International Regulation of Maritime Safety
Maritime safety was historically regulated at the international level, underpinned by 
the principle of self-regulation. There was a plethora of regulations adopted and 
enforced by international intergovernmental organisations, shipowners, classifications 
societies, P&I Clubs, shipyards, flag states and port authorities. It was acknowledged 
that the international nature of shipping required a set of uniform international laws 
and regulations. The IMO emerged as the foremost forum for the negotiation and 
adoption of maritime safety legislation. Nonetheless, there was a tendency for 
regulatory action to trail behind major maritime accidents (Kumar and Hoffman 2002, 
Haralambides 1998, Zacher 1996, Yannopoulos 1989, Stevens 2004: 135).
The principal driver of dry bulk and tanker shipping markets was cost rather than 
quality. Adverse market conditions and tonnage overcapacity for most of the 1980s 
discouraged shipowners from investing in newbuildings (Nomikos and Alizadeh 
2002, Stopford 1997, Stokes 1997). This combination of regulatory and commercial 
factors resulted in a number of high-profile maritime accidents, culminating in 
approximately 450,000 tonnes of oil spills from tankers in 1991. Thereafter the age 
and quality profile of the tramp shipping fleet improved with the number of accidents 
and oil spillages in steady decline. For most of this period, the Greek shipowners 
primarily operated second-hand and older tonnage (Polemis 1995). Rather than order 
newbuildings, the Greek owners were known for their timing in purchasing second­
hand vessels during the shipping market cycles (Harlaftis 1996, Harlaftis 1995, 
Thanopoulou 1994). According to one commentator, “ ...purchasing second-hand 
vessels has been the backbone for a large segment of Greek shipowners” (Harlaftis
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1995). Initially a handful of operators foresaw that quality tonnage would be an 
important differentiator in an increasingly stringent regulatory environment (Christou 
2004, Lyras 2000, Harlaftis 1996). These shipowners departed from the traditional 
family model by adopting modem corporate stmctures and seeking public listings in 
international stock markets to raise financing for newbuildings (Efthymiou 2005, 
Parker 2004, Grammenos and Choi 1999).
6.2.1 MARPOL and ship-source pollution
In March 1967 the 8-year old supertanker Torrey Canyon ran aground off the coast of 
the United Kingdom, spilling its entire cargo of 120,000 tonnes of crude oil into the 
sea. This became a catalyst for the adoption of several conventions by the IMO 
addressing the legal and operational problems exposed by the accident. In 1973 the 
IMO adopted the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) covering both accidental and operational pollution. Yet again in March 
1978 the four-year old tanker Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the coast of France 
spilling 227,000 tonnes of cmde oil. This instigated an amendment to MARPOL with 
the adoption of the principle of port state control (PSC), underpinned by the concept 
of “no more favourable agreement” whereby port states enforced legislation to which 
the flag state was not a contracting party (Nordquist and Moore 1999, Horrocks 1999, 
Manakabady 1986, Henry 1985, Mankabady 1984).
The MARPOL 73/78 Convention stipulated stringent conditions for ship-source 
discharges at sea. The stringency was heightened in the instances of discharges in 
‘special areas’ of the sea such as the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and the North Sea. 
The Convention made a distinction between pollution originating on the one hand
from deliberate (‘operational’) ship-source and on the other hand, from maritime 
accidents. Deliberate ship-source pollution involved oil, sewage and garbage which 
were discharged in the sea during the operation of a vessel. The cause of pollution by 
deliberate discharges was prohibited with the exception of instances of damage to the 
vessel or its equipment if neither the owners nor the master acted intentionally or 
recklessly and failed to take all reasonable precautions to prevent or lessen the 
pollution. Despite the provisions of MARPOL 73/78, pollution by deliberate 
discharges did not subside in the intervening decades with a small proportion of 
polluters being prosecuted. This was primarily attributed to the inability of the IMO to 
ensure the implementation and enforcement of provisions agreed at the international 
level. In conjunction, other reasons cited were the absence of appropriate waste 
reception facilities in ports, the lack of mechanisms to trace discharges to a specific 
vessel and the lenient sanctions imposed once the polluters were identified and 
convicted (Coleman 1998).
Within the parameters set by international legislation, the European Commission 
pursued several initiatives to decrease the occurrence of deliberate ship-source 
pollution that materialised into provisions within three Directives (Interview with 
Head of Maritime Transport Policy & Maritime Safety European Commission April 
2006). Within the context of port-state control, Directive 21/95 stipulated that the 
documentation inspected on vessels should include oil and other record books. In case 
of inconsistencies or doubts, the port authorities were allowed to conduct further 
inspections or even proceed with detaining the vessel (Council Directive 21/95). 
Subsequently, Directive 59/00 specified a set of rules for deliberate discharges of 
vessels calling at EU ports. These encompassed the establishment of adequate waste 
reception facilities at EU ports and in parallel requirements for the vessels to make
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use of the facilities for deliberate discharges (Lyons 2000: 145). With the traffic 
monitoring Directive (59/02) the purpose was to strengthen the availability of 
information on the vessels and cargoes beyond transported through the waters of a 
coastal state. The Directive involved procedures for identifying illegal ship-source 
discharges and the follow-up measures of the EU member states (Directive 59/02).
6.2.2 The Exxon Valdez and phasing-out of single hull tankers
In March 1989 the three-year old tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on a reef off the 
Alaskan coast, spilling 38,800 tonnes of crude oil in the sea. Responding to the media 
publicity and public outcry the United States proceeded with unilateral measures, 
departing from the international regulatory framework. It was maintained that 
international standards on the prevention of marine pollution were inadequate and 
pushing forward for more stringent regulation at the IMO would be a long process 
requiring arduous negotiations. Rather, with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) 
the oversight of oil transportation by the Federal government was raised substantially 
by setting requirements on vessel construction and operation, crew licensing and 
manning. Foremost, it was stipulated that single-hull tankers were to be phased-out by 
2015. Commencing from this date, single-hull tankers would be prohibited from 
entering US waters. The phasing-in of double-hull tankers rested on the premise that 
surrounding the cargo tanks with a second inner plate would reduce the possibility of 
the cargo tanks being damaged and the risk of marine pollution (OCIMF 2003, 
Goulielmos 2001, Wood 1995).
Although a piece of national legislation, OPA 90 had regulatory repercussions across 
the world (Interview with Director-General of Danish Maritime Authority April 2006, 
Interview with Head of Policy and Planning Unit International Maritime Organisation
223
March 2006, Interview with Vice-Chairman of Greek Shipping Cooperation 
Committee March 2006, Interview with Chairman of Lloyd’s Register March 2006). 
In 1992 the IMO agreed on an amendment to MARPOL adopting a similar phasing- 
out timetable that culminated in 2026. According to the amendment, tankers of 5,000 
dwt and above that were ordered after July 1996 were required to be fitted with 
double hulls or an alternative design approved by the IMO (IMO 1998). Single-hull 
tankers above 20,000 dwt that were delivered before July 1996 were required to 
comply with the double-hull provision from the age of twenty-five or thirty, 
depending on whether these vessels were fitted with Segregated Ballast Tanks (SBT). 
The discrepancy between OPA 90 and the MARPOL amendment entailed that single­
hull vessels prohibited from operating in the US waters were allowed to trade in other 
parts of the world, including the European Union.
Against the background of the Exxon Valdez and the MARPOL amendment, two large 
accidents in EU waters reinforced pressures for the tightening of maritime safety 
regulation and the prevention of prevention of sub-standard shipping. In December 
1992 the double-hull tanker Aegean Sea ran aground off the Spanish coast spilling
70,000 tonnes of crude oil. Within weeks in January 2003 the tanker Braer ran 
aground close to the Shetland Islands in the United Kingdom spilling a total of 84,700 
tonnes of crude oil. The accidents coincided with the European Commission’s 
Communication on A Common Policy on Safe Seas that was issued in January 2003 
(CEC Com 66/93). At the same time, the Treaty of the European Union had 
established a legal basis for EU regulation of transport safety. In accordance with 
Article 71, the EU was authorized to adopt ‘measures to improve transport safety’. In 
the European Commission’s Communication the maritime safety trends in 
international shipping were analysed, indicating national variations in the numbers of
lost vessels and deficiencies during inspections. These shortcomings were attributed 
to the loose implementation and enforcement of international rules (CEC Com 66/93, 
Roe and Selkou 2004: 81, Stevens 2003: 135, Lalis 2000). Given the variation in the 
implementation and enforcement of internationally agreed regulation, the European 
Commission maintained it was ‘uniquely placed’ to ensure that standards were 
applied in a uniform manner by the EU member states (CEC Com 66/93). Hence, the 
Communication stipulated a package of measures encompassing four main areas, the 
convergent implementation and uniform enforcement of exisiting international 
legislation by the EU member states, the strengthening of port-state control of vessels, 
the improvement of maritime traffic infrastructure and promotion of the IMO 
objectives. In tandem, measures were envisaged for the strengthening of EU member 
state flags through incentives in the form of the state-aid guidelines (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000, Haralambides 1996b). A number of EU legislative initiatives followed 
establishing common standards for ship inspections and classification societies 
(Directive 57/94), harmonising inspection and detention practises of vessels calling at 
EU ports (Directive 21/95), stipulating the hours of work of seafarers (Directive 
63/99) and setting the minimum training of officers on EU-flagged vessels (Directive 
25/01). Moreover, Regulation 2978/94 in encouraging the wider employment of 
double-hull tankers in the EU waters, provided incentives in the form of lower port 
and pilotage dues.
In sum, the international nature of the shipping industry necessitated the adoption of 
maritime safety regulation at the international level. The IMO had emerged as the 
foremost venue for the negotiation and adoption of maritime safety regulation. 
However, the adopted legislation was neither implemented consistently nor enforced
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uniformly. In the words of one commentator, at the international level “ ...regulations 
are cumbersome to design, easy to circumvent and extremely difficult to police” 
(Haralambides 1996: 12). In spite of a stringent set of international rules on deliberate 
and accidental discharges by vessels, there were shortcomings in implementation and 
enforcement coupled with inadequate waste reception facilities in EU ports. In 
parallel, OPA 90 established a precedent in the adoption of unilateral measures by 
phasing-out single-hull vessels from the US waters. This instigated negotiations at the 
IMO and the eventual adoption of a comparable yet of longer duration timetable on 
single-hull vessels. As a result, ‘windows of opportunity’ were emerging for the 
European Commission to expand the competence of the EU in the regulation of 
maritime transport safety.
6.3 The Phasing out Single-Hull Tankers
In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez accident the US administration adopted OPA 90 
with the objective of phasing-out single-hull tankers in US waters by 2015. It was 
maintained that double-hull tankers would reduce, if not eliminate marine pollution 
following maritime accidents. At the same time, by endorsing national measures, the 
US circumvented the IMO as the foremost venue for international maritime safety 
policy-making. Resting on this precedent, in ensuing IMO negotiations a comparable 
timetable for the phasing-out of single-hull tankers was agreed culminating in 2026. 
However, within the European Commission there were concerns that the vessels 
prohibited from operating in US waters would be trading in the EU. Two high profile 
maritime accidents involving single-hull vessels in the EU waters, the Erika and the 
Prestige offered an opportunity to the European Commission to pursue the
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accelerated phasing-in of double-hull tankers in the EU. With approximately three 
hundred single-hull vessels under their ownership, the Greek ocean-going shipowners 
actively engaged at the national and European levels in opposing the European 
Commission initiatives.
6.3.1 The ERIKA accident
The design of oil tankers proved to be highly controversial. As with other segments of 
the industry, a maritime accident was the catalyst for the adoption of regulation. On 
the twelfth of December 1999 the 25-year old, single-hull oil tanker Erika chartered 
by Total-Fina-Elf broke in two off the southern tip of Brittany, France. Salvage tugs 
began the operation of towing the two hull sections further away from the coast. 
However both sections sank on the thirteenth of December. Approximately 10,000 
tonnes of the 30,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil it was carrying were spilt, polluting 400 
kilometres of coastline. The environmental impact of the accident received 
considerable publicity and strong statements by the French government. The French 
President Jacque Chirac declared that it was not acceptable for society and the 
environment to “bear the brunt caused by rampant pursuit of profit.. .by shipowners” 
(.Lloyd's List January 21, 2000). The Transport Minister announced that France would 
be campaigning at the EU and IMO for the rapid elimination of single-hull vessels 
from EU territorial waters and ports and indicated that operators should be made 
liable for environmental pollution. Similarly, the European Parliament with a 
Resolution and the Council called on the European Commission to take immediate 
and effective action to prevent the recurrence of such a maritime accident. The 
prevailing attitude within the EU institutions was ‘zero tolerance’ on safety measures
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and vessel inspections (European Parliament Resolution on Improving Safety at Sea 
2235/2003, Council Conclusions 15626/December 2002).
In March 2000 the Commission prepared a set of proposals that became known as the 
‘Erika I package’ (CEC COM 142/2000). In December 2000 the ‘Erika II package 
was proposed primarily involving the establishment of the European Maritime Safety 
Agency to assist in the implementation of EU legislation (CEC COM 802/2000). A 
set of short term measures were proposed including the strengthening of the existing 
Directive on Port state Control with the intention of increasing the number of vessels 
inspected and producing a blacklist of vessels that were refused access. In addition, 
there were proposals to strengthen the existing Directive on the activities of 
classification societies when conducting safety checks on ships for flag states. Most 
importantly, the measures entailed the acceleration of the phasing out of single-hull 
tankers for vessels flying the flag of an EU member state and as a condition for 
entering EU ports. Departing from existing IMO legislation that proscribed the 
phasing-out of single-hull vessels by 2026, the European Commission compressed the 
timetable to 2015. Concurrently, financial incentives were proposed in the form of 
discounted port and pilotage dues for double-hull vessels. Moreover, it was 
acknowledged that additional research was required in assessing the social and 
economic impact of the phasing-out of single-hull vessels. Yet, the European 
Commission maintained that in comparison to the costs arising from major accidents 
as in the Erika, it would be “...a reasonable price to be paid to ensure an effective 
reduction in the risks of pollution” (CEC COM 142/2000).
From the perspective of the European Commission the Erika highlighted weaknesses 
in the existing IMO regulatory framework, involving inadequate class control, 
absence of transparency and an international system that could implement rules 
(Djonne 2006). In the justification of the proposals, the European Commission cited 
the deficiencies of the IMO framework, particularly in relation to stringent US 
legislation, adverse market trends and the technical superiority of double hull tankers 
(CEC COM 142/2000). First, it was argued that unless EU and IMO legislation were 
aligned with the timetable proscribed by US legislation (OPA 90), vessels that were 
prohibited from US territorial waters would be operating on EU trades. In the words 
of the TEN European Commissioner, the EU would receive “...all the rust buckets 
that will be prohibited from US waters” (de Palacio June 2000). Second, the 
prevailing business practice for independent shipowners was splitting their fleets into 
single-ship companies which were registered on offshore locations. Although this was 
carried out for tax reasons, it complicated the identification of the owner responsible 
for the safety standards of the vessels. Third, the spot market for chartering vessels 
did not differentiate between young and old tonnage, with freight rates often 
determined by low cost yet older tonnage, jeopardising safety standards. Fourth, the 
majority of the vessels in operation were designed with a single-hull, with the bottom 
and side plating separating the cargo from the sea. In case of grounding or collision, 
the risk of the cargo being discharged into the sea was considerable (CEC COM 
142/00). Following the Erika accident, due to the political pressures from certain EU 
member states, the media and the public, the European Commission hastened the 
internal process for the adoption of proposals. Within weeks of the accident, in 
January 2000 DG TREN prepared a dossier, commenced consultation with industry 
representatives and allowed two weeks for comments. As the consultation process
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was compressed, industry contribution was limited with the respective associations 
concentrating their lobbying efforts on the policy-making stages following the 
adoption of the European Commission proposals (Interview with Vice-Chairman of 
Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee March 2006, Interview with Secretary of 
International Chamber of Shipping February 2006).
In the immediate aftermath of the Erika accident, the Greek shipowners responded by 
utilising EU material and immaterial resources in shaping the EU policy-making 
process. During the deliberative stage, Greek shipowners used EU resources in a 
cognitive way by communicating and disseminating their interpretation of the Erika 
accident (Interview with Chairman of the Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee 
March 2006). The GSCC and the UGS communicated directly with DG TREN and 
MEPs to provide possible explanations for the causes of the accident and proposals 
for improving regulation (Lyras 2000, Embirikos 2000, Naftemporiki March 3, 2001). 
The primary objective of the Greek shipowners was to counter the prevailing 
interpretation within EU institutions that the accident occurred because firstly, the 
Erika was a single-hull tanker and secondly, due to the old age of the vessel. Drawing 
from technical research the GSCC underscored the risks arising “...by accelerated 
corrosion in pre-MARPOL tankers, which had been converted to MARPOL 
requirements, when carrying heated cargoes adjacent to converted and uncoated 
ballast tanks” (Interview with Chairman of Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee 
March 2006, Interview with Director of Hellenic Chamber of Shipping May 2006). 
Subsequently, the UGS and the GSCC met to discuss and coordinate their response to 
the European Commission’s initiatives. In March 2000 in a joint statement, the two 
associations declared that political expediency should not dictate regulatory reform. In
the words of the UGS President “...political expediency triumphed, the master of the 
vessel who managed under very difficult conditions to at least save his crew was 
imprisoned for his pains and the whole tanker industry was condemned for the failure 
of one products carrier of admittedly questionable pedigree which had been chartered, 
however, by a major oil company with its own extensive vetting system” (Lyras 
2000). The Greek shipowners affirmed that the IMO was the appropriate venue for the 
adoption of maritime legislation and regional measures should strengthen but not 
depart from international regulations (UGS-GSCC Joint Statement March 28, 2000). 
However, there was concern that the adoption of the ‘technically unsubstantiated’ and 
‘hastily formulated’ proposals by the European Commission would undermine the 
effectiveness of IMO regulation on maritime safety. According to the UGS and the 
GSCC, existing technical research had not validated the interpretation of double-hull 
tankers being safer vessels. In tandem, there was an absence of evidence suggesting a 
correlation between the age of a vessel and the occurrence of maritime accidents 
(Interview with Director of Hellenic Chamber of Shipping May 2006, Interview with 
Marine Operations Manager of Shipping Company March 2006). In converse, 
maritime safety was linked to the condition of a vessel as a result of regular 
maintenance and infrequent changes in its ownership. Moreover, it was estimated that 
approximately three-hundred Greek-owned vessels that were in good condition would 
be withdrawn and three-thousand jobs would be lost (.Naftemporiki July 4, 2000, 
Naftemporiki June 15, 2000,). Hence, if the EU were to adopt the accelerated phasing- 
out of single-hull tankers, a large number of vessels would be removed from EU 
member ship registries, further eroding the competitiveness of Community shipping.
In obtaining influence within the Council of Ministers, the relationship between the 
Greek shipowners, the Greek government and YEN was central. This coincided with 
the appointment of a new YEN Minister who had exposure to EU policy-making as a 
previous member of the European Commission. This was interpreted as the intention 
of the Greek government to upgrade the respective Ministry (Naftemporiki May 11, 
2000). At the same time, the Bureau of Parliamentary Deliberation (Tpatpeiou 
KoivoPou^snxiicfiq Epyaaiaq, GKE) was formed within YEN to monitor the 
deliberation of maritime transport issues at the Hellenic Parliament and the European 
Parliament in coordination with the Greek Permanent Representation to the EU. After 
consultation with the UGS and the GSCC, YEN adopted identical positions affirming 
the centrality of the IMO over regional measures and renouncing the adoption of 
hasty measures that could undermine the competitiveness of Greek and European 
shipping. Although broadly in favour of the intensification of port state controls and 
the central auditing of classification societies, YEN was opposed to the acceleration 
of the phasing-out of single-hull tankers in correspondence to the OPA 90 timetable 
(Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions February 25 2000). In a memorandum 
sent to the European Commission YEN emphasised the need for a globally acceptable 
and practical solution to the phasing-out of single-hull tankers (YEN Memorandum 
September 2000). It was argued that this issue should not be divorced from broader 
considerations on the competitiveness of the EU fleet and the employment of 
seafarers. It was noted that approximately fifty-five percent of the EU tanker fleet 
was Greek-owned and 278 vessels fell into the scope of the proposed measures. In 
addition, expanding the phasing-out schedule to vessels outside the scope of 
MARPOL would adversely impact Greece’s fleet of smaller tankers. It was estimated 
that 156 single-hull tankers under 5,000 dwt were transporting twenty-two million
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tonnes of oil products annually to over seventy Greek islands (YEN Memorandum 
September 2000). According to the YEN Minister the strategy of Greece was through 
alliances to form a core of EU member states with shared positions. In his words “our 
logic are the interests of Greek shipping within the European context, our compass is 
the competitiveness of Greek shipping and our purpose is to prevent the adoption of 
adverse decisions at the European level” (Papoutsis YEN Press Conference May
2000). Amongst the EU member states, the Netherlands emerged as the main ally 
with the Dutch Minister of Transport stating the importance of coordinating efforts at 
the EU level (Naftemporiki May 25, 2000).
Aside from direct contacts with European Commission officials, MEPs and YEN, the 
Greek shipowners mobilized indirectly through the international shipping associations 
(Interview with Chairman of Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee March 2006, 
Interview with Member of the Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee Council 
March 2006). A number of organisations presented positions that were consistent with 
the interests of the Greek shipowners, including the International Chamber of 
Shipping (ICS), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the Oil 
Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and the Alliance of Maritime 
Regional Interests in Europe (AMRIE). The OCIMF was particularly active in 
lobbying the EU institutions as the Erica vessel was chartered by Total-fina-Elf which 
one of its members (Interview with Director of Oil Companies International Marine 
Forum March 2006, OCIMF Comments May 2000). Nevertheless, for the Greek 
shipowners, the first port of call in the representation of industry interests at the EU 
level was the European Community Shipowners Associations (ECSA). This would 
allow for the coordination of the responses of national shipowner associations to the
European Commission proposals. Indeed, alongside the UGS and the GSCC, several 
national shipowner associations, including the Netherlands Shipowners Association 
(KVNR), Swedish Shipowners' Association (SSA) and Norwegian Shipowners' 
Association (NSA) declared their opposition to the European Commission’s intention 
to adopt regional measures. The priority for ECS A was to ensure that the EU adopted 
measures that were both practical and consistent with international standards 
(Interview with Executive Advisor of European Community Shipowners Association 
March 2006, ECS A Annual Report 2001/2002). Certainly, it was recognised that the 
EU had an important role in ensuring maritime safety through “... vigorous, effective 
and uniform enforcement within the EU of the internationally agreed rules and 
regulations” (Pontopidan 2001).
Alongside ECSA, the other major international industry association representing the 
interests of shipowners was Intertanko. This association had in place a strategy to 
interact constructively with the European Commission, European Parliament and 
Council of Ministers according to the stage of the policy-making process Djonne 
2006, (Intertanko Annual Review 2001). As with the Greek shipowners’ industry 
associations, the prime objective of Intertanko was convincing the EU that regulatory 
reform should be pursued at the IMO and not through unilateral regional measures 
(Interview with Manager of Intercargo March 2006). Meetings were organised with 
high level European Commission officials at DG TREN and DG Environment, 
notably a meeting between the Chairman of Intertanko and the TEN Commissioner 
Loyola de Palacio. Similar direct discussions were held with members of the 
European Parliament Committee on Transport. Illustratively, with the purpose of 
presenting the importance of the tanker industry for the European economy and
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promoting the positions of the industry, Intertanko organised a joint workshop in the 
European Parliament in December 2001. In the words of the Managing Director of 
Intertanko, “...it is very difficult for the international shipping industry to pursue the 
improvement of safety standards when at the same time the EU promotes measures 
out of political expediency rather than technical merits” (To Vima April 22, 2000).
Subsequently, the Council of Ministers discussed the European Commission 
proposals in March and June 2000 (Council Meeting PRES/00/24). The lobbying 
efforts of the Greek shipowners and industry associations combined with pressure 
from Greece and several EU member states was engendering a consensus within the 
EU that the IMO was the appropriate venue for putting forward proposals on the 
single-hull tankers. This was affirmed in an Opinion issued by the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in October 2000 (EESC TEN/041). 
Amongst the Greek civil society organisations with membership in the EESC, the 
UGS had permanent representation in the EESC Transport and Energy Committee 
(TEN) since 1981.31 According to the EESC Opinion double-hull tankers “...do not 
constitute a panacea” in preventing the occurrence of large maritime accidents. 
Additional research in the technical merits of the proposed ship design as well as a 
better understanding of the social and economic impact of phasing-out single-hull 
tankers were required. Moreover, it was reinstated that the international level through 
the IMO was the suitable venue for deliberating and adopting regulations on shipping. 
Explicitly, the European Commission was urged to “...to coordinate the position of 
Member States within IMO with a view to achieving the revision of the MARPOL 
Convention so as to introduce a realistic and practicable acceleration of the current 
phasing-out schedule” (EESC Opinion TEN/041 2000).
31 The UGS is represented by its Director of Intemational/EU Affairs, Anna Bredima-Savopoulou.
Indeed, in October 2000 the Council of Transport Ministers decided on a common 
approach to the accelerated introduction of double-hulled tankers. This was 
accomplished after reaching a compromise between France proposing for phasing-out 
in correspondence with OPA 90 and Greece arguing for a slower timetable (Lloyd's 
List September 21, 2000). This would be promoted by EU member delegations and 
European Commission representatives at the upcoming meeting of the IMO Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) in October 2000 (Council Meeting 
PRES/00/347). However, the European Commission and France pressed for the 
inclusion in the Council decision of a caveat that could undermine the lobbying 
efforts of the shipping industry. If the IMO reached an agreement on the proposed 
amendment at the MEPC meeting scheduled for April 2001, the Council of Ministers 
would immediately transpose it into EU law. By contrast, if the IMO negotiations 
were inconclusive, the Council of Ministers pledged to proceed with speeding up the 
phasing-out of single-hull tankers in accordance with opinions of the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. Following the Council meeting this was 
reiterated by the TREN Commissioner who stated “...I hope we have a quick 
response from IMO...if there is a failure in the IMO . . .  the EU will go ahead with 
regional proposals” (Lloyd’s List October 3, 2000).
At the IMO MEPC October meeting, the formal proposals for amendments to 
MARPOL (Regulation 13G) were jointly submitted by France, Belgium, Germany 
and Spain. Concurrently, an informal submission was prepared by Denmark, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom with moderate suggestions from Greece and 
Norway. The proposals accelerated the existing timetable by bringing forth the dates 
for phasing-out single hull tankers as well as expanding the categories of oil tankers
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that were covered. In the negotiations that ensued, a schedule similar to OPA 90 was 
agreed upon, yet stipulating longer dates. It was maintained that the final 
compromise was designed by the Greek permanent delegation after considerable 
consultation between the latter and the MEPC {Lloyd’s List November 1, 2000). 
Although the Greek shipowners were content with the revised timetable there were 
concerns on the details of the phasing-out with respect to dates and required surveys 
(Embiricos 2000). Nonetheless, these differences were ironed out and in the April 
2001 meeting of the MEPC, the revised MARPOL Regulation 13G was adopted 
setting out a stricter timetable for the phasing-out of single-hull tankers and 
designating the year 2015 as the principal cut-off date for all such vessels {See Table 
7)(IMO 2005a, IMO 2005b, MEPC 2001).
Table 5: Revised MARPOL Regulation 13G (MEPC April 2001)33
Single-Hull Vessel USA OPA 90 MARPOL
Commission
Proposal
MARPOL 
(April 2001)
Category 1 2010 2007/2012 2005 2005/2007
Category 2 2010/2015 2026 2010 2010/2015
Category 3 2015 No Deadline 2015 2015
In December 2001 the European Council and the European Parliament adopted 
Regulation 417/02 on the accelerated phasing-in of double-hull vessels. The
32 The draft text was agreed upon the in IMO inter-sessional group meeting that was held in January 
2001.
33Category 1: Crude oil tankers of 20.000 tonnes dwt and above and oil product carriers of 30.000 
tonnes dwt and above not equipped with segregated ballast tanks(SBT). End phase out date: 2007. May 
only operate beyond 2005 if it has successfully passed a Condition Assessment Scheme. Category 2: 
Crude oil tankers of 20.000 tonnes dwt and above and oil product carriers of 30.000 tonnes dwt and 
above equipped with segregated ballast tanks (SBT). End phase out date: 2015. May only operate 
beyond 2005 if it has successfully passed a Condition Assessment Scheme. Category 3 : Crude oil 
tankers of 5.000-20.000 tonnes dwt and oil product carriers of 5.000-30.000 tonnes dwt. End phase out 
date: 2015.
Regulation transposed the MARPOL amendment, stipulating the gradual phasing-out 
of single-hull vessels and from 2015 the complete ban on vessels flying EU member 
state flags or seeking access to EU ports. The constellation of actors involved in the 
negotiations leading to this outcome stated their contentment. The Greek shipowners 
and the industry associations were content that unlike the initial intentions of the 
European Commission, unilateral measures at the regional level were prevented. 
Through coordinated efforts with national and international industry associations and 
the use of EU material and immaterial resources, the negotiations for the amendment 
of MARPOL were transferred to the IMO as the suitable international venue (UGS 
Annual Report 2001-02, GSCC Annual Report 2001-02). The outcome of the IMO 
negotiations was not optimal but according to the Chairman of the GSCC “...the 
compromise at the IMO was a liveable outcome, whereas what the European 
Commission proposed was not” (Lloyd's List November 22, 2001, Lloyd's List 
November 1, 2000). However, in spite of use of EU resources in cognitive ways, the 
Greek shipowners were unable to persuade the European Commission on an 
alternative interpretation regarding the causes of the Erika accident. Within the EU 
institutions, the prevailing premise was that ship design and age were the primary 
causes of maritime accidents. Concurrently, the relationship between the Greek 
shipowners and YEN was strengthened after a period of distancing in the preceding 
years. YEN and the Greek government were valuable points of entrance in the 
Council of Transport Ministers and the European Council. In addition, YEN 
articulated the interests of the UGS and the GSCC and sought coalitions with 
likeminded EU member states. Similarly, ECSA and Intertanko maintained that the 
objectives of the shipping industry were met (Interview with Executive Advisor of 
European Community Shipowners’ Association March 2006). Central to the
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favourable outcome was the decision of the EU institutions and member states to seek 
an international solution and use their collective influence in ensuring this within the 
IMO (ESCA Annual Report 2001/02, Intertanko Annual Review 2001). This 
approach was encapsulated in the following statement by the IMO Secretary General, 
“...the adoption of the proposed amendments to MARPOL regulation 13G reaffirms 
IMO’s position as the proper forum for dealing with complex technical, economic and 
political issues concerning international shipping” (O’Neil IMO Briefing 2001). 
Moreover, through the policy process, the European Commission was able to increase 
its presence in the international regulation for maritime safety. Rather than following 
developments as in the case of OPA 90, the European Commission was the driving 
force in the acceleration of the phasing-out of single-hull tankers at the international 
level. According to the TREN European Commissioner, the EU “has made it possible 
for such an international decision to be taken rapidly, we can be proud of what we 
have done since it was decisive in achieving this final result which is very close to our 
own position” (European Commission Press Release IP/01/633).
In sum, the sinking of the Erika in December 1999 was a turning point in the role of 
the EU in the regulation of maritime transport safety. The eagerness of the European 
Commission to expand its regulatory presence in maritime safety could be traced back 
to the Braer accident in 1993 (Intertanko Annual Review 2001, NSA Annual Report
2001). Intertwined with pressures from the public, media and national politicians, the 
Erika became an opportunity for the European Commission to flex its muscles and 
demonstrate its capacity to shape the international shipping agenda. In addition, the 
European Commission claimed to have converted the EU in to the first genuine 
maritime safety region, guaranteeing protection for European citizens and the
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environment (de Pallacio June 2002). The Greek shipowners responded by utilising 
EU material and immaterial resources and exerting indirect influence through the 
Greek state and international associations. Direct contact was established with 
European Commission DG TREN and DG Environment officials and members of the 
European Parliament Transport Committee. Shipping interests had a long history of 
associability beyond the national level and the Greek shipowners were in a position to 
tap into the expertise, networks and resources of ECSA and Intertanko. The capacity 
of this actor constellation to shape policy outcomes was demonstrated in shifting the 
European Commission’s emphasis towards the IMO and international negotiations. A 
new timetable for the phasing-out of single-hull tankers was agreed upon without 
resort to regional measures and the erosion of the legitimacy of the IMO.
6.3.2 The Prestige accident
As the European Commission was finalising the post-Erika packages and political 
activity on maritime safety was subsiding, a similar maritime accident occurred in 
November 2002. During adverse weather conditions off the coast of North-western 
Spain, the 26-year old single-hull tanker Prestige called for help to the Spanish 
coastal guard as one the vessel’s tanks had burst. Rather than towing the vessel into a 
place of safe refuge, the Spanish authorities ordered the tanker to steer away from the 
coast. On the twenty-ninth of November the tanker split into two releasing in excess 
of 60,000 tonnes of oil. Fuelled by the public outcry and media coverage, an intense 
debate ensued on the causes of the accident and the liability of those involved. This 
was illustrated in a question raised by the Financial Times (November 20, 2002):
When a stricken tanker is registered in the Bahamas, owned by a Liberian
company, managed by Greek administrators, chartered by a Swiss-based
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Russian oil trader and sails under the command o f a Greek captain with an 
Asian crew, who is ultimately responsible for the environmental and economic 
damage caused by oil spills?
Initially, the Spanish government considered legal action against the United Kingdom 
and secondarily Greece for not carrying out the required port-state inspections when 
the Prestige called at their ports in previous months {Lloyd's List November 15,
2002). Although this was supported by the TEN European Commissioner, the British 
permanent representative to the EU in a letter to the European Commission refuted 
the allegation and instead underscored the refusal of the Spanish authorities to tow in 
the vessel to safe refuge. Nonetheless, the European Commission once again drew 
attention to the issue of phasing-out single-hull tankers. Under the pressure of 
demonstrations and calls for immediate action by the press and environmental groups, 
the Spanish and French governments jointly proposed an instant ban on single-hull 
tankers operating in EU waters. The two governments also pledged to enforce 
stringent inspections within 200 nautical miles off their coasts on single-hull tankers 
over 15 years of age. There were several instances of Spanish and French warships 
escorting ships with these characteristics beyond the 200 nautical mile boundary 
{Lloyd's List December 3, 2002). Yet, on one occasion the Greek operator of an 
escorted vessel responded by publicly declaring “we have an excellent vessel in first 
class condition.. .we therefore expect unhindered passage as per international law and 
expect the European Union, the International Maritime Organisation and the nation 
states to support and respect the law” {Naftemporiki December 6, 2002).34
34 The vessel was the Ennis Maritime, owned by the Alafouzos family.
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Following from the proposals of the French and Spanish governments, the European 
Commission confirmed that EU member states were entitled to proceed with the 
phasing-out of single-hull tankers ahead of the EU timetable (Lamoureux 2002). 
Rather than the adoption of new legislation, the European Commission began 
considering the strengthening of existing legislation, especially the recently adopted 
Erika I and Erika II packages. In early December 2002 the European Commission 
prepared a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament proposing a 
set of measures for the abolition of substandard oil tankers from EU waters. A new 
Regulation was proposed prohibiting the transportation of heavy-fuel oil by single­
hull tankers calling at EU ports. Concurrently, the European Commission published 
an indicative black list of vessels that were detained in the past by EU port authorities 
for failing to comply with maritime safety regulation. The purpose of the initiative 
was to prevent operators from chartering these vessels and for the flag states of the 
vessels to apply stringent maritime safety standards. In addition, member states were 
requested to design national plans for the accommodation of vessels in distress at 
places of refuge. Furthermore, there were provisions for the criminal liability of 
entities responsible for maritime pollution through gross negligence (European 
Commission IP/02/1791). Subsequently, in late December 2002 the European 
Commission submitted to the Council and the European Parliament a proposal for the 
immediate ban on the carriage of heavy fuel oil in single-hull tankers and the 
acceleration of the phasing-out of single-vessels flying an EU member state flag and 
calling at EU ports. In conjunction, the strengthening of technical inspections was put 
forward for single-hull tanker over 15 years old that traded at EU ports (CEC COM 
681/02, Ranheim 2002).
The Greek shipowners were confronted with political circumstances similar to those 
that followed the Erika accident. The UGS and the GSCC made use of the EU 
material and immaterial resources and indirect channels of influence that were 
employed in shaping the post-Erika package of measures. There was evidence of 
cognitive usage of EU resources in persuading European Commission officials, MEPs 
and representatives of national governments on the causes of the Prestige accident and 
the distribution of responsibility (Interview with Greek Shipping Cooperation 
Committee Council Member March 2006, Interview with Director of Hellenic 
Chamber of Shipping May 2006). The UGS interpreted the European Commission 
proposals as a consequence of media pressure and political expediency. The approach 
of the UGS was premised on the principle that irrespective of ship design, maritime 
accidents could not be completely prevented. In the case of the Prestige, the 
responsibility lay with the Spanish authorities for not offering place of refuge to a 
damaged vessel and instead allowing it to remain in the open Ocean under adverse 
weather conditions. Certainly, it was argued that “...the ship did not fail because she 
was old and single-hull. Under the circumstances, the ship was doomed to break into 
two and pollute” (UGS Annual Report 2002-03). According to the UGS the proposals 
to ban single-hull vessels from carrying heavy crude oil and accelerate the phasing- 
out of single-hull tankers were not technically substantiated and were made hastily 
without awaiting the outcome of official investigations. Similarly the Chairman of the 
GSCC stated that “...European proposals for phasing out single skin tankers, by their 
own admission, are not technically based, but designed to appease public opinion” 
(Tanker Operator February 2003, GSCC February Bulletin 2003). The UGS and the 
GSCC advanced two lines of argumentation in opposition to the European 
Commission proposals. Firstly, it was reiterated that the appropriate venue for the
adoption of legislation on maritime safety and environmental pollution was the IMO 
and the EU should refrain from pursuing unilateral measures. It was claimed that the 
existing framework, involving classifications societies, insurers and port authorities 
was exerting sufficient pressure on shipowners to improve the standards of safety and 
environmental friendliness of their vessels (Interview with Chairman of Lloyd’s 
Register March 2006, Interview with representative of International Group of P&I 
Clubs April 2006). Hence, resting on this premise the UGS proposed the 
establishment of a well-defined an efficient regime for areas of refuge to prevent as 
the most suitable measure for preventing accidents such as the Erika and Prestige 
(UGS Annual Report 2002-03, GSCC December Bulletin 2003). Secondly, it was 
argued that European Commission regulators tended to neglect the strategic 
importance of shipping industry for the EU economy and the investment made by 
shipowners in the renewal of the fleet in the 1990s. It was maintained that over sixty 
percent of the EU oil trade was seaborne. Hence, the control of the tanker fleet was an 
issue of strategic importance in satisfying EU demand for energy. It was asserted that 
contrary to the EU intentions of maintaining ownership and manning within the EU, 
the measures would render open registries increasingly attractive to shipowners.
Several meetings were held between the YEN, the UGS and the GSCC in Athens and 
London. The significance of the relationship between the Greek shipowners and YEN 
was amplified as Greece was assuming the EU Presidency for the six months 
commencing in January 2003. In seeking to lessen the adverse attention the shipping 
industry was receiving, the Greek government stated that it would not make maritime 
policy the central focus of its Presidency. In early January the IMO General Secretary 
met with the YEN Minister and it was agreed that the Greek Presidency would
promote the IMO as the most suitable domain for the formulation of shipping 
regulation. Following the meeting, it was announced that the YEN Minister would 
“brief his EU counterparts on the proposal and stress the importance of IMO as arbiter 
of safety and maritime pollution issues” (Anomeritis 2003). As with the Erika 
accident, there was an alignment of interests between YEN and the Greek shipowners. 
The YEN Minister stated on numerous occasions the primacy of the IMO and the 
importance of improving maritime safety standards without compromising the 
competitiveness of EU shipping (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions June 4,
2003). In tandem, it was advanced that Greek-owned shipping maintained a robust 
safety record. The YEN Minister argued that “...on issues of maritime safety and 
control of seaworthiness, we are ahead of other European countries by 
decades...Greece performs the highest number of ship inspections annually much 
higher than countries such as France that, during the Prestige accident accused Greek 
shipping of low safety standards” (Anomeritis MP Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament 
Sessions December 21, 2002).
The international shipping organisations moved rapidly in disseminating information 
and proposals within the EU institutions and towards the European media with the 
purpose of taking the lead in the ensuing political response (Interview with Executive 
Advisor of European Community Shipowners Associations March 2006, Interview 
with Secretary of International Chamber of Shipping February 2006, Interview with 
Manager of Intercargo March 2006, Interview with International Affairs Liaison of 
Baltic and International Maritime Council March 2006). It was believed that in the 
case of the Erika, misconceptions regarding the causes of the accident prevailed that 
subsequently underpinned unfavourable regulatory proposals. In an effort to
circumscribe the parameters of the political discussion, ECSA, Intertanko and 
BIMCO issued separate press releases in November 2002 that provided data on the 
improving safety record of the industry and made a set of proposals, including the 
accelerated preparation of national schemes for accommodation of vessels in places of 
refuge (Directive 59/02), the strengthening of Port State control and the speedily 
establishment of the European Maritime Safety Agency (ECSA Press Release 
November 2002, BIMCO-Intertanko Joint Press Release November 2002). Once the 
European Commission proposals were announced, there was consternation as it was 
felt that the industry was not sufficiently consulted on the implications of the 
measures (ECSA Annual Report 2002-03). Subsequently, a meeting of the Round 
Table of Maritime Associations was convened by the ESC A with the International 
Chamber of Shipping, Intertanko, Intercargo and BIMCO to discuss the EU measures 
(Intertanko Annual Review 2002, BIMCO Bulletin January 2001). The purpose was 
to coordinate the lobbying efforts of the four associations in communicating a 
coherent message and avoiding replication. However, there were divisions between 
the national shipowners’ associations that were reflected in the ECSA position on 
favouring the ban of single-hull vessels carrying heavy oil whilst criticising the 
reconfiguration of the phasing-out timetable, which was deemed impracticable (ECSA 
Annual Report 2001-02). Although the UGS and the GSCC were categorically 
opposed to these measures, other organisations such as the Swedish Shipowners’ 
Association supported the European Commission measures (Fairplay April 24, 2003). 
Notwithstanding these differences there was broad consensus that the IMO was the 
appropriate level for discussing maritime safety and on proposals regarding places of 
refuge and the strengthening of port state control (BIMCO Press Release December
2002). This partly explained why organisations such as BIMCO and Intertanko that
were not composed by national shipowners association were more unyielding in their 
approach to the European Commission proposals. On behalf of the Round Table, 
BIMCO sent a letter to the EU President requesting a full enquiry on the Spanish 
authorities’ handling of the Prestige accident as the “...the EU transport ministers 
seem to have pre-judged the outcome of any inquiry into the Prestige and concluded 
that the fault rests entirely with the shipping industry” (BIMCO Letter to EU 
President December 12, 2002). As with the associations of Greek shipowners, there 
was cognitive usage of EU resources in explaining the causes of the Erika and 
Prestige accidents. Through articles, speeches and public and private presentations to 
the European Commission, Intertanko and BIMCO elucidated the technical details of 
the accidents whilst advocating that the banning of single-hull tankers would not 
prevent similar occurrences in the future (Mikelis 2003, Intertanko January 2003, 
BIMCO Bulletin 2002). An additional channel of influence for the shipowners was the 
IMO Secretary General. In March 2003 the IMO Secretary General met with the TEN 
European Commissioner in Brussels. Emphasizing the primacy of the international 
level in the regulation of shipping, the IMO Secretary General called for an official 
enquiry to be made in discerning the causes of the accident before measures were 
adopted. Likewise, on the same day, Intertanko announced that the Commission’s 
proposals should be subject to “...thorough and rigorous analyses and impact studies 
by the IMO before introduction” (Lloyd's List March 5, 2003).
In expanding the political opportunity structure, the EU offered material and 
immaterial resources to actors that historically were not prevalent in fashioning 
international legislation on maritime safety. The European Commission and the 
European Parliament actively solicited the input from a variety of organisations,
alongside the international shipping associations. There was evidence of 
environmental interest groups taking a larger part in the EU maritime safety policy­
making process. Lacking in resources in comparison to industry associations, the 
competitive advantage of environmental groups was in the generation and 
dissemination of ‘knowledge’ and information (Jacquot and Woll 2003b, Princen and 
Finger 1994). Unlike the shipping associations lobbying the EU institutions, 
Greenpeace maintained one representative in Brussels concentrating on marine 
affairs, including maritime transport (Interview with Greenpeace EU Marine Policy 
Advisor, March 2006). EU material and immaterial resources were used in a cognitive 
way in shaping the discussion on the causes of the Erika and Prestige accidents. 
Greenpeace was vocal in attributing the accidents to the use of single-hull tankers, 
requesting a complete ban on such vessels and the establishment of a new regime of 
unlimited responsibility for the perpetrators of marine pollution, including 
shipowners, operators and charterers (Greenpeace Report November 2003). In 
tandem, Greenpeace concentrated on issues of environmental friendly ship-breaking 
of the single-hull tankers that would be placed out of operation due to the accelerated 
timetable (Greenpeace Report December 2004). Moreover, in raising publicity, 
Greenpeace activists boarded single-hull tankers transiting EU waters, calling for an 
immediate ban (Greenpeace Press Release January 23, 2003, Greenpeace Press 
Release November 29, 2002). Industry associations and member states complained to 
the IMO that Greenpeace activists were jeopardising the safety of vessels during their 
campaigns. This initiated discussions on the removal of the ‘consultative status’ of 
Greenpeace at the IMO. Rather than safety issues, Greenpeace claimed that the 
removal from the IMO was initiated by industry associations and member states due 
to the interest groups’ strong stance on the phasing-out of single-hull tankers.
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Although the ‘consultative status’ issue was internally discussed throughout 2003, 
Greenpeace eventually maintained its position within the IMO. Indeed, according to 
the IMO, the presence of Greenpeace within the organisation was valuable in 
promoting marine pollution prevention measures (Interview with Head of Policy and 
Planning Unit International Maritime Organisation March 2006). Nonetheless, this 
was an illustration of the complexity of the EU negotiating process on maritime safety 
with the transference of divisions between the industry associations and 
environmental groups to the international level.
In early December 2002, the Council of Transport Ministers affirmed the European 
Commission proposals (CEU Information Note 15626/02). The Council agreed that 
heavy grades of oil were to be transported solely by double-hull tankers and invited 
the European Commission to draft a proposal on the accelerated phasing-out of 
single-tankers with an approval date of no later than July 2003. Further, the Council 
called on the member states to ensure that similar rules were established at the 
international level. The Council conclusions reflected a division between the member 
states in the interpretation of the causes of the accident and the nature of the measures 
required. France, Spain and Portugal concentrated on the design of vessels seeking a 
rapid phasing-out of single-hull tankers. In contrast, Greece, Germany, the UK, 
Denmark and the Netherlands favoured the status quo or at least the pursuit of the 
issue entirely through the IMO (Lloyd’s List February 5, 2003). The main points of 
difference regarding the draft Regulation were the scope of accelerated phasing-out, 
the calendar of phasing-out and the inclusion of small tankers (600-5000dwt) in the 
ban (Transport Council Background Notes March 2003). Subsequently, the EU 
President Romano Prodi circulated a letter to the EU governments, reiterating the
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European Commission proposals as the optimal way forward in improving maritime 
safety standards. In March 2003 the Council of Transport Minister reached political 
agreement on the accelerated timetable proposed by the European Commission 
(European Commission Memorandum October 2003). In addition, the Council urged 
the member states to promote similar measures at the global level by seeking the 
amendment of MARPOL. Despite the initial resistance from Germany, the UK and 
the Netherlands, it was maintained that during the Council meeting the Greek 
delegation was marginalised, being the sole country to oppose the revised timetable 
(Interview with Maritime Transport Attache of Greek Permanent delegation to the EU 
March 2006).
The Transport Committee of the European Parliament appointed Belgian MEP Dirk 
Sterckx as head of the Temporary Committee on Improving Safety at Sea (MARE 
Committee) to conduct an investigation on the circumstances surrounding the Prestige 
accident. In deciphering the responsibilities for the Prestige accident and discussing 
measures to improve maritime safety, the European Parliament held three public 
hearings. The European Parliament invited contributions from industry associations 
(ECSA), maritime experts, environmental groups, classifications societies, salvage 
companies, the European Commission and EU member governments. The Greek 
shipowners and the international shipping associations were content with the 
parliamentary process and the conclusions of the final report (ECSA Annual Report 
2002-03). Firstly, in interpreting the causes of the Prestige accident, emphasis was 
drawn to the decision of the Spanish authorities to refuse a ‘place of refuge’ for the 
vessel. Secondly, it was recognised that rather than creating new legislation, the 
priority should be the application of existing EU and international legislation. Thirdly,
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the international nature of the shipping industry required measures designed and 
approved at the IMO, although it was noted that he IMO was institutionally incapable 
of swift responses to maritime issues, “moving as fast as its slowest member” 
(European Parliament 2066/03, European Parliament 0350/04).
In July 2003 the Council and the European Parliament adopted Regulation 1726/03 
amending Regulation 417/02, stipulating that single-hull tankers transporting heavy 
grades of oil were banned from calling at EU ports. In tandem, the timetable for 
phasing-out single-hull tankers was accelerated matching more closely the OPA 90 
schedule. Subsequently, the negotiations shifted to the IMO as discussions 
commenced on the adoption of the EU measures at the international level. Indeed, 
within 2003 further amendments were adopted to the MARPOL convention, 
mirroring EU legislation. A compromise was reached with opts-outs that were not 
applicable under Regulation 1726/03, allowing for specified sub-types of single-hull 
tankers to continue operating beyond their twenty-fifth anniversary as well as 
recognising the discretion of coastal states in permitting the operation of certain types 
of vessels (UGS Annual Report 2003-04). Furthermore, IMO member states such as 
Japan and Singapore stated that single-hull tankers will be allowed to continue 
operating in their jurisdictions until 2015. An outline of the differing timetables is 
displayed in the table below:
Table 6: Revised Phasing-out Timetable (July 2003/Sept. 2005)35
Single-Hull Vessel US A OPA 90
EU 
(July 2003)
MARPOL 
(Sep. 2005)
Category 1 2005 2005 2005
Category 2 2010 2010 2010/15
Category 3 2010 2010 2015/15
In response to the adoption of Regulation 1726/03 he Greek shipowners and their 
industry associations stated their disapproval with the adopted measures and the 
handling of the Prestige accident by the European Commission. The sentiments of the 
Greek shipowners were captured by the GSCC in stating that . .the political pressure 
continues for the EU to by-pass any investigation or analysis and continue the witch­
hunt” (GSCC February Bulletin 2003). It was maintained that the legislation rested on 
an erroneous premise as the link between the use of single-hull tankers and the Erika 
and Prestige accidents was not established (UGS Annual Report 2003-04). Despite 
the cognitive usage of material and immaterial resources, the UGS and the GSCC 
were unable to persuade European Commission regulators and key EU member state 
governments with their interpretation of maritime safety. With respect to national 
governments, there was an imperative to demonstrate to their political constituencies 
that measures were taken to prevent the repetition of maritime accidents. 
Concurrently, emulating the United States, the European Commission manifested its 
capacity to instigate reform and shape international shipping regulation. However, the 
UGS and the GSCC complained that the revision of the phasing-out schedule twice in
35 For description of Categories see footnote 9, Chapter 5. “Revised phase-out schedule for single-hull 
tankers enters into force” IMO Briefing 18, April 2005, “European Union Regulations on single-hull oil 
tankers” IMO Briefing 23, October 2003, “Revised phase-out schedule for single hull tankers enters 
into force IMO News Is. 2, 2005, D ouble hull tankers: H igh level p a n el o f  experts R eport 
(Brussels: EM SA, 2005).
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three years jeopardised the smooth operation of ocean-going shipping. In conjunction, 
it was argued that the EU initiatives were undermining the legitimacy of the IMO, 
resulting in the coexistence of three different regulatory frameworks involving the 
IMO, US and the EU (UGS Annual Report 2003-04). Amongst the Greek shipowners 
there was disappointment with the lobbying efforts of the Greek government and its 
inability to persuade its counterparts of transferring the issue of single-hull tankers to 
the IMO. The expectations were amplified as Greece held the EU Presidency in the 
first six months of 2003. The YEN Minister received criticism from the industry 
associations and opposition parties for ‘succumbing’ to the pressures exerted by the 
Spanish and French governments. MPs from the opposition New Democracy party 
accused YEN for not materialising an earlier proposal for an EU report on the causes 
of the Prestige accident including an impact assessment of the European Commission 
proposals on the competitiveness of the European shipping industry (Minutes of 
Hellenic Parliament Sessions June 4, 2003, Minutes of Hellenic Parliament Sessions 
February 11 2003).
In sum, the media exposure and political pressures emanating from the maritime 
accidents of the Erika and the Prestige provided the foundation for the European 
Commission to expand its competency in the regulation of maritime safety. The 
European Commission pursued the reform of existing international legislation on 
maritime safety, seeking a ban on single-hull tankers transporting heavy grades of oil 
to EU ports and further acceleration of the phasing-out of single-hull tankers, one year 
after a revised timetable was adopted. The European Commission was able to 
demonstrate its capacity to initiate reform and shape international shipping regulation. 
Likewise, the European Parliament resting on its co-decision powers was actively
involved in gathering information on the circumstances of the accident and the 
development of legislation. Through a public hearing and meetings with industry 
representatives, it was felt by industry associations that the European Parliament 
engaged in a thorough consultation process. However, due the diverse party-political 
and national interests represented through the European Parliament, it was difficult to 
effectively shape the outcome of its deliberations (Interview with ECSA Executive 
Advisor March 2006, Interview with Secretary of International Chamber of Shipping 
February 2006, Interview with Executive Director of European Liner Affairs 
Association April 2006). The UGS and the GSCC formed part of a constellation of 
veto points spanning the national, European and international levels that were 
opposed to the European Commission initiatives. There was evidence of the 
employment of EU material and immaterial resources by supporters and detractors of 
reform in shaping the policy outcome. At the deliberative level, with speeches, reports 
and technical research the Greek shipowners through UGS, GSCC, ECSA, Intertanko, 
ICS and BICMO sought to modify the interpretation of maritime accidents shared by 
the European Commission and key EU member state governments. It was advanced 
that the design of the vessel was not the cause of the accident with attention drawn to 
weaknesses in existing regulation on ‘places of refuge’ and port state control. At the 
same time, contrasting technical approaches were advanced by other actors who 
favoured the phasing-in of double-hull vessel. Bolstered by higher legitimacy with the 
EU public, political actors such as environmental groups utilised EU material and 
immaterial resources in increasing their presence in maritime safety policy-making.
In addition, the UGS and the GSCC used material resources in the form of EU 
institutions and policy instruments. Meetings with European Commission officials
and MEPs were organised directly or through the international industry associations. 
This included a direct meeting between the IMO Secretary General and TEN 
Transport Commissioner. A central feature of the Greek shipowners’ approach was 
retaining the pre-eminence of the IMO in maritime safety regulation. Substantive 
consultation was conducted with YEN, especially as the negotiations on the maritime 
safety measures coincided with the Greek government assuming the EU presidency 
for the first six months of 2003. Despite the efforts of YEN and the Greek permanent 
delegation in Brussels, the Greek government found itself marginalised in the Council 
meeting on the adoption of Regulation 1726/03. Unlike the case of the Erika accident, 
the Greek shipowners and their allies were unable to transfer the negotiations to the 
international level. Rather, the IMO had to react to the EU measures with the revision 
of the timetable for the phasing-out of single-hull tankers under negotiation for the 
second time in three years (Table 3). Amongst the shipowners’ community, there was 
dissatisfaction with the Greek government’s inability to hold back the European 
Commission initiatives.
Figure 11: Timeline of MARPOL revisions
1989 1992 2001 2003
1973 1990 1999 2001
Exxon Valdez 
Accident
IMO adopts 
MARPOL 
(Amended 1978)
MARPOL Amended 
Phasing-out by 2026
MARPOL Amended 
Phasing-out by 2010
MARPOL Amended 
Phasing-out by 2015
Erika Accident Prestige AccidentUS OPA 90 
Phasing out by 2010/15
Overall, the Greek shipowners were adjusting to a new political landscape with the 
EU increasing its prominence in international shipping policy-making (UGS Annual 
Report 2002-03, ECSA Annual Report 2002-03, Interview with Vice-Chairman of 
Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee March 2006, Interview with Shipowner
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March 2006). By employing EU material and immaterial resources, they were able to 
favourably shape the political process in the aftermath of the Erika accident, yet this 
was not replicated in the case of the Prestige accident. In the latter instance the 
ensuing political momentum fuelled by media attention, key EU member 
governments and the European Commission was overly powerful to be overturned. 
This was encapsulated in a statement by the TEN Commissioner “ ... as far as the 
industry is concerned, the recognition is gradually grounded that the Commission is a 
player in maritime transport...with the Commission's proposals originating in 
legitimate concerns from a wide number of people” (De Pallacio 2003).
6.4 The Directive on Ship Source pollution
In the aftermath of the Erika and Prestige accidents, the European Commission 
examined a variety of measures in seeking the prevention of analogous accidents in 
the future. DG TREN officials were considering ways of ‘tightening the net’ as 
existing international civil liability regimes governing ship-source pollution were 
interpreted to be overly lenient (Karamitsos 2005, Michaux and Anastasakos 2004, 
Karamitsos 2003). This signified an asymmetry between the responsibilities a 
shipowner undertook in transporting cargoes and the corresponding ability of the 
polluter to limit liability. In tandem, it was believed that larger exposure to sanctions 
would offer an incentive for shipowners and charterers to employ quality vessels. In 
response to the Prestige accident, the initial proposals of the European Commission 
included the introduction of criminal sanctions for entities responsible for marine 
pollution (European Commission IP/02/1791). This was affirmed by the Copenhagen 
European Council in December 2003 whilst the respective Council of Transport
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Ministers welcomed the initiative for legislation stipulating that “...any person who 
has caused or contributed to a pollution incident through grossly negligent behaviour 
should be subject to appropriate sanctions” (CEU Information Note 15626/02). In the 
March 2003 European Commission proposals, alongside the accelerated phasing-in of 
double-hull tankers, a Directive on criminal sanctions for ship pollution was outlined 
(CEC COM 0105/03). In addressing existing shortcomings in Community legislation, 
the introduction of criminal sanctions regarding deliberate and accidental pollution 
was suggested. The envisaged Directive encompassed the complete maritime 
transport chain, incorporating inter alia shipowners, charterers and classifications 
societies. According to the wording of the European Commission the intention was 
that “ ...the parties responsible for such pollution will no longer be able to shirk their 
responsibilities” (CEC COM 0105/03). Subsequently, the European Commission 
proposed the adoption of a Directive on ship-source pollution and on the introduction 
of sanctions, including criminal sanctions for pollution offenders (CEC COM 92/03). 
In response to recurring maritime accidents and deliberate discharges, the European 
Commission proposed that ship-source pollution should constitute a criminal offence 
with corresponding sanctions, including criminal sanctions for the persons who 
caused or participated in the act by intent of grossly negligent behaviour. The 
proposed Directive pertained to discharges of polluting substances by any ship 
irrespective of its flag in the internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) of an EU member state as well as the high seas. This covered the 
shipowner, charterer, classification society and any person involved who was found 
guilty of participating in or causing illegal pollution, either intentionally or by gross 
negligence. Further, the sanctions were outlined including fines, confiscation of
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proceeds, temporary ban on engaging in commercial activities and placement under 
judicial supervision (CEC COM 92/03).
Complementing the Directive on sanctions for ship-source pollution, a Framework 
Decision was proposed to strengthen the criminal law framework. The proposal of a 
separate Framework Decision was the outcome of a competence dispute between the 
Council and the European Commission. The Council argued that according to the EU 
Treaty, the European Commission was not competent to prepare the implementation 
legislation with respect to ship-source pollution. In converse to the Directive on ship- 
source pollution, the co-decision rule was not applicable to the adoption of the 
Framework Decision and the European Parliament was entitled to offer non-binding 
advice. With respect to the Council of Justice Ministers decisions were agreed upon 
through unanimity and not qualified majority. This enabled Greece, Malta and Cyprus 
to negotiate across the draft Directive and Framework Decision with the exercise of a 
veto as a last resort (Interview with Maritime Transport Attache of Greek Permanent 
Representation to the EU March 2006, Interview with Secretary-General of Cyprus 
Shipping Council April 2006).
As European Commission initiatives towards adopting a Directive on ship-source 
pollution gathered pace, there was considerable evidence of the usage of EU material 
and immaterial resources by the Greek shipowners in shaping the cognitive 
interpretations of the causes of marine pollution. There was consternation with the 
intention of the European Commission to pursue regional measures despite the 
lobbying efforts over the previous years of the UGS, GSCC and international shipping 
associations to emphasise the primacy of the international level. The prevailing
sentiment amongst Greek shipowners was captured by the Chairman of the GSCC 
maintaining that . .the Commission frequently acts as if the industry were a slightly 
shady, regional activity in need of severe correction and reprimand” (Embiricos 
2005). In the same vein, the President of the UGS proclaimed that “.. .one area that 
does concern me is that there are certain individuals within the Commission who are 
showing animosity towards the shipping industry and thus ...not doing their duty” 
(Efthymiou 2005). Whilst supporting measures for the enhancement of maritime 
safety and the protection of the marine environment, several arguments were 
presented against the constitution of accidental pollution as an infringement. Firstly, 
the European Commission proposals were in conflict with exisiting international 
legislation in the form of UNCLOS and MARPOL. Secondly, further regulation 
would create a competitive disadvantage for EU shipping and deter the attraction of 
new seafarers to a profession that was already facing difficulties in recruiting 
(Embiricos 2005). Thirdly, citing the OCIMF vetting system established by the major 
oil companies it was argued that criminal sanctions and penalties were not the sole 
approach for deterring ship-source pollution. The UGS and the GSCC engaged in 
‘venue shopping’ seeking to utilise every access point to the EU policy-makers 
(Mazey and Richardson 2001: 220). The two associations engaged directly with the 
cabinets of the TREN, Environment and Justice European Commissioners, key 
European Commission officials such as the Director of Maritime Transport in DG 
TREN and MEPs from a variety of European Parliament Committees (UGS Annual 
Report 2004-05, GSCC Annual Report 2004-05, GSCC Memo 2005). Furthermore, 
the GSCC commissioned a legal opinion by the law firm Ince & Co that provided a 
legal basis for opposing the European Commission proposals. In the legal opinion it 
was stated that the proposed Directive would conflict with existing international
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regulation, it did not entail the improvement of maritime safety and posed a threat to 
the human rights of seafarers.
As with the negotiations on single-hull tankers, the Greek government was an access 
point to the Council of Ministers. The process for the adoption of the ship-source 
pollution Directive coincided with the appointment of new YEN leadership following 
the March 2004 national elections. There was considerable consultation between the 
UGS, GSCC and YEN and meetings were held at the highest level including the 
Greek Prime Minister (YEN Press Release April 6, 2004). The opinion of the UGS 
and the GSCC was that the Greek state should be a leader in the formulation of 
international maritime policy, particularly at the EU level. Likewise, the approach of 
YEN was that merchant shipping was a central pillar of the national economy and 
should be supported through international initiatives. From the statements, press 
releases and EU Council voting patterns it can be seen that the positions of the Greek 
shipowners and YEN were aligned (Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions 
November 17 2004). According to YEN, Greek legislation on the protection of the 
marine environment was the most stringent in the EU and should be a point of 
reference in the EU negotiations on ship-source pollution. Rather than seeking the 
constitution of accidental pollution as an infringement, it was advocated that the EU 
should pursue legislation on the designation of places of refuge. Further, it was noted 
that the measures would have a counter-productive impact as shipowners could switch 
away from EU flags, undermining the competitiveness of EU merchant shipping 
(Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament Sessions November 17 2004, YEN Press 
Conference November 3, 2004).
Moreover, the IMO represented an important institutional channel of influence with 
respect to the European Commission. The capacity of the UGS and the GSCC to exert 
influence within the IMO secretariat was amplified with the appointment of Efthimios 
Mitropoulos as the Secretary General in June 2003. The Greek shipowners maintained 
direct access to the IMO head and a number of meetings were held to discuss the 
European Commission initiatives. Indicatively, in May 2004 the YEN Minister met 
simultaneously with the IMO Secretary General and the GSCC to exchange opinions 
on the EU maritime transport policy. Indeed, as part of the Erika and Prestige 
packages of measures, the European Commission proposed that the EU ought to gain 
full membership at the IMO. This was intermittently pursued by the European 
Commission since gaining observer status in 1974. At the time of the adoption of the 
Directive on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey 
organizations, the European Commission declared that an external Community 
competence was created and that the detailed arrangements for exercising this 
competence would be the subject of subsequent proposals (Council Directive 57/94). 
In parallel, it was agreed that there would be constructive co-ordinations between the 
EU member states and the Commission on matters subjects to Community 
competence that were discussed at the IMO. This would ensure the EU rules were 
complied with by the member states in IMO discussions (Interview with Head of 
Maritime Transport Policy & Maritime Safety European Commission April 2006, 
Interview with Maritime Transport Attache of Greek Permanent Delegation to the EU 
March 2006). However, it was countered that according to the IMO Convention, 
membership was open only to nation-states and not regional organisations. An 
amendment of the Convention would require the approval of a two-thirds majority of 
the member states (Interview with Head of Policy and Planning Unit IMO March
2006, Interview with Deputy Director of Maritime Safety Division IMO March 2006). 
Aside from IMO constitutional hindrances, the EU member states were not in favour 
of strengthening the competence of the EU in the IMO (ECSA Annual Report 2004- 
05). Likewise, the UGS and in particular the GSCC were opposed to this prospect as 
it was argued that it would be difficult to articulate a ‘single common interest’ across 
the EU member states whilst the quality of the technical discussion at the IMO would 
be reduced (GSCC Annual Report 2004/2005). At present the issue remained 
inconclusive although it was understood that the European Commission’s eventual 
aim was for the EU to become a full member of the IMO (ECSA Annual Report 
2004-05, ICS Annual Review 2005).
In converse to the negotiations on the phasing-out of single hull tankers, there was 
consensus amongst the industry associations against the criminal sanctions Directive 
(Interview with Chairman of Lloyd’s Register March 2006, Interview with Manager 
of Intercargo March 2006, Interview with Vice-Chairman of Greek Shipping 
Cooperation Committee March 2006, Interview with Secretary-General of 
International Salvage Union March 2006, Interview with Secretary of International 
Chamber of Shipping February 2006). The UGS and the GSCC were integral in 
coordinating the efforts of the respective European and international industry 
associations. Illustratively, the Chairman of the Royal Association of Netherlands’ 
Shipowners (KVNR) commended the Greek shipowners for “their courage to speak 
out openly their anger and frustration with this unwelcome strategy” (Korteland 
2005). Likewise, the Managing Director of a large P&I Club presented the UGS as a 
model for shipowners’ associations to emulate in effectively lobbying governments 
and regulators in European and internationally (Eccleston 2005). The ICS, ECSA,
Intertanko and OCIMF agreed to coordinate their lobbying efforts in favourably 
shaping the European Commission proposals on ship-source pollution. These 
organisations combined, represented more than fifty percent of world merchant 
tonnage, seventy percent of the world’s independently owned tankers and all the 
major oil companies. In August 2003 the four associations issued a joint position 
paper with respect to the Directive on ship-source pollution (Industry Joint Position 
Paper August 2003). Although there was agreement with the principle that entities 
responsible for illegal discharges should receive corresponding sanctions, it was noted 
the ship-source pollution should be addressed at the international level. There was 
concern that certain provisions in the proposed Directive were in conflict with the 
exisiting stipulations of MARPOL and UNCLOS. The EU member states were 
already contracting parties to the international conventions and national legislators 
had provided for a variety of sanctions to illegal ship-source pollution. Hence, it was 
argued that the additional layer of legislation would introduce legal uncertainty to the 
ship-source pollution regime. In addition, rather than penalise operators for 
operational (deliberate) ship-source pollution, the associations urged the European 
Commission to provide for suitable waste reception facilities in EU ports, in line with 
Directive 59/2000 on Port Reception Facilities (Interview with Director of Oil 
Companies International Marine Forum March 2006, Interview with Member of 
Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee March 2006, Joint Position Paper August
2003). As the negotiations on the ship-source pollution Directive proceeded, in an 
unprecedented move a coalition of ten and eventually thirteen shipping associations 
was formed to oppose the European Commission proposals. The coalition comprised 
major shipping industry associations, including ECSA, ICS, Intertanko, Intercargo, 
BIMCO, the International Salvage Union (ISU) and the International Transport
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Workers’ Federation. The purpose of the coalition was to request that the European 
Parliament endorse a draft Directive that complies with existing international 
legislation (ECSA Newsletter October 2004).
Aside from certain national governments and the European Commission, the ship- 
source pollution Directive was supported by environmental interest groups. Figuring 
prominently was Oceana, a non-governmental organisation campaigning for the 
protection of oceans. Oceana engaged actively through the use of EU material and 
immaterial resources in supporting the European Commission proposals on 
constituting accidental ship-source pollution an infringement if committed with intent, 
recklessly or by serious negligence (Interview with Oceana EU Political Advisor 
March 2006, Oceana MEP Briefing February 2005). EU resources were employed in 
a cognitive way through the preparation and dissemination of research on the 
environmental impact of ship-source discharges. Evidence was presented that 
discharges of polluting substances posed a threat to the marine and coastal 
environmental that was three times greater than oil slicks from vessel accidents, 
pointing especially to vessels under the flags of Cyprus and Malta (Oceana Press 
Release November 2004). Compared to the major shipping associations, Oceana had 
limited resources and concentrated on the environmental constituency within the 
European Parliament. Although it cannot be maintained that Oceana shaped the 
policy-making process, it could be argued that it was an additional source of 
legitimacy for the European Commission proposals.
36 The coalition also included the International Group of P&I Clubs
In January 2004 the European Parliament offered its first reading of the proposed 
Directive, adopting a set of amendments to the European Commission proposals. It 
was maintained that UNCLOS and MARPOL should remain the relevant legislation 
for ship-source pollution and corresponding criminal sanctions. In June 2004 the 
Council of Transport Ministers reached a political agreement on the draft Directive on 
sanctions for ship-source pollution. Departing from the opinion of the European 
Parliament the proposals adopted moved beyond the stipulations of UNCLOS and 
MARPOL. It was agreed that committing ship-source pollution within the internal 
waters or territorial sea of an EU member state, by intent, recklessly or by serious 
negligence was an infringement. Accordingly, the EU member states could impose 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions, including criminal sanctions. It 
was noted that accidental pollution beyond the EU member state territorial waters 
would not be an infringement for the owner, master and the crew if the respective 
MARPOL conditions were fulfilled. In tandem, the EU member states were obliged to 
institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, for instances of infringement 
as opposed to the discretion afforded in international conventions (Fawcett-Ellis
2004). As with the negotiations on the phasing-out of single-hull tankers, the 
governments of France, Spain and Portugal were in support of a stringent approach 
beyond the stipulations of international legislation. Greece and Malta were the only 
two member governments to vote against the adoption of the draft Directive (ECSA 
Newsletter July 2004). The two governments insisted on the alignment of EU 
measures with international legislation and lobbied for the provisions of the proposed 
Directive not to be extended to the EEZ and the open seas. As a compromise, the 
member states agreed to withdraw a proposal whereby criminal sanctions were
37 In October 2004 the Council o f Transport Ministers confirmed the draft Directive as a ‘Common 
Position’ with Greece and Malta voting against.
applicable to EU member flagged vessels for accidental pollution beyond the EU 
territorial waters. However, the European Commission reserved the right to review 
the issue in five years subsequent to a report on the implementation of the Directive.
For the second reading by the European Parliament, the rapporteur presented a report 
on the draft Directive, including proposed amendments to the Council’s Common 
Position. The amendments entailed that accidental ship-source pollution should be an 
infringement in line with MARPOL as regards shipowner, master and crew, respect 
for the human rights of seafarers and proportionality of sanctions across the maritime 
transport chain. The ensuing discrepancy between the Council and the European 
Parliament led to informal tripartite discussions between delegates from the Council, 
European Parliament and European Commission. A critical point was the 
reinstatement of criminal sanctions for accidental pollution that had been watered 
down by the European Parliament with the purpose of protecting seafarers 
(Naftemporiki March 3, 2005). However, the plenary of the European Parliament had 
not supported a proposal to eschew designation of accidental pollution as an 
infringement. The proposal was submitted, following lobbying of MEPs, by the UGS, 
GSCC and the international shipping associations in coordination with the Greek 
government (ECSA Newsletter April 2005). The YEN Minister sent letters to all the 
Greek MEPs requesting that they support the proposed amendment as this was a vital 
issue for the interests of Greek shipping (Kefalogiannis Letter to MEPs February 17,
2005). According to the Greek shipowners, the proposed amendment corresponded to 
the MARPOL agreement and the conclusions of the European Parliament at the first 
reading of the draft Directive. Eventually the three institutions reached a compromise 
that was approved in the form of Directive 35/05 by the European Parliament in
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February 2005 and by the Council of Transport Ministers in July 2005. In the Council 
meeting Greece and Malta voted against whilst Cyprus abstained from the vote. The 
Maltese Prime Minister personally attended the ministerial meeting, reiterating the 
conflicts between the Directive and international legislation (Interview with member 
of Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee Council March 2006, Interview with 
Secretary-General of Cyprus Shipping Council April 2006).
Directive 35/05 stipulated that ship-source pollution, including accidental pollution in 
the internal and territorial waters of the EU member states was an infringement on the 
basis of intent, recklessness or serious negligence. The sanctions were applicable to 
the entire maritime transport chain, encompassing the shipowner, the operator, the 
master, the charterer and the classification society. Beyond territorial waters, 
accidental pollution was covered by the MARPOL provisions. The conduct of a fair 
and impartial hearing would precede the determination of sanctions that would be 
proportional to the criminal offence. Administering criminal sanctions was a member 
state and not an EU competence and would be detailed in a separate Framework 
Decision. In addition, the European Commission was requested to prepare a 
feasibility study and accordingly a set of proposals for the establishment of an EU 
Coastguard (CEC Directive 35/05). In parallel to the adoption of the ship-source 
pollution Directive, negotiations unfolded on the adoption of the Framework 
Decision. In the October 2004 Council of Justice Ministers, Greece, Cyprus and Malta 
vetoed the adoption of the draft decision. The Greek government explained that the 
proposed stipulations on penalising accidental pollution beyond the EU member 
territorial waters were in conflict with exisiting international legislation (Minutes of 
the Hellenic Parliament Sessions November 11, 2004). Following protracted
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negotiations the Council of Justice Ministers reached political agreement in December 
2004 and Framework Decision was adopted in July 2005. In the adopted Framework 
Decision the proposed stipulation to apply criminal sanctions, including 
imprisonment, to EU-flagged ships for pollution occurring beyond the EU member 
territorial seas was removed.
The Greek shipowners were discontent with the adoption of Directive 35/05 following 
arduous negotiations. The final text of the Directive raised several concerns for the 
UGS and the GSCC. Firstly, conflicts between the provisions of the Directive and 
international legislation, especially accidental ship-source pollution constituting an 
infringement were a cause of legal uncertainty. Secondly, serious negligence as a 
basis from criminal liability was not a legally established concept entailing the 
likelihood of misuse by prospective victims of ship-source pollution (Embiricos 
2005b, UGS Annual Report 2004-05, GSCC Annual Report 2004-05). The UGS and 
the GSCC were unable neither to prevent the incorporation of accidental ship-source 
pollution in the Directive nor to integrate guarantees that the owner, master and crew 
would not be prosecuted if all reasonable measures had been taken. Most importantly, 
it was the second time in a few years when European Commission initiatives that 
were deemed impracticable by the Greek shipowners were adopted despite 
considerable lobbying efforts to block them. The European Commission sought to 
reassure the concerns of the Greek shipowners, explaining that the Directive would be 
applicable to the “...rare instances whereby the responsible party is considered to 
have acted intolerably and must be condemned for that” (Karamitsos 2005). 
Nonetheless, in December 2005 the GSCC in a coalition with Intertanko, Intercargo, 
Lloyd’s Register and the International Salvage Union applied to the High Court in
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London for judicial review of Directive 35/05, requesting referral to the European 
Court of Justice for a ruling. The Directive was challenged on two main grounds, 
conflict with international law and failure to comply with the legal requirement of 
certainty. Overall, the coalition stressed that the supremacy of international law is 
critical for the effective regulation and smooth operation of the shipping industry. 
(Industry Coalition Briefing Note January 2006, Interview with Chairman of Lloyd’s 
Register March 2006, Interview with Secretary General of ISU March 2006, 
Interview with Manager of Intercargo March 2006).
In sum, the growing regulatory role of the EU altered the opportunity structure in 
maritime transport policy-making. In initiating reforms beyond the existing 
international regulatory framework, the European Commission was confronted with a 
constellation of formal and factual veto points, including the Greek government, the 
UGS, GSCC and a plethora of international shipping associations. Against the 
background of the accelerated phasing-out of single-hull tankers, the Greek 
shipowners were apprehensive regarding European Commission initiatives on ship- 
source pollution. The UGS and the GSCC featured prominently in the opposition to 
the adoption of the proposed Directive. There was evidence of the use of EU material 
and immaterial resources in a cognitive way. The proposed Directive rested on an 
interpretation of maritime accidents and their legal implications that was contested by 
the Greek shipowners. In the words of the GSCC Chairman, “... by the EC’s own 
admission, the directive was driven, not by sound rational thought, but by political 
sentiment and expediency, following the Prestige” (Embiricos 2005). In countering 
the cognitive interpretation put forward by the European Commission, the GSCC 
presented technical research and solicited a legal opinion highlighting the conflicts
with existing international law. In tandem, material resources were used in strategic 
and legitimising ways as the UGS and the GSCC engaged directly with officials from 
DG TREN, DG Environment and DG Justice and MEPs. In addition, there was 
considerable evidence of consultation and coordination between the two industry 
associations, YEN and the Greek government. This coincided with the appointment of 
new YEN leadership that was responsive to the requests of Greek ocean-going 
shipping. The 2004 EU enlargement entailed the accession of Cyprus and Malta with 
extensive maritime transport interests. A large proportion of Greek tonnage was 
registered under the flags of Malta and Cyprus. The alignment of interests between 
Greece, Cyprus and Malta was demonstrated in Council voting on the ship-source 
pollution Directive and the Framework Decision. Concurrently the EU enlargement 
into Eastern Europe introduced a number of countries that tended to vote as 
‘satellites’ to the large member states (Interview with Greek Maritime Transport 
Attache to the EU March 2006). Yet, aside from Greece, Cyprus and Malta that 
considered maritime safety an issue of high politics, the majority of the EU member 
states were willing to make concessions in addressing the concerns of the public and 
environmental groups. These voting patterns impaired the capacity of the Greek 
government to favourably shape the Council negotiations (Pallis 2006, Moravcsik and 
Vachudova 2003). Although Greece, Cyprus and Malta achieved some amendments 
to the draft Directive, without the support of the larger EU member states, their 
combined presence was not sufficient in removing the more controversial aspects of 
the legislation. Moreover, the lobbying efforts of the Greek shipowners were 
underpinned by a consensus amongst the major industry associations in opposition to 
the European Commission proposals. The resources and contacts of the main 
international and European industry associations formed an indirect channel of
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influence towards the EU institutions. An unprecedented move was the establishment 
of a coalition of thirteen industry associations in which the Greek shipowners played 
an integral part. In conjunction, the IMO represented an additional source of 
institutional influence, in the cognitive usage of EU immaterial and material 
resources.
6.5 Ocean-going shipping, the Greek state and the European Union
Following the high-profile maritime accidents of the Erika and the Prestige the 
shipping industry was confronted with a barrage of criticism and negative publicity. 
Within the ensuing ‘window of opportunity’ the European Commission pushed 
forward with a set of initiatives to improve maritime safety and prevent the recurrence 
of maritime accidents. Amongst the proposed measures the accelerated phasing-out of 
single-hull tankers and the criminal sanctions for ship-source pollution were strongly 
opposed by the Greek shipowners and YEN. As part of the empirical evidence 
presented in this chapter, there is considerable evidence of the use of EU material and 
immaterial resources by the Greek shipowners and YEN in seeking to favourably 
shape maritime-safety policy making. Immaterial resources were used in a cognitive 
way in seeking to alter the interpretation of maritime accidents and ship-source 
discharges that underpinned the European Commission proposals on maritime safety. 
Through letters, speeches, reports, legal recommendations and technical analyses the 
UGS and the GSCC sought to establish an interpretation within the EU institutions 
that did not link the causes of the Erika and Prestige accidents to the employment of 
single-hull tankers. Rather, attention was drawn to a series of factors including the 
condition of the vessel, port-state control and the designation of places of refuge.
I l l
Likewise, attempts were made to persuade actors within the European Commission 
and the European Parliament of primacy of the international level and the 
counterproductive nature of the ship-source pollution proposals on the 
competitiveness of the EU shipping industry and the attraction of seafarers.
In conjunction, EU material resources were used in cognitive and strategic ways by 
the UGS, GSCC and YEN. Direct contacts were pursued with key figures in the 
cabinets of the European Commissioners, DG TREN, DG Environment and DG 
Justice. However, amongst the Greek shipowning community there was apprehension 
regarding the European Commission as it was believed that it lacked the technical 
expertise and an appreciation of the commercial dynamics in the shipping industry. 
Similarly, the UGS and the GSCC sought direct engagement with MEPs, especially in 
the Transport Committee of the European Parliament. Resting on the co-decision 
powers on transport arising from the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Parliament had 
become an important venue for achieving amendments to European Commission and 
Council proposals. Yet, at the same time the diversity of interests represented in the 
European Parliament rendered its decisions unpredictable. The outcome of the first 
reading of the ship-source pollution Directive by the European Parliament was 
welcomed by the Greek shipowners as the initial European Commission proposals 
were attenuated. However, in the second reading and the ensuing tripartite 
negotiations between the Council, European Commission and European Parliament, 
the adopted amendments were inimical to the interests of the Greek shipowners. 
Moreover, in communicating and effectively presenting the interests of the industry to 
the MEPs the Intergroup on Maritime Affairs was formed with the initiative of ECSA, 
Intertanko, Intercargo and BIMCO (Interview with Head of Brussels Representation 
of Swedish Shipowners Association April 2006, Interview with Executive Advisor of
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the European Community Shipowners’ Associations March 2006, Interview with the 
Secretary of the International Chamber of Shipping February 2006).
The international and European shipping associations, notably ECSA, ICS, 
Intertanko, Intercargo and BIMCO were an indirect channel of influence that was 
utilised by the UGS and the GSCC. The international industry associations were 
endowed with varying organisational resources and developed different lobbying 
styles. In engaging with EU institutions, ECSA was the first port of call due to its 
knowledge and experience of EU policy-making and contacts within the EU. 
Although the Greek shipowners were influential within this organisation, their 
positions could be diluted as ECSA sought to reconcile the differences of the national 
shipowners’ associations that formed its membership. In parallel, ECSA was criticised 
for being at times “too close to the European Commission” (Interview with 
Shipowner March 2006). Compared to the other organisations, Intertanko was 
equipped with the most resources and employed an assertive lobbying style. Although 
it had not maintained a physical presence in Brussels, Intertanko contracted a political 
consultancy to monitor EU developments. Likewise, BIMCO appointed the former 
TREN European Commissioner, Neil Kinnock in improving its access to the EU 
institutions. The competence of the Greek shipowners in engaging with the EU 
institutions was partly attributed to the resources and contacts of these organisations. 
On the one hand, shipping interests had a long history of associability beyond the 
national level with an accompanying level of political expertise and networks. On the 
other hand, the shipping industry had neither committed large funds to lobbying 
activities, nor pursued public relations campaigns. This tendency circumscribed the 
capacity of industry associations to favourably influence international and European 
legislation (Van Dyck 2005). The extensive lobbying efforts committed in opposing
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the ship-source pollution Directive were seen as an ad hoc response. Furthermore, 
although the major shipping associations had difficulties coordinating their efforts in 
the past, a coalition consisting of thirteen organisations was formed against the 
European Commission proposals. Indeed, the UGS and the GSCC were integral in 
bringing together these organisations. An additional source of influence and 
legitimacy was the Secretary-General of the IMO, in expressing the opinion of the 
industry and maintaining channels of dialogue open with the European Commission. 
Concurrently, the EU expanded the political opportunity structure with the active 
engagement of actors that were not prominent in international shipping regulation. 
Environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace with respect to the accelerated phasing-out 
of single-hull tankers and Oceana regarding ship-source pollution represented 
different constituencies. In spite of limited resources, through the dissemination of 
information and ‘knowledge’ these organisations amplified the legitimacy of the 
European Commission proposals.
As the EU expanded its competence in maritime safety regulation, there is evidence of 
the reinforcement of the state corporatist relations between the Greek state and the 
ocean-going shipowners. In accordance with interpretations of the domestic impact of 
European integration on Southern Europe, it would be anticipated that state 
corporatism would be weakened as the Greek state articulated the interests of other 
domestic constituencies. It was maintained that European integration was responsible 
for the retreat of the Greek state and political parties, expanding the opportunity 
structure for other interest groups (Kazakos 2004, Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, 
Ioakimidis 1996, Diamandouros 1994). Nonetheless, the evidence from the lobbying 
efforts on the phasing-out of single-hull tankers and the ship-source pollution 
Directive points to the opposite direction. Rather, the relationship between the UGS,
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the GSCC and the Greek state are tightened in the face of reform pressures from the 
European Union. The positions represented by the Greek government at the EU level 
are fully aligned with the interests of the ocean-going shipowners. There is continuous 
consultation between the UGS, GSCC and the Greek government in the formulation 
of positions and the coordination of lobbying efforts. This is demonstrated in 
European Council voting patterns with the Greek government finding itself 
marginalized among EU member states on several instances. Illustratively the YEN 
Minister declared that “...people outside the industry could even request triple-hull 
tankers, if it [Prestige] was a double-hull tanker what would have been the 
ramifications? We must be careful both at the international and European level 
because the national interests of Greek shipping are being jeopardised” (YEN Press 
Conference November 21, 2002).
As per the analytical framework that is advanced in this dissertation, the identified 
conditions provide an explanation for the direction of domestic political change due to 
the Europeanisation of maritime transport policy-making. The direction of domestic 
change is contingent on the unitary character and low ‘integrated leadership’ of the 
Greek state, recognition of incongruence between the EU proposals and international 
rules and the ensuing use of EU material and immaterial resources by the Greek 
shipowners. Foremost in reinforcing the state corporatist arrangement, the Greek 
ocean-going shipowners maintain capital mobility and are not counterbalanced by 
other influential domestic formal or factual veto points. If national or EU legislation 
were overly onerous compared to other jurisdictions, shipowners are in a position to 
exercise capital exit by re-flagging their vessels. In conjunction, the structural power 
of the Greek ocean-going shipowners is compounded by a sizeable contribution to the
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national economy in the form of foreign exchange income, employment, technology 
transfer and investment in a variety of industries.
Furthermore, some observations are made on the significance of party politics and the 
international dimension of domestic politics with respect to the Greek state and ocean­
going shipping. Despite the conflictual nature of Greek party politics, the positions of 
the two main parties, PASOK and New Democracy have been identical on issues of 
ocean-going shipping. Although particularly in the 1980s for ideological reasons 
PASOK sought to distance itself from the ‘shipowning capital’, state policies 
regarding the competitiveness of the Greek flag and repatriation of Greek shipowners 
from foreign flags remained remarkably stable for most of the post-war years. In 
tandem, rather than the governing party acting as a collective patron for the 
shipowners who actively supported it, capital mobility reconfigured the relationship in 
favour of the Greek shipowners (Sotiropoulos 1993, Lyrintzis 1984). It has been 
theorized that the institutialisation of direct relations between the state and business 
interests involves the displacement of political parties (Golden 1986: 281). Although 
this was not entirely applicable due to the weakness of the Greek state, in the ocean­
going shipping sector party politics had not figured prominently. Furthermore, the 
relationships between the Greek state and shipping contested conventional 
conceptualizations of state corporatism by blurring the boundaries between the 
domestic and the international. On the one hand, the Greek owned fleet is spread 
across a number of flags. On the other hand, the institutional representation of Greek 
shipowners is divided between the UGS located in Piraeus and the GSCC in London. 
In formulating domestic shipping policy and coordinating Greek positions at the EU 
level, YEN consults with both organisations. Similarly, it could be conjectured that 
the GSCC may actively engage with the UK Department of Transport in promoting
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the interests of Greek shipping. However, there is little evidence of the GSCC 
influencing UK policies on shipping with the United Kingdom Chamber of Shipping 
prevailing in the policy-making process.
Thus, over a period spanning two decades the EU gradually muscled in the 
international maritime safety framework. The political pressures and media publicity 
emanating from the Erika and Prestige accidents provided the impetus for the 
European Commission to propose unilateral measures beyond international maritime 
safety standards. In circumventing the IMO, the European Commission sought to 
buttress its legitimacy as a source of stringent regulation on maritime transport. In 
conjunction, attempts were made for the EU to become a full member of the IMO. 
Shipping interests had a long history of associability beyond the national level in the 
form of the ICS, ECSA, Intertanko, Intergarco and BIMCO. Drawing from the 
resources and networks of these institutions whilst engaging directly with the EU 
institutions, the Greek shipowners sought to favourably shape negotiations at the EU 
level. As an access point to the Council of Ministers, there was considerable 
consultation and coordination between the UGS, GSCC and YEN. As a result, the 
European Commission initiatives have resulted in the strengthening of the state- 
corporatist relations between the Greek state and ocean-going shipowners. This is 
attributed primarily to capital mobility of ocean-going shipowners and the absence of 
countervailing interest groups at the domestic level. Nevertheless, the presence of the 
EU in the regulation of maritime transport is becoming normalised as it proceeds with 
further initiatives in the form of the “Erika III package” and the Green Paper on 
Maritime Policy (Interview with representative of Maritime Policy Task Force 
European Commission March 2006). In response, the Greek shipowners are seeking 
improved consultation with the European Commission, adopting the position that “a
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stable, supportive and competitive regulatory framework was essential for the 
European shipping industry to thrive” (Polemis January 2006).
Chapter 7
Chapter 7: Discussion of Empirical Findings
Against the background of extensive state involvement in the economy, regime 
discontinuities in the history of Greek politics spawned differentiated patterns of 
interaction between the state and business interests characterized by ‘disjointed 
corporatism’ (Lavdas 2005, Lavdas and Lanza 2000, Lavdas 1997). Accordingly, in 
the shipping sector the relations between the Greek state and the shipowners took the 
form of state corporatism. Although the theorists of corporatism would anticipate state 
domination in the sector, the development of this arrangement is associated with the 
autonomy and influence of the shipowners (Lavdas 2005, Aspinwall 1998, Lavdas 
1997, Strange 1976, Hirschman 1970). This is reflected in monopolistic 
representation, formal recognition of the shipowner associations, regular interaction 
with the Greek state, privileged access and consultation prior to the adoption of 
legislation (Schmitter and Grote 1997, Schmitter 1979, Schmitter 1977). The UGS 
and the EEA emerged as the peak associations in the ocean-going and coastal 
shipping segments and were involved in the negotiation of collective wage contracts 
with the seafarers. These associations maintained informal and formal access to senior 
government figures, MPs and Ministry officials and their consultation on legislative 
measures was institutionalised through the National Shipping Policy Council, the 
Hellenic Chamber of Shipping and the Council of Coastal Transport. Moreover, 
acknowledging the significance of shipping for the Greek economy, the Ministry of 
Mercantile Marine was devoted to maritime transport affairs. YEN was intertwined 
with the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) and consisted primarily of coast guard officers. 
Hence, aside from their policing mission, HCG officers were responsible for the 
formulation of maritime transport policy, labour issues, maritime education and the
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representation of Greece in international fora such as the IMO and the EU.
In the post-authoritarian period, the provision of coastal shipping services was a 
cabotage trade, reserved solely for ships that were registered under the Greek flag. In 
tandem, with the objectives of preventing ‘catastrophic competition’ between coastal 
shipowners, protecting the passengers from ‘predatory pricing’ and ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the islands with the mainland, coastal shipping was underpinned 
by the ‘system of licenses’ (Steer Davies Gleave 2005, Giannopoulos and 
Aifandopulou-Klimis 2004, Lekakou 2002, OECD 2001, Psaraftis 1998, Stumey, 
Panagakos and Psaraftis 1994). YEN was central to this arrangement, maintaining 
substantial discretion in the allocation of licenses to coastal shipowners for the 
operation of passenger ships on island routes. Although there were a number of 
technical and commercial criteria, the issuance of licenses was not a transparent 
process, resulting in specific coastal shipowners operating exclusively on island 
routes for a period of over three decades. As a consequence, coastal shipping became 
synonymous with old passenger ferries, unreliable services and a poor safety record 
(Lekakou 2002, Psaraftis 2002, Psaraftis 1996).
Against this background, in the 1986 package of maritime transport measures the 
European Commission proposed the abolition of the cabotage trades in coastal 
shipping across the EU member states (CEC Com 90/85). Within the EU there was 
discrepancy between the competitive coastal shipping services in the Northern EU 
member states and the highly regulated markets of the Southern member states, 
including Greece (Aspinwall 1995, Bredima-Savopoulou and Tzoannos 1990). The 
industry associations of the Greek coastal shipowners, the EEA and the EEEP,
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combined with YEN and the island communities opposed the opening of the domestic 
cabotage trade. By contrast, there were individual coastal shipowners, the EEMFP 
and the UGS that favoured the liberalisation of domestic coastal shipping. The 
resistance of Greece and the Southern EU member states brought the EU discussions 
to an impasse. In the ensuing negotiations, the European Commission put forward 
several formulae for overcoming the stalemate. Most notably, in 1989 the European 
Commission proposed the establishment of single European ship registry (Euros) that 
would operate in parallel to the member state flag registries (CEC Com 266/89). The 
dual objectives of Euros were enhancing the competitiveness of Community fleet and 
bolstering EU seafarer employment (Selkou and Roe 2004, Stevens 2004, Lyons 
2000). In tandem, it was advanced that only the ships featuring on this supplementary 
register would be granted access to the EU cabotage trades (Aspinwall 1995). 
Nonetheless, the Greek shipowners and most prominently the UGS were against the 
creation of a single EU ship registry. Arduous negotiations followed culminating in 
Regulation 3577/92 as a political compromise recognizing a derogation period of 
eleven years for the opening of the Greek cabotage trades. Regarding this period, 
there was limited evidence of the Europeanisation of the domestic state corporatist 
arrangement between the Greek state and the coastal shipowners. Hence, in a unitary 
state with weak integrated leadership, the convergence of formal and factual veto 
points against reform entailed the limited impact of EU pressures on the domestic 
institutional configuration.
However, in anticipation of the January 2004 completion of the derogation period, 
there were changes to the market structure of coastal shipping that had extensive 
repercussions for the domestic state corporatist arrangement. In emulating the
business practices of the Greek coastal shipowners that were prevailing on the routes 
of the Adriatic Sea Corridor, the domestic coastal shipping market was recalibrated 
through industry consolidation, corporate restructuring and fleet modernization (Steer 
Davies Gleave 2005, OECD 2001). In tandem, the availability of equity capital 
through the burgeoning Athens Stock Exchange buttressed fleet expansion and market 
growth. A handful of large coastal shipping companies emerged, altering the internal 
composition and power dynamics of the EEA and the EEEP. Most notably, the 
industry associations shifted their position from detractors to supporters of the 
liberalisation of the cabotage trades. Although the completion of the derogation period 
was approaching rapidly and despite the intermittent reminders by the European 
Commission, YEN the incumbent Greek governments did not initiate any reform to 
the ‘system of licenses’. Rather, the robustness of the state corporatist arrangement 
was illustrated in the attempts of Attica Group and Strintzis Lines to gain access to the 
lucrative Cretan routes in the late 1990s. Following opposition from the formal and 
factual veto points of the incumbent Cretan companies and the island community, 
YEN refused to issue new licenses. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the accident of 
the Express Samina, Law 2932/01 was adopted with the purpose of accelerating the 
opening of the domestic cabotage trades, commencing from November 2001. Under 
the reformed regulatory framework the system of licenses was abolished, competition 
was introduced to the operation of the island routes and the participation of a large 
number of stakeholders, primarily local authorities was sanctioned through the revised 
composition of the Council of Coastal Shipping, the advisory body to the YEN 
Minister. In conjunction, the Regulatory Agency for Coastal Shipping (RHATE) was 
setup as a new body with the purpose of ensuring conditions of free and fair 
competition in the domestic coastal market. At the same time, there were
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discrepancies between Law 2932/01 and Regulation 3577/92 that were communicated 
by the EEA, the EEEP and the European Commission to YEN. Unlike the stipulations 
of the EU legislation, the fares were not liberalized and a maximum ferry vessel age 
of thirty years was established.
Subsequently, in spite of the advent of January 2004 the terms of liberalisation 
remained under negotiation between YEN, the European Commission, EEA, EEEP 
and the island communities. There was a heightening in the usage of EU material and 
immaterial resources by the respective actors in shaping the domestic political 
process. With respect to EU immaterial resources, the notions of ‘European interests’, 
‘European constraints’, ‘European economy’, ‘European competition’ and ‘European 
integration’ were utilized in legitimating ways by the domestic actors in advancing 
their interests. Similarly, material resources in the form of EU institutions and policy 
instruments were used by the coastal shipowner associations in accomplishing the 
completion of the liberalization of the coastal market. The coastal shipowner 
associations cited innumerable times the EU Directive 3577/92 in statements, 
speeches, declarations, memoranda and letters in seeking policy reform. Alongside 
meetings with YEN and the Greek government, direct contact was pursued by the 
EEA and the EEEP with officials in DG TREN, DG Competition and Greek MEPs 
and indirect channels of influence were utilized in the form of the European 
Community Shipowners’ Association (ECSA) and Interferry. Concurrently, there is 
evidence of mobilization by the island communities in safeguarding the provision of 
safe, reliable and affordable coastal services through the formation of island and inter­
island committees, public demonstrations and participation in European associations. 
Direct contact was established with DG TREN and Greek MEPs whilst indirect
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influence was pursued through the European associations of Insuleur and the Islands 
Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMRE). 
In addition, the European Commission initiated infringement proceedings against 
Greece for incorrect application of EU legislation on the liberalisation of coastal 
shipping.
The pressures from the European Commission for the complete liberalisation of 
coastal shipping, combined with the responses of the domestic actors were altering the 
state corporatist arrangement that prevailed for over three decades. The loosening of 
the preferential ties between YEN, and the coastal shipowners that held the operating 
licenses is witnessed. Rather, a more transparent arrangement is emerging, fostering 
market competition and institutionalizing the participation of a representative of the 
local communities in the CTC and the involvement of various levels of local 
government in the National Shipping Policy Council. Overall, in the case of coastal 
shipping, there is evidence of the loosening of the state corporatist arrangement 
encompassing the Greek state and the coastal shipowners. This is contingent on the 
unitary nature of the state, its inability to exercise ‘integrated leadership’, the 
incongruence between EU and domestic policies, the limited capacity of coastal 
shipowners for capital mobility and the presence of an influential factual veto point in 
the form of the island communities.
Maritime safety standards for ocean-going shipping were historically negotiated and 
agreed at the international level. In the post-war years, the International Maritime 
Organization emerged as the primary locus for the adoption of measures on the 
improvement of maritime safety and the prevention of marine pollution (Farthing
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1987, Mankabady 1986, Mankabady 1984, Simmonds 1963). Greece developed an 
influential position within the IMO which was attributed to membership in the IMO 
Council, the provision of technical expertise and the active attendance of internal 
meetings. In spite of its accomplishments, it was maintained that the effectiveness of 
the IMO was lessened by the inconsistent implementation of internationally agreed 
rules, the absence of an enforcement mechanism, slow decision-making and the 
endorsement of lowest common denominator outcomes (O’Neil 1998, Haralambides 
1998).
These shortcomings constituted ‘windows of opportunity’ for the European 
Commission to expand its competence in maritime safety regulation. Indeed, the high- 
profile maritime accidents involving the single-hull tankers Erika and Prestige were 
the catalyst for the European Commission to put forward proposals that on the one 
hand, sought to address the weaknesses of the international maritime safety 
framework, and on the other hand, questioned the primacy of the IMO. Amongst the 
proposed legislation, the accelerated phasing-out of single-hull tankers and the 
establishment of criminal sanctions for ship source pollution proved the most 
controversial for the Greek ocean-going shipowners (CEC Com 142/00, CEC Com 
105/03). In response there was extensive evidence of the use of EU material and 
immaterial resources by the Greek shipowners in seeking to halt or amend the EU 
initiatives. Immaterial resources were used in cognitive and strategic ways with the 
intention of altering the interpretation of the causes of maritime accidents that 
prevailed within the European Commission. Through letters, reports and technical 
research the UGS and the GSCC sought to persuade the European Commission 
officials, MEPs and representatives of EU national governments that the maritime
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accidents of the Erika and the Prestige were not caused by the employment of single­
hull tankers. Alternatively, attention was drawn to several aspects of maritime safety 
including the condition of the vessel, port-state control and the designation of places 
of refuge (Embiricos 2004, Lyras 2000). Likewise, attempts were made to highlight 
the counterproductive implications of the ship-source pollution measures on the 
competitiveness of the EU shipping industry and the attraction of new seafarers to the 
profession. It was maintained that the IMO was the appropriate level for the 
discussion, negotiation and endorsement of international maritime safety rules. In 
tandem, EU material resources were utilized by the UGS and the GSCC in cognitive 
and strategic ways. Direct contact was established with European Commission 
officials in DG TREN, DG Environment and DG Justice, MEPs, especially in the 
Transport Committee of the European Parliament.
Yet, it was maintained that the diverse national, party political and functional interests 
represented in the European Parliament complicated the favourable shaping of MEP 
decisions. In strengthening the communication of shipping interests to the European 
Parliament, the Intergroup on Maritime Affairs was established by a coalition of 
international shipping industry associations. Indeed, alongside the direct lobbying 
efforts of the Greek shipowners, the existing European and international associations 
were utilized as an indirect route to the EU institutions, notably ECSA, International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), Intertanko, Intercargo, and Baltic and International 
Maritime Council (BIMCO). With the exception of ECSA, these associations 
traditionally concentrated on IMO lobbying. Yet, in parallel to the growth of EU 
maritime transport regulation, there was evidence of the formulation of strategies and 
the political mobilization of the international industry associations at the EU level.
ECSA was the first port of call due to its accumulated understanding and experience 
of the EU political process. Despite the prominent position of the UGS within ECSA, 
the interests of the Greek shipowners were diluted as consensus was sought amongst 
the EU member state shipowners. ECSA was perceived by some stakeholders as 
being at times “too close to the European Commission”. In addition, the international 
industry associations were committing resources in directly engaging with the EU 
institutions, notably Intertanko hiring a Brussels-based political consultancy and 
BIMCO appointing the former EU Transport Commissioner Neil Kinnock as EU 
liaison officer. The competence of the Greek shipowners in lobbying the EU 
institutions was attributed to their ability to tap in the resources and networks of the 
international associations. Shipping interests maintain a long history of associability 
beyond the national level with a substantial degree of expertise and contacts. Yet, it 
was not in the tradition of the shipping industry to commit funds for lobbying efforts 
or public relations campaigns (Van Dyck 2005). Moreover, in pooling resources and 
avoiding duplication the international industry associations formed coalitions with the 
purpose of improving the effectiveness of EU lobbying. It was advocated that the 
UGS and the GSCC were integral to the co-ordination of the lobbying efforts of the 
international shipowner associations. Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the IMO 
was another source of influence and legitimacy in articulating the interests of the 
shipping industry.
As the EU muscled into a sector characterized by dense transnational activity, there is 
considerable evidence of the employment of EU material and immaterial resources by 
the Greek shipowners. As the EU expanded its competence in international maritime 
safety regulation there is evidence of the reinforcement of the state corporatist
relations between the Greek state and the ocean-going shipowners. Resting on 
exisiting interpretations of the domestic impact of European integration, it could be 
anticipated that state corporatism would be weakened as the Greek state articulated 
the interests of other domestic constituencies such as environmentalists or the general 
public. It was argued that European integration entailed the retreat of the Greek state 
and political parties, expanding the opportunity structure for other interest groups
(Kazakos 2004, Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, Ioakimidis 1996, Diamandouros
{
1994). Nonetheless, in response to the EU initiatives the relationships between YEN, 
UGS and the GSCC are tightened. The positions represented by the Greek 
government at the EU level are fully aligned with the interests of the Greek 
shipowners. There is continuous consultation between the two industry associations 
and YEN in the formulation of positions and the coordination of lobbying efforts. 
This is exemplified in European Council voting patterns with the Greek government 
finding itself marginalized among EU member states on several instances. Hence, the 
direction of domestic change is contingent on four conditions encompassing the 
unitary nature and low ‘integrated leadership’ of the Greek state, recognition of 
incongruence between the EU proposals and international rules and the ensuing 
employment of EU material and immaterial resources by the Greek shipowners. 
However, most importantly in reinforcing the state corporatist arrangement, the Greek 
ocean-going shipowners maintain structural power and were not counterbalanced by 
other influential domestic formal or factual veto points. If national or EU legislation 
were overly onerous compared to other jurisdictions, shipowners were in a position to 
withdraw their vessels from the Greek registry and transfer their operations to other 
international maritime centers. In conjunction, the structural power of the Greek 
ocean-going shipowners is compounded by a substantial contribution to the national
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economy in the form of foreign exchange income, employment, technology transfer 
and investment in a variety of industries.
The purpose of this dissertation was to analyse the domestic impact of the expanding 
EU competence in maritime transport on the state corporatist arrangement 
encompassing the Greek state and the shipowners. The concept of Europeanisation 
was employed as an interactive process involving the ‘top-down’ effects of European 
integration on domestic politics and the ‘bottom up’ usage of EU resources by 
domestic actors in shaping the domestic and EU political process. The arguments 
advanced are sustained by analysing the domestic impact of Europeanisation in two 
different segments of the Greek shipping industry, the ocean-going and coastal 
shipping sectors. Although there is evidence of the re-shaping of the relations between 
the Greek state and shipowners, it is argued that the domestic impact of 
Europeanisation was fragmented and differentiated across the ocean-going and coastal 
shipping sectors (Featherstone 2005, Featherstone and Kazamias 2001, Featherstone 
1998). More specifically, it is maintained that the direction of change is contingent on 
four conditions. Firstly, it is related to the nature of the Greek state and its ability to 
exercise ‘integrated leadership’. Secondly, domestic actors recognise and respond to 
the existence of incongruence between the EU initiatives and domestic or 
international policies. Thirdly, Greek shipowners have the capacity to exit from the 
domestic configuration through capital mobility. Fourthly, the existence of formal and 
factual veto points, alongside the shipowners that are influential in the domestic 
political process.
Chapter 8
Chapter 8: Conclusion
Against the background of EU expansion in maritime transport regulation, the 
purpose of this dissertation was to analyze the domestic impact of Europeanisation on 
the state corporatist arrangement between the Greek state and shipowners. According 
to existing accounts of the Europeanisation of domestic politics in the Southern EU 
member states, the loosening of state corporatism would be anticipated. However, the 
empirical evidence from the ocean-going and coastal shipping segments indicates that 
the domestic impact of Europeanisation is differentiated.
In the case of ocean-going shipping, the European Commission initiated measures on 
the accelerated phasing-out of single-hull tankers and the constitution of criminal 
sanctions for ship-source pollution that were opposed by the Greek shipowners and 
YEN. In the ensuing negotiations that spanned the national, European and 
international levels there is evidence of the reinforcement of state corporatism 
between the Greek state and the ocean-going shipowners. This was contingent on the 
unitary nature of the Greek state, the absence of integrated leadership, the 
incompatibility between EU and international policies, the capital mobility and related 
structural power of the ocean-going shipowners and the weakness of the other formal 
or factual veto points in the domestic political process.
In the case of coastal shipping, the European Commission pursued the abolition of 
cabotage restrictions in the costal shipping sectors across the EU member states. 
There was considerable political activity as the European Commission, the coastal 
shipowners, YEN and the island communities negotiated the terms of liberalisation. In
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this instance, the domestic impact of Europeanisation is associated to the loosening of 
state corporatism between the Greek state and coastal shipowners. In spite of the 
unitary nature of the state, the lack of ‘integrated leadership’ and the incongruence 
between the EU and domestic policies, the coastal shipowners were more embedded 
at the national level and contended with the island communities as an influential 
factual veto point.
Certainly, in the case of Greece, the prevailing view is that Europeanisation is 
reconfiguring the relations between the state and business interests. The majority of 
the respective literature points to the retreat of the state and political parties and the 
expansion of the opportunity structure to include a variety of interest groups and non- 
traditional political forces (Pagoulatos 2003, Mouzelis and Sotiropoulos 2002, 
Morlino 2002, Ioakimidis 1996). Nonetheless, the evidence presented in this 
dissertation supports the approach that the ‘disjointed corporatist’ arrangement of 
state-business relations refracts the process of Europeanisation, spawning a 
fragmented and asymmetric domestic impact (Featherstone 2005, Featherstone and 
Kazamias 2001, Lavdas 1997). As the EU expanded its competence in maritime 
transport regulation, there was evidence of the loosening of state corporatism in 
coastal shipping, whereas the relations between the Greek state and the shipowners 
were reinforced in ocean-going shipping.
Moreover, some broader observations can be made on the patterns of change and 
continuity with respect to the dominance of the political parties and the autonomy of 
local political forces (Featherstone 2005, Sotiropoulos 2004, Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 
2002, Sotiropoulos 1993). National policies on ocean-going and coastal shipping
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remained consistent and continuous in spite of a succession of different governments 
in the post-authoritarian years. The leading political parties PASOK and New 
Democracy supported on the one hand, the repatriation and retainment of ocean-going 
shipowners and on the other hand, the cabotage restrictions and ‘system of licenses’ in 
coastal shipping. Although the employment and promotion procedures in YEN and 
the Hellenic Coast Guard were penetrated by party politics, there was an absence of 
evidence that national shipping policies were subject to government alternations and 
party affiliations. Largely insulated from party politics, the formulation of national 
shipping policy was a technocratic process involving experts from YEN, the Hellenic 
Chamber of Shipping and the Greek shipping companies. In addition, this knowledge 
and expertise underscored Greece’s influential position in the IMO fora, providing an 
untypical example of a small country holding disproportionate negotiating power in 
an international organisation. Yet again, the continuity in national shipping policies 
can be primarily attributed to structural power and capital mobility of the Greek 
shipowners, shaping the state corporatist arrangement in their favour.
Furthermore, the coastal shipping case study draws attention to influential political 
position of the island communities within the state corporatist arrangement. By and 
large, Greek civil society and local politics are theorised in the literature as being 
penetrated by party politics and economic interests (Sotriropoulos 2004, Mouzelis and 
Pagoulatos 2002, Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002). As presented in the respective case 
study, there is evidence of local political autonomy and political mobilization that was 
divorced from political parties and central government. Throughout the period under 
investigation, the island communities sought to ensure the provision of cost-effective 
and reliable transport services. This was illustrated with their initiative of establishing
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people-based companies in the early 1970s and their active participation and 
contribution to the negotiating process on the liberalisation of the cabotage trades.
The evidence collected as part of this dissertation demonstrates that the process of 
Europeanisation is reshaping the domestic political arrangement in relation to Greek 
shipping. The direction of this change though is not conclusive and is contingent on a 
number of identified conditions. Future research needs to test the explanatory value of 
these conditions against the shipping segments of other member states or industry 
segments in Greece that may share similar characteristics, especially the capital 
mobility of the business interests. In addition, a comparative study between the ocean­
going segments of Greece and Norway (a non-EU member state with a comparable 
shipping fleet) could be instructive in distinguishing the impact of Europeanisation 
from other global or domestic sources of political change.
With respect to Greek comparative politics, this dissertation sought to collect 
empirical data and provide a theoretical framework for understanding the state 
business relations in the shipping sector. In spite of the national significance of the 
ocean-going and coastal shipping segments, the existing literature has afforded 
limited attention to the politics of Greek shipping. This dissertation has attempted to 
remedy this, although there is further scope for an in depth analysis and theorization 
of the relations between the Greek state and the shipowners. The concept of state 
corporatism was put forward as the most appropriate interpretation of the empirical 
findings, corroborating and elaborating upon Lavdas (1997) brief political analysis of 
this industry segment. However, additional research should be conducted in testing
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this conceptualization against theoretical alternatives in the literature on state-business 
relations.
Furthermore, the empirical case studies unearthed a number of puzzles that depart 
from the established interpretation of the Greek political process. Primarily in relation 
to ocean-going shipping and increasingly in coastal shipping, technocratic institutions 
and technical experts influence the agenda and largely shape the policy outcomes. The 
role of expertise in Greek politics has received attention only in recent years, notably 
Ladi’s (2005, 2004) studies on constitutional reform and environmental policy 
transfer. The respective concepts could be applied in establishing the existing or 
increasing importance of experts in shipping policy reform against the broader themes 
of Europeanisation and modernization. At the same time, the apparent insulation of 
shipping from party politics provides a challenge to the prevailing conceptualization 
of the Greek state as ‘colossus with feet of clay’ penetrated and instrumentalised by 
party politics. (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, Sotiropoulos 1993, Mouzelis 1990). 
As this is attributed to the capital mobility of the ocean-going shipowners, future 
research can test shipping’s apparent ‘exceptionalism’ in comparison to other industry 
segments and policy fields. Moreover, the political mobilization of the island 
communities highlights the significance of territorial politics in the coastal shipping 
political configuration. This indicates the presence and involvement of overlooked 
political forces that are not necessarily dominated by the state or the incumbent 
political party (Morlino 2005, Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002). There could be scope 
for researching the political engagement of regional or local communities across other 
industries and policy issues (Paraskevopoulos 2001, 1998). Indeed, these are areas
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that merit further investigation and may open new avenues for debate in Greek 
comparative politics.
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